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Abstract
Human beings, at least most of us, want to feel and be safe. This is one of the fundamental
needs of an organism. However, several of the processes and machines used in current
societies introduce hazards that could and can harm us causing unnecessary pain and
financial losses. Still, our modern societies need these processes and machines to operate so
we cannot really be without them. Fortunately, there are ways to reduce risks introduced
by systems around us to a tolerable level.
This thesis considers the design and development of safety-related systems and safety-
related parts of control systems referred to as functional safety systems. These systems
implement safety functions that reduce risks introduced by machines, processes, and other
systems. That is, the functions affect the system under control so that the likelihood of
occurrence or severity of consequences are reduced.
The design and development of safety systems is typically regulated by laws and standards.
This increases the cost of safety system development and therefore eventually also the
product in which it is incorporated. However, from a manufacturer viewpoint, safety in
all its forms is also a potential asset for the companies developing, producing, and selling
the systems. An increase in efficiency to develop and design safety systems offers the
potential for a larger margin or increased sales due to the reduced price.
One way to support design and development efficiency is to apply good design methods
and solutions in form of design patterns. In this thesis, a design pattern language for the
development and design of functional safety systems is introduced. The purpose of the
language is to support the designers in their task to design and implement safety functions
in machines and processes. The language considers various aspects of the development
and design of safety systems starting from the initial phases of hazard and risk analysis,
followed by the selection of the hazard and risk reduction methods, and concluding with
the hardware and software structure, functionality, and design principles considerations.
Finally, a functional safety system may, and often does, co-exist and co-operate with a
control system. Therefore, a part of the pattern language takes this aspect into account.
To compile the design pattern language and the included patterns a design science research
approach complemented with grounded theory approach is applied The data to identify
the patterns is collected from literature, personal experience, interviews, and discussions
with industry representatives and people engaged with the design or use of systems
including safety systems or functionality. Like the patterns have evolved during the
research, so has the approach to identify, document, and process the patterns.
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1 Introduction
Safety is a centric aspects of human behaviour including the design and development of
systems. Thus, it is appropriate to start with thoughts on safety in general to have the
background set up for the suggested outcome of the thesis.
1.1 A Craving for Safety
In Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1943) safety is the second most important need
an organism, that is, also a human, thrives to have fulfilled. According to Maslow, only
physiological needs are considered having a higher priority in the need hierarchy. That
is, right after the physiological needs have been gratified, the seek to fulfil the need for
safety is established. From the psychology perspective, safety or the seek to feel safe has
a high influence in human behaviour.
In the 19th century and even at the beginning of the 20th century, bad working conditions
and methods, young and inexperienced workers, long working days, and other occupational
problems combined with machinery were factors in several accidents (Eves, 2014, chap.
1-2) (Rosner and Markowitz, 1987, p. xi). In the United States alone, a large number
of people died or were injured in machinery related accidents during this era (Rosner
and Markowitz, 1987, p. xii). For instance, threshers contained, among other potential
hazard sources, exposed belt drives (Wendel, 2005, p. 218) (Pripps and Morland, 1992,
cover page) introducing nip points (OSHA, 2007, p. 8) that were capable of causing harm
with consequences resulting from minor injury to death.
The lack of safety aspect in the history of machines can also be seen in safety regulations.
According to Macdonald, the regulations in the United Kingdom considering machines
and their use in workplaces did not initially take safety directly into account. The early
regulations in the United Kingdom from 1802 considered health and welfare instead of
safety. It was as late as 1842 the first safety provisions appeared in UK regulations
requiring, for instance, ‘fencing of certain type of machines’. (Macdonald, 2004, p. 25).
In the 20th century, the awareness and willingness to take safety aspect into consideration
increased. For instance, a steep increase of accident related costs due to new accident
‘compensation laws and tighter employers’ liability’ was a major driver for this development
in the United States in the early 20th century (Aldrich, 2001, sec. Employers Become
Interested in Safety). Later administrative parties, such as Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (USA), Health and Safety Executive (UK), and National Institute
of Occupational Safety and Health (Japan), appeared to improve occupational safety and
health including safety of machinery. Also, regulation considering the safety of machinery
emerged including, among others (HSE, 1956; Machinery directive, 2006; OSHA, 1996).
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1.2 Viewpoints on Safety
In this thesis, the focus is on machinery and process systems and the development of such
systems. Within the engineering discipline, in which devices, machines, and systems are
designed, safety can be considered from different viewpoints. At least the following types
of safety can be considered:
• Perceived safety
• Substantive safety
• Normative safety
The perceived type of safety has the strongest relation to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs.
This type of safety is characterized by how people feel about their situation (Ericson,
2011, p. 76) (Bartneck et al., 2009, p. 339 ). Do they feel or think they are threatened
or not? Perceived safety may relate to, for instance, hostile activity in neighbouring
countries, crime rate, the initial consideration of the safety of a vehicle or a machine, or,
as stated by Bartneck et al. (2009, p. 76), the level of comfort when interacting with a
robot. Perceived safety is something a product designer or manufacturer should seek to
fulfil as it has an effect when people determine, for instance, whether or not they want to
use or purchase a product or a machine. Perceived safety potentially steers the decisions
and behaviour of humans, but this type of safety has little value when the safety of a
product or machine is assessed against laws and regulations.
The substantive type of safety takes neither into account whether people feel safe and
secure, nor considers if an engineered system has been developed according to the appli-
cable laws, regulations, or standards. Instead, substantive or objective safety only takes
into account the actual or expected safety performance of the subject under consideration
(Ericson, 2011, p. 339) (Stein and Neuman, 2007, p. 8). That is, has the system under
consideration produced harm and if so, how severely and how often. The objective form
of safety can in some cases be considered a valid input for safety system development.
For instance, according to the Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable
electronic safety-related systems (IEC 61508), the compliance of an element of a safety-
related system with a required Safety Integrity Level (SIL) can be demonstrated, under
certain conditions, with documented and justified records, indication sufficient capability
of the element in existing applications (IEC 61508-2, 2010, sec. 7.4.2.2 c).
The normative type of safety considers whether or not a system meets the standards
applicable in its design (Ericson, 2011, p. 339). That is, if one is able to justify that a
system, its development process, functionality, and other assessed aspects conform to
the applicable standards, directives, and laws, the system can be considered safe. In the
context of this thesis, this type of safety is likely the most interesting from the functional
safety system development viewpoint as functional safety systems are typically developed
to conform with the normative safety approach. That is, laws, regulations, and standards
define the requirements, development processes, methods, and techniques related to the
functional safety system development. Such standards include, among others, (IEC 61508,
2010) and (ISO 13849-1, 2015).
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1.3 Viewpoints to Design
Design is both an activity and an outcome. The purpose of an activity of design is to
produce a design that meets its requirements and defined boundaries. These aspects of
design can be defined as follows (Merriam-Webster, 2016):
(noun) : the way something has been made : the way the parts of something
(such as a building, machine, book, etc.) are formed and arranged for a
particular use, effect, etc.
(verb) to plan and make decisions about (something that is being built or
created) : to create the plans, drawings, etc., that show how (something) will
be made
A variety of methods and approaches to design systems and objects have been developed
and documented. Jones lists design methods from traditional ones such as craft evolu-
tion and design-by-drawing (Jones, 1974, chap. 2) to more modern methods including
interviewing users, brainstorming, interaction matrix, checklists, and systems engineering
(Jones, 1974, part 2).
Building on this view, individual methods can be seen and used as parts of larger
development processes and system life cycle models, including, but not limited to: waterfall
model (Royce, 1970), spiral model (Boehm, 1986) (Kossiakoff et al., 2011, p. 103, 370),
V-model (Forsberg and Mooz, 1992, cited by Buede, 2011, p. 10) (Stevens et al., 1998,
sec. 6.4), agile approaches such as Scrum (Schwaber, 1995), and Rapid Object-Orientated
Process for Embedded Systems (Douglass, 1999, chap. 4).
Each time a new design is produced or a problem related to a design is solved, resources
are consumed, for instance, in the form of designers’ time. Reuse of design artifacts, such
as software components and design solutions, can potentially increase the productivity
and efficiency of design activities (Boehm, 1999). Design patterns provide a potential way
to document solutions and promote design artefact reuse at the solution and approach
levels. The effect of patterns can be further enhanced by forming the patterns into a
whole referred to as a pattern language.
1.4 Objectives and Scope
1.4.1 Objectives
The objective of this thesis is to compile, as well as to document and assess the research
process resulting, a pattern language for the development process of safety systems to
provide support for developers in their design task in the context of normative safety. In
that context, a designer of a safety system may encounter at least the following situations
in which support could enhance design performance.
An inexperienced designer potentially benefits from support considering the whole de-
velopment process. For such a designer, solutions illustrating centric design decisions
throughout the development process of the system are potentially beneficial. The related
and potentially sequential solutions described in the language build a framework for the
safety system development.
A designer of any experience level will likely encounter problems for which they have
no direct solutions or solution models available as result of their experience. It is still
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likely that solutions for the problem in hand have already been considered and applied
in similar contexts. Such solutions are typically able to provide at least a starting point
when the actual problem in the considered context is being solved.
The development of safety systems is regulated by standards such as (ISO 13849-1, 2015),
(IEC 61508, 2010), and Machinery directive (Machinery directive, 2006). The regulations
and the standards help the development process by defining methods, techniques, and
requirements considering the development process and the produced safety systems.
However, there is a gap between the requirements given by the standards and the final
designs that are supposed to fulfil these requirements. Providing existing solutions to
operationalize the standards and their requirements into a working design could have a
potential impact on the performance of a designer.
The awareness that a solution has been successfully applied in safety systems can support
making a design decision of applying the solution again. The atmosphere of the safety
system standards may appear discouraging to new and novel solutions as well-tried
components and traditional methods and languages are typically recommended. Therefore,
the awareness that a (novel) solution has been applied by other companies and designers
can support a designer to apply the solution even if it may initially appear to conflict
with a standard or regulation. This approach can also support one to assess whether or
not a solution or an approach can be seen fit from a standard or regulation viewpoint.
The objective of completing the pattern language introduced in this thesis is to concretize
tacit knowledge into an explicit format. Designers have applied certain solutions over and
over again, but they may not have noticed it and even if they had, the solution has not
been explicitly documented anywhere. The tacit knowledge can also exist in the designs
where it resides potentially in an implicit format. That is, the designer has not explicitly
marked, justified, or rationalized the solution used to solve a certain problem.
1.4.2 Research Questions
The research questions of this thesis are:
RQ1 How can design patterns support the development of functional safety
systems?
RQ2 Is there a set of commonly applied solutions for functional safety system
designs utilized and known by domain experts and practitioners? Which
topic categories do the solutions contribute and belong to? What purposes do the
solutions serve?
RQ3 How do the design patterns for functional safety system development
relate to each other? What kind of whole emerges from the identified design
patterns? What kind of relationships can be used to describe the relations between
the design patterns?
RQ4 How to document emerging solution models and approaches applied in
the field of functional safety system engineering into a design pattern
format? Does the design pattern format fit to document the commonly known
solutions? Is there a need for a specialized format or elements to be used for the
solutions in the functional safety system domain?
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1.4.3 Scope
This thesis considers design patterns for functional safety system design and development
in the domains of machinery and process systems. The domain of machinery includes both
mobile and stationary machines such as harvesters, passenger hoists, guillotine shears,
and benders. The domain of process systems includes, among others, paper machines
and distillation processes. Both domains consider machines that potentially introduce
hazard sources to the users and other people. The thesis excludes hand-held machines
and machine-like objects that are not considered machines according to the Machinery
Directive (Machinery directive, 2006).
IEC 61508 and EN ISO 13849-1 standards provide the background for the patterns. That
is, several, but not all of the known uses for the patterns have been discovered from
systems developed according to either or both of the standards. However, it should be
noted that application of some or all of the the patterns does not necessarily result in
compliance with the mentioned standards as such. These standards are widely applied
in the field of functional safety system development and the standards are applicable
to many types of machines. The patterns could be potentially beneficial and applicable
outside these standards as well.
A common denominator of the systems in the scope of this thesis is the presence of a
safe state (Eloranta et al., 2014, p. 179). In a safe state, the ability of a system to
produce harm is minimized. In many cases, considering the systems in the scope the safe
state is a halted or de-energized state. That is, there is no movement or active operation.
For some systems, such a state does not exist. For instance, for the winglets of a flying
aeroplane, there is no safe state where they could be taken for an undefined period of
time.
1.4.4 Related Work
Figure 1.1 illustrates the positioning of the work in the context of the design patterns
and pattern languages. This thesis primarily considers the subjects marked in grey in
the figure, that is, design patterns on safety systems and software-based safety functions.
The remainder of this subsection outlines the work on the topics related to this thesis.
As discussed in [P1], design patterns have gained popularity in the domain of software
engineering. The works in this domain cover, for example, object-oriented software
(Freeman et al., 2004; Gamma et al., 1995), pattern-oriented architecture (Buschmann
et al., 1996; Schmidt et al., 2000), enterprise applications (Fowler, 2002; Hohpe and
Woolf, 2003), and service-oriented architecture (Erl, 2009). The mentioned works focus
on software engineering from several aspects. The patterns are most likely not written
with safety systems in mind, but one is still free to apply the patterns also in the safety
system domain if found applicable.
The domains and subjects of distributed control systems, and fault tolerance and reliability
are, in a natural way, related to the functional safety systems. Machines and processes
controlled by distributed control systems are often potential targets for functional safety
systems as well. In such a case, a (distributed) control system controls and operates a
machine or a system that may introduce hazards to the users of the system. For instance,
a guillotine shear introduces a shearing hazard. Thus, a safety system alongside the
control system can be used to mitigate the risk related to the hazard. A pattern language
by Eloranta et al. (2014) considers distributed control systems mainly from the software
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Figure 1.1: The positioning of the patterns considered in the dissertation
and architecture points of view. The language includes some patterns taking a stand on
safety aspects. These patterns such as Safe state and Limp Home provide an anchoring
point for the extended safety system and safety function patterns presented in this thesis.
Fault tolerance and reliability are areas from which functional safety systems benefit.
Safety systems should be reliable and fault tolerant. In such a case they can produce
correct service or operation even when a fault escalates into an error (Avizienis et al.,
2004). Another approach to react on the identified faults and errors is to fail safely. In this
approach, a system is taken into a safe state when an error is detected (Krishnamurthy
and Saran, 2007, p. 16). Patterns and pattern languages by, for instance, Hanmer
(2007), Douglass (1999), Armoush (2010) in his dissertation, Alho and Rauhamäki (In
press), and Preschern et al. (2015) present patterns for safety-related system design and
development. However, in the mentioned design patterns and pattern languages, the
focus is on reliability, dependability, and fault tolerance aspects such as redundancy and
diversity as well as achievement of these properties with architectural solutions.
Fault tolerance can also be seen from the viewpoint of the resilience of a system. Strigini
discusses the concept of resilience and provides multiple interpretations. According to
Strigini, in the context of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) systems,
traditional approaches on fault tolerance and dependability work well in closed and
unchanged systems, whereas resilience approach targets to achieve dependability in open,
interconnected and changing systems. The concept of resilience highlights flexibility and
management of the unexpected to achieve fault tolerance. (Strigini, 2012, p. 5). In
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recent discussion occurring in social media, Friedrichsen defines resilience as the ability
of a system to recover from erroneous states. He also highlights the availability of the
considered system to be achieved by minimizing Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) instead
of maximising Mean Time To Fail (MTTF) in context of distributed systems. Friedrichsen
approaches resilience from a design pattern perspective. His pattern language introduces
patterns to identify errors, restrict their effect, and recover from the errors and failures
identified. (Friedrichsen, 2014, 2016) Friedrichsen’s patterns can be seen to support the
goals of a safety-related system and therefore could be considered providing additional
insight also in context of the pattern language presented in this thesis.
In addition to fault tolerance and distributed control, control systems, control engineering,
and real-time properties also relate to the work of this thesis. Real-time aspects in safety
system development and design emerge from the purpose of a safety function. A safety
function executed too late does not achieve its purpose. Works by Douglass (2003), Gomaa
(2016, chap. 11), and Zalewski (2001) introduce design patterns for real-time software.
Real-time aspects are also present in control systems that implement the algorithms and
functions specified by control engineering. Patterns and their usage for control systems
and control engineering have been proposed in (Pont, 2001; Sanz and Zalewski, 2003;
Zalewski, 2001).
Development process patterns for the IEC 61508-3 (IEC 61508, 2010) based safety system
engineering have been proposed by Koskinen et al. (2012). The patterns consider applying
and complying with the development process defined in the standard, but lack suggestions
for the structural and functional aspects of the safety functions. However, these aspects
are considered by (Preschern et al., 2013) in the light of the IEC 61508. The approach
utilizes the concept of tactic defined as a ‘design decision that influences the achievement
of a quality attribute response’ (Bass et al., 2012, p. 70).
The scope of this thesis does not cover how patterns are applied in a development process,
and neither does it consider any tool support. Instead, Vepsäläinen has studied modelling
and tool support of design patterns (Vepsäläinen, 2015, p. 24) and (Vepsäläinen and
Kuikka, 2014) and summarized this work also in [P2]. In addition, Preschern et al. (2014)
have studied and compared a set of pattern-based approaches and pattern languages used
(or proposed to be used) in the design process of safety systems .
1.5 Research Methodology
The research methodology followed in this thesis integrates aspects from both design
science research and grounded theory. The design science research methodology is
considered as a framework for the whole research to compile and validate a pattern
language and the included patterns. The grounded theory methodology is applied within
the framework to produce design pattern artifacts, categorize them, and identify pattern
relations for the pattern language.
Design science research is a research methodology applied in information systems and
information technology. The methodology is described, for instance, by Hevner and
Chatterjee (2010); Hevner et al. (2004); Kuechler and Vaishnavi (2008); March and Storey
(2008). The foundation of design science lays in the engineering and science of artificial
(Simon, 1996, cited by Hevner et al., 2004). Design science is essentially a problem-solving
paradigm, which is based on designing, building, and applying artifacts. Design science
produces knowledge and understanding about a problem through building and applying an
artifact that is produced as a part of the research. (Hevner et al., 2004). These artifacts,
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resembling human-made constructs (Simon, 1996, cited by Hevner and Chatterjee, 2010),
can be constructs, models, methods, instantiations, and better design theories (Hevner
and Chatterjee, 2010, p. 6).
Building and evaluating the artifacts are the basic activities of design science. The building
phase produces an artifact, the performance of which is measured in the evaluation phase
to judge the suitability of the artifact (March and Smith, 1995). The framework of the
design science research process as extended by Kuechler and Vaishnavi (2008) includes
the following phases as described by Piirainen and Gonzalez (2013).
1. problem awareness
2. finding suggested solutions
3. solution artifact development and testing
4. artifact performance evaluation
5. conclusions and result communication
In this thesis, a design science approach has been applied to construct design patterns
and a pattern language as the artifacts considered in design science research. A design
pattern approach (see Chapter 3) forms a framework in which the research results are
realized and documented. In addition to a usability view of design patterns, a scientific
view of design science and grounded theory has been exploited. An evolving pattern
mining process has been applied through the research (see Section 5.2 for the initial, 6.2
for an evolved, and 7.2 for the final pattern mining approach). The following list maps
the research actions carried out for this thesis to the design science research phases listed
above.
1. The first phase of the research process was realized partially in research projects
considering control system and safety-critical software development. This work
provided insights into the problem area of safety-critical software and control system
development. Phase one continued in the actual pattern research phase through
seeking problems from standards, literature, and discussions and interviews with
industry representatives.
2. Phase two co-occurred partly with phase one. The material acquired in the previous
phase also contributed to identifying suggested solutions. Drafts of the solutions
were constructed as design pattern draft artifacts.
3. In phase three, the solutions were further developed with feedback from the pattern
community, industry, and colleagues. In this phase, another artifact, namely the
pattern language, was constructed and developed.
4. In the context of the thesis, the fourth phase can be seen as realized in a set of
industry representative interviews and workshops, where the developed artifacts
were identified, discussed, criticised, and enhanced. The evaluation of independent
pattern artifacts was gained in this phase by identifying known uses for the patterns.
5. The fifth phase of the research is realized in this thesis where the results are
communicated and concluded.
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Grounded theory is a qualitative research method that has it roots in social sciences
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p. 1). Research applying grounded theory does not have to
begin with questions and hypotheses (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p. 6&33). Instead, the
theories and hypotheses should come from data regarding the subject under research
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p. 2&3). The theories emerge from data through coding,
categorization, and their relations, which are identified during data analysis (Glaser and
Strauss, 1967, chap. V) According to Hentrich et al. (2015) Glaserian grounded theory
can be applied to pattern mining. Hentrich et al. also propose a process in which the
concepts of grounded theory are mapped into a pattern mining process.
In the context of this thesis, the ideas of grounded theory have been primarily applied
to identify individual patterns. In the final pattern mining process (see Section 7.2)
data was collected from companies without a hypothesis. Although the interviews were
semi-structured with a prepared set of questions, no presumption on the results was
(intentionally) made, excluding the situations where pre-existing design pattern ideas
were shown to the interviewees. The researchers participated in the interviews in the role
of interviewers who initiated the discussion and asked prepared questions and follow-up
questions reacting and reflecting on the initial answers. The purpose of this was to make
the interview a conversational event and to enable adaptation to the expertise of the
interviewees.
The interviews did not strictly follow the process described in (Hentrich et al., 2015).
The interview questions were not directed to probe dedicated parts of patterns. Instead,
the solutions and approaches applied were the primary subjects of interest although
the underlying problems, consequences, forces, and relations between the solutions were
documented if any were discovered in the interviews.
After the collection phase, the data was analysed to find potential pattern candidates
and new known uses for the existing patterns and pattern candidates. This part of the
process followed the analysis phase described by Hentrich et al. (2015) rather closely.
Interesting findings were formed into sections of patterns including problem, solution,
force, or consequence statements, which resembled the codes in the grounded theory. A
set of codes produced a concept which emerged in the form of a pattern. Typically, some
parts of the patterns needed to be augmented by the researchers to produce a complete
pattern as some aspects of the patterns were not always brought up during the interviews.
Nevertheless, new patterns emerged as a result of the analysis and subsequent discussions
with other industry representatives. Finally, the categories of grounded theory emerged
in the form of a pattern language and categorization in the final phases of the research,
thus giving the basis for answering the research questions one, two, and three. The fourth
research question (of the appropriate pattern format) will be solved based on the various
phases of the research process, outlined next in connection with a discussion on design
science and grounded theory.
1.6 Contributions
The scientific contribution of this thesis is the following:
Rationale for the Usage of Design Patterns in the Engineering of Safety Sys-
tems This contribution describes potential benefits of the application and usage of
design patterns in the context of safety system development. Some of the benefits can
be considered applicable to design patterns in general and regardless of the application
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domain. Others, such as the possibility to bridge the gap between the requirements given
by standards and their fulfilment in the designs, are more likely to provide benefit in the
safety system domain. This contribution is presented in [P1] and [P2] and summarized in
Chapter 4.
A Collection of Design Patterns for the Safety System Domain This contribu-
tion presents the design patterns and pattern candidates to be used and applied in the
design and development of safety systems. The patterns target specifically machinery
and process control systems, but they can also be applied in other domains if the context
is considered sufficiently similar. The patterns have been collected using the pattern
mining processes described in sections 5.2, 6.2, and 7.2. The contribution is presented in
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 and their respective publications [P3]...[P8] and (Rauhamäki and
Vepsäläinen, 2016).
A Pattern Language for Safety System Development This contribution forms a
pattern language of the aforementioned pattern collection. Individual patterns are useful
for solving individual problems. However, a pattern may also introduce a set of new
problems or benefit from the application or existence of other patterns. Therefore, an
illustration of the pattern language emerging from the relations between the individual
patterns has been compiled. The pattern language can help a user of the patterns to
navigate through the patterns, for instance, to see alternative solutions and consider next
patterns. The pattern language is compiled in Chapters 5, 6, and 7.
Categorization of the Patterns and Their Respective Solutions for Safety
System Development This contribution is targeted to serve users of the pattern
collection. Categorising the patterns according to their topic and purpose helps the users
to identify potentially suitable patterns for the problem in hand more quickly as there is
supplemental information available on the patterns other than their names. On the other
hand, categorizing according to the purpose of the patterns helps to identify potentially
suitable patterns to achieve a certain outcome by applying a pattern. The categorizations
are described and shown in Chapters 5, 6, and 7.
1.7 Organization of the Thesis
The thesis is organized as a retrospective presenting the research process parts and results
obtained in the different parts of the process. The purpose of this is to illustrate the
evolution of the research approach, especially in terms of the applied pattern mining
process.
The thesis is organized into three main parts: background, result, and discussion and
conclusion chapters. The background parts consist of Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2
introduces the concepts of safety and safety systems and discusses the development of
functional safety systems. Chapter 3 provides an introduction to design patterns and
pattern languages. The chapter also considers the representation of patterns in general
and how they are formatted in this thesis. Table 1.1 summarizes the publications included
in this thesis and the chapters of this thesis where they are discussed.
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Table 1.1: The included publications and their appearance and use in the thesis.
Publications Thesis Chapter
[P1] and [P2] 4: On Design Patterns Supporting Safety System De-velopment
[P8] and [P3] 5: Control Systems, Safety Systems, and Their Co-existence
[P4], [P5], [P6], and [P7] 6: Hazard Management Process and Risk Reduction
[P3], [P5], [P7], and [P8] 7: Functional Safety System Development
Chapter 4 summarizes the potential benefits of applying design patterns in functional
safety system development and introduces and justifies the structure of the result chapters.
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 present the main contributions of the thesis. These chapters define
the pattern language and pattern categorization in the related publications. Chapter 5
summarizes patterns for control and safety system development and co-existence. Chapter
6 summarizes the patterns considering a hazard management process. The patterns
in this section discuss the development process of a safety system, introduce risk and
hazard mitigation methods, and consider the human role in the safety system operation.
Chapter 7 summarizes patterns considering the design and development of functional
safety systems and augment the pattern categories introduced especially in Chapter 5.
Chapter 8 revisits the research questions and discusses both the validity of the research
and the potential future work possibilities in terms of open questions.

2 Functional Safety Systems and
Their Engineering
This chapter provides backgrounds to safety, safety(-related) systems, and their engineering.
Especially the engineering part differs to some extend from the development of a system
that has no specific requirements regarding safety.
2.1 Definitions and Terms on Safety Concepts
As the scope of this thesis is on machinery and process applications and their normative
safety, the viewpoint to the concepts and definition is adopted from normative safety,
which, as illustrated in Section 1.2, differs from perceived and substantive viewpoints by
its focus in standards and regulations.
In the context of this thesis safety is: ‘freedom from unacceptable risk’ (IEC 61508-4,
2010, sec. 3.1.11), where risk is the: combination of the ‘probability of occurrence of
harm and the severity of that harm’ (IEC 61508-4, 2010, sec. 3.1.6) and harm is a
‘physical injury or damage to the health or property or the environment’ (IEC 61508-4,
2010, sec. 3.1.1).
The definition of risk includes the attribute unacceptable. Consequently, there exists a
tolerable risk, which is defined as a: ‘risk which is accepted in a given context based on
the current values of society’ (IEC 61508-4, 2010, sec. 3.1.7). This indicates that, in some
cases, a residual risk remains regardless of the actions taken to mitigate the risk. For
instance, modern cars introduce many approaches to mitigate the risk of severe injury or
death in a car accident, but these approaches do not completely remove the risk. Still,
most of the people consider the risk tolerable and use cars in traffic.
In summary, to achieve safety one needs to mitigate risks into an acceptable level by
affecting either the likelihood of occurrence or the severity of harm. From the perceived
safety viewpoint, the sense or feeling of an acceptable risk could suffice. However, from
the normative safety viewpoint, there needs to be justified indication that risks have been
mitigated to an acceptable level conforming to the relevant regulation.
2.2 Risk Mitigation Approaches
In practice, there are several ways to achieve reduction of a risk. However, regardless of
the selected mitigation approach, the risks need to be known, and only then can they be
justifiably mitigated.
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Figure 2.1: Hierarchy of controls. Illustration inspired by (Manuele, 2005; Nix, 2011).
The hierarchy of controls introduces the basic approaches to risk mitigation. Figure
2.1 illustrates the approaches indicating the effectiveness of the approach, the way the
risk is reduced, and the main persons and/or roles involved to enable the success of the
approach.
The most effective way to reduce risk related to a machine, process and their functions
and operation is to apply inherently safer design, that is, to eliminate or substitute the
hazard(s) under consideration. This approach
seeks to remove the hazard at the source, as opposed to accepting the hazard
and attempting to mitigate the effects (Center for Chemical Process Safety,
2012, p. 123).
From the system manufacturer point of view, this approach is beneficial as the manufac-
turer has a high level of control over the risk mitigation. Regardless,
an inherently safer process should not, however, be considered “inherently
safe” or “absolutely safe.” While implementing inherently safer concepts will
move a process in the direction of reduced risk, it will not remove all risks.
(Center for Chemical Process Safety, 2012, p. 128)
Not all machines and processes can be made inherently sufficiently safe by eliminating
or substituting hazards. In such cases, engineering controls also known as protective
measures as defined in (ISO 12100:2010, 2010, sec. 3.19), can be applied to provide
additional risk mitigation to make the risks tolerable. The protective measures include
both passive and active methods of reducing the risk. In this thesis, we primarily consider
active protective measures. In a protective measure approach, the considered hazard
remains in a system, and some of the control over the mitigation is transferred from the
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system designer or manufacturer to the user of the system. For instance, engineering
controls such as guards and Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic (E/E/PE)
safety-related systems need to be maintained and inspected periodically to ensure their
desired operation.
Finally, risk can be mitigated by administrative controls and Personal Protective Equip-
ment (PPE). In these approaches, the control over risk mitigation is effectively transferred
from a designer of a system to the users and user organizations of the system. Conse-
quently, the effectiveness of these controls are lower compared to inherently safer design
and engineering controls, as the administrative controls and PPE affect a smaller number
of people. For instance, training only affects the ones who have been given the training
(although this knowledge can be shared), and PPE only affects the ones who wear the
required PPE.
2.3 Functional Safety Systems
Functional safety is one, but not the only, way to achieve the aforementioned state of
safety. According to IEC, functional safety is:
the part of the overall safety that depends on a system or equipment operating
correctly in response to its inputs and the detection of a potentially dangerous
condition resulting in the activation of a protective or corrective device or
mechanism to prevent hazardous events arising or providing mitigation to
reduce the fight consequence of the hazardous event. (IEC, 2015)
This thesis considers the development and design of safety-related systems and safety-
related parts of control systems that are used to implement safety functions with
the purpose of achieving functional safety. The terms are given in (IEC 61508-4, 2010)
and (ISO 13849-1, 2015) respectively with the following definitions:
safety-related system: designated system that both implements the re-
quired safety functions necessary to achieve or maintain a safe state for the
Equipment Under Control (EUC); and is intended to achieve, on its own or
with other E/E/PE safety-related systems and other risk reduction measures,
the necessary safety integrity for the required safety functions (IEC 61508-4,
2010, sec. 3.4.1)
safety-related part of a control system: part of a control system that
responds to safety-related input signals and generates safety-related output
signals (ISO 13849-1, 2015, sec. 3.1.1)
For consistency reasons regarding the publications included in this thesis, the terms are
combined under the functional safety system and safety system terms. That is, in
this thesis, functional safety system is considered to be a system conforming to and
implementing one or both of the above definitions.
A functional safety system is, as it emerges from the definition in Section 2.2, inherently
an active system (IEC, 2015). An active system is one that affects the operation of the
considered target system to achieve its purpose. In the context of functional safety, an
active system (as functional safety system) would affect the operation of the system under
control to achieve safety.
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2.4 Safety System Development
In European Union (EU), the Machinery Directive regulates machinery safety by declaring
the Essential health and safety requirements (EHSR), which are targeted to ensure the
safety of machines. More detailed descriptions of design and use are given in the
harmonized standards. One does not necessarily need to comply with the standards, but
if a harmonized standard is complied with, the associated EHSRs are considered fulfilled.
(Rausand, 2014, p. 15).
The harmonized standards in the field of machinery safety include (European Commission,
2016), among others, (ISO 13849-1, 2015) and (IEC 62061, 2005). In addition, (IEC
61508, 2010) also considers functional safety system development, but does not hold a
harmonized standard status. However, (IEC 61508-3, 2010) and (IEC 61508-4, 2010) are
normatively referenced from (ISO 13849-1, 2015, chap. 2).
The standards introduce requirements considering the development of functional safety
systems. These requirements consider, for instance, the development process (see Section
2.6), the methods and techniques to be applied, and the architecture of the safety system.
A manufacturer willing to comply with a standard needs to justifiably show that the
methods and techniques are suitably applied (or provide a rationale why they have
not been applied) and be able to show that the requirements have been fulfilled. The
purpose of this is to provide the manufacturer itself and an assessing party with sufficient
confidentiality that the requirements of the regarded standards and regulation are met.
To strengthen the confidence, communication between the manufacturer and the assessing
party may be initialized already in the development process.
Although the standards provide requirements for the development, they leave room for
creativity to fulfil the requirements in the designs and development processes. This
introduces a potential problem to manufacturers and developers. Emerging questions
may include for instance:
• Can I justifiably use design approach X? Does it cover the requirements given by
the standard?
• In what way do I apply a software method or technique? How can it be applied
sufficiently well considering the safety requirements?
• How do I manage the hazard and risks? How does the safety system co-exist and
operate with a control system? What kind of solutions could benefit functional
safety system development?
2.5 Functional Safety System as a Part of the Overall Control
of a System
Typically, the main element operating the system under control is referred to as a control
system. The purpose of a control system is to operate and control the EUC to implement
the regarded functionality and outcome. A control system is
an interconnection of components forming a system configuration that will
provide a desired system response (Dorf and Bishop, 2005, p. 2).
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In the context of this thesis, a control system can be centralized or distributed. In a
centralized control system, all the control logic or software resides in a single processing
or logic unit. Another form of a control system is a distributed control system where
the control logic has been distributed in many interconnected units which thereby only
execute a subset of the control loops of the system (Center for Chemical Process Safety,
2010, p. 264). In larger machinery applications, the latter case can be considered a more
typical approach.
The definition of the desired system response could also include the idea of safety. That
is, a desirably operating machine or process should retain the safety of the people that
operate around it. However, safety systems and functions can be and have traditionally
been separated from the control system (Sueur and Knobel, 2014, p. 2). Also International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) acknowledges this approach (IEC, 2016). In this
approach, a separated Safety Instrumented System (SIS) exists aside a control system.
Currently also integrated control and safety system approaches are becoming available
(School and de Groot, 2012). In the integrated approach, the control and safety systems
are integrated from the user viewpoint but not necessarily implemented in a single common
system. Still, regardless of the integration, the requirements for their development are
distinct.
Regardless of the implementation approach, in both cases the purpose of a safety system or
function is to reduce the risks to a tolerable level. In addition, safety functions typically do
not participate in the productive system control functions. These tasks and functions are
left for the control system and include, among others, the feedback control of a motor, the
pressure control of a tank, and the path control of a robot arm. Still, both of the systems
operate and affect the same system under control. This induces the need to make control
and safety systems co-operate at least on some level so that the overall functionality
of the system is desirable. An example of safety and control system co-operation and
existence is given in the introduction of [P3]. Patterns considering the co-operation and
co-existence of control and safety systems are discussed in Chapters 5 and 7.
2.6 On Safety System Development Processes
Figure 2.2 gives an overview of functional safety system development found on the (ISO
13849-1, 2015) and (IEC 61508, 2010). The thesis introduces design patterns considering
the underlined parts of the process. The patterns are discussed in Chapters 5, 6, and 7.
The process begins with the definition of the concept and scope of the system to be
considered. This includes the boundaries of the system and the system’s assessment.
In the next step, risk and hazards are assessed to provide a foundation for the risk
mitigation work. The system safety requirements are defined and allocated reflecting
the risk assessment results. In this phase, the risk mitigation methods are selected. For
the scope of this thesis, the mitigation method is primarily considered to be a functional
safety system.
The following part of the process is the development of the specified safety functions,
that is, the functional safety system which implements the functions. This part of the
process begins with the safety function requirement specification to define the function
to be developed. Then, the hardware and software for the function are developed. The
level of co-operation between hardware and software developers may vary. Regardless,
the hardware and software are finally integrated into a functional element, and the
performance of the safety function is validated.
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Figure 2.2: A simplified process for safety system development according to (ISO 13849-1,
2015) and (IEC 61508, 2010), derived from [P2].
The development process is carried out for any subsequent safety functions. When all
the functions have been developed, the complete system installation, commissioning, and
validation can take place. If modifications are needed to the safety system, new hazards
may emerge or risks may change. Thus new risk analyses and assurance cases are needed,
which again can be based on the design patterns and standards referred by the design
patterns of this thesis. Consequently, the process reverts to the risk assessment phase to
make appropriate changes to the safety system.
3 Design Patterns
In this chapter, the concept of design patterns is introduced from generic and safety
system specific perspectives. The chapter begins with the generic viewpoint and converges
into more safety system related aspects at the end of the chapter. The purpose is to
present design patterns and pattern languages as a framework, in which design artifacts
are produced using the methodology described in Section 1.5.
3.1 Brief History of Patterns
The concept of patterns originates from the field of architecture. The book ‘A Pattern
Language: Towns, Buildings, Construction’, by Christopher Alexander (Alexander et al.,
1977) is typically seen as the starting point of patterns as they are considered in the design
pattern community. The patterns by Alexander consider, among others, architecture,
urban design and community building (Alexander et al., 1977, p. xix-xxxiv).
Thus, the origins of patterns reside in the domain of architecture, and it took some time
before the concept of patterns was adopted into other domains of engineering. Eventually,
in the late 1980s, the surge was sparked in the domain of software engineering as a result
of the work by Beck and Cunningham (1987) presented in OOPSLA’87 (Eloranta et al.,
2014, p. 80). This trend was advanced by Erich Gamma in his dissertation (Gamma,
1992, cited by Gamma et al., 2002) and especially the succeeding book ‘Design patterns:
Elements of Reusable Object-Oriented software’ by Gamma, Helm, Johnson, and Vlissides
(also known as Gang of Four (GOF)) (Gamma et al., 1995).
Since the 1990s design patterns have been identified and documented in various domains
including, but not limited to, security (Schumacher et al., 2005), embedded systems
(Douglass, 2010), teaching (Köppe, 2013), learning (Iba et al., 2009), cooking (Isaku and
Iba, 2015), and business (Kelly, 2012). The variation of domains where patterns have
been applied supports the idea of design patterns as a generic approach to document the
solutions and practices of any domain.
3.2 What are Design Patterns and Pattern Languages?
What is a design pattern? Various definitions have been given. Alexander defined:
Each pattern is a three-part rule, which expresses a relation between a certain
context, a problem, and a solution. (Alexander, 1979, p. 247)
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This definition represents one view on patterns and captures the concept of what is
generally considered the core of a design pattern. Eloranta et al. provide a similar
definition:
A pattern is in essence a design solution to a recurring problem in a specific
context. (Eloranta et al., 2014, p. 80)
Both of the definitions share a similar approach, where the lack of recurrence of the
solution in Alexander’s definition seems to be the main difference. However, according to
Coplien, Alexander’s definition is further explained after the definition as follows:
As an element in the world, each pattern is a relationship between a certain
context, a certain system of forces which occurs repeatedly in that context, and
a certain spatial configuration which allows these forces to resolve themselves.
As an element of language, a pattern is an instruction, which shows how this
spatial configuration can be used, over and over again, to resolve the given
system of forces, wherever the context makes it relevant. (Alexander, 1979, p.
247)
The further explanation introduces more centric aspects of patterns. Firstly, application of
a pattern does not necessarily lead to an identical outcome each time. Instead, depending
on the context (the system and its environment) where a pattern is applied, the applier,
and other aspects, the result may vary to some extent, but the essence of the resolution
stays identifiable. Consequently, a design pattern typically provides a framework of the
solution, leaving some of the details to the applier of the pattern.
Secondly, the explanation introduces the concept of language. A pattern language is
a set of related patterns that form a whole considering the domain or subject of the
patterns. Buschmann et al. state the following about pattern languages:
A pattern language defines a network of patterns that build on one another,
typically a tree or direct graph, so that one pattern can optionally or necessarily
draw on another, elaborating a design in a particular way, responding to specific
forces, taking different paths as appropriate. (Buschmann et al., 2007, p. 13)
The purpose of such a language is to cover a broader domain or area of interest than
a single pattern that typically only considers a specific problem. Here, the application
of one pattern may introduce new problems that need to be solved. In addition, many
(practically all) domains naturally introduce multiple problems to be solved before a
functional whole can be reached.
In a pattern language, the patterns can be related to each other with various relationships.
Different languages utilize different relationship types. Presumably, the most typical kind
of relationship in a pattern language is the ‘consider or apply next’ type of relationship.
This relationship indicates a potential or recommended application order of the patterns
so that the patterns build on each other. That is, when one pattern is applied, another
one can be or should be considered as it potentially resolves the emerged problems caused
by the previous pattern. This type of relationship is applied, for instance, by Eloranta
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et al. (2014, sec. 4.2), Buschmann et al. (2007, p. 12-15), Noble and Weir (2001, p. 17)
and Hanmer (2007, p. xiii, 34-35).
There have been discussions on whether or not a pattern language should cover its domain
(or a defined part of it) completely or not. A similar concept pattern collection does
not assume the collection to represent a whole. Hanmer discusses the aspects by stating
the following:
A pattern language is morphologically complete if the solution space that it
describes has no gaps that are not addressed. (Hanmer, 2007, p. xiii)
Here, a morphologically incomplete pattern language is paralleled to the concept of pattern
collection. However, it is rather difficult to justify the absence of gaps in the solution
space of a pattern language. Thus, in the context of this thesis, a pattern language is
referred to without the assumption of a whole or a morphological completeness. That
is, the relationships between individual patterns supported by the categorization of the
patterns are taken as a pattern language.
In summary, design patterns can be seen as nuggets of wisdom (Kohls and Panke, 2010).
They contain documented solutions to recurring problems in defined contexts. Patterns
tend to be brief (to earn the nugget title), but the length varies from a couple of lines to
dozens of pages. Multiple design patterns can compose a pattern language, where the
solutions add up as the patterns of the language are applied sequentially.
3.3 What Makes Pattern a Pattern?
The nature of design patterns is not to present new ideas. Instead, design patterns
consider existing and applied solutions and ideas. The solutions and ideas are (or at least
should be) known as they have been applied by designers or seen in existing systems.
However, a pattern can be applied without ever noticing it. In such a case, a designer
uses tacit knowledge in the form of ideas, experience, and personal skills (Chugh, 2015)
(Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, p. 60) potentially alongside some explicit knowledge (Nonaka
and Takeuchi, 1995, p. 61) to solve a problem. Now, a design pattern discovered and
documented can turn this tacit knowledge into new explicit knowledge. This approach
takes a step towards a scientific approach and according to Kohls and Panke:
If science is about the nature of things, then patterns certainly belong to
science. In the case of patterns, the things or objects of consideration are
artefacts and practices of creating the artefacts. Hence, patterns are a way to
investigate the "science of the artificial" (a term coined by Simon (1969)), or
the nature of artificial objects. (Kohls and Panke, 2010)
The validity and justification of the existence of design patterns lie in their known uses.
In the pattern community, a pattern has been traditionally considered valid only after
three independent known uses have been discovered (Holzner, 2006, p. 282) (Kohls and
Panke, 2010)(Eloranta et al., 2014, p. 88). The rule of three known uses is also applied
in this thesis. That is, the patterns with three known uses are considered patterns. If a
solution or approach lacks at least three known uses, it is called a pattern candidate.
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The process of publishing and discussing patterns in dedicated Pattern Language of
Programs (PLoP) series conference is seen as valuable from the pattern credibility and
quality viewpoints. In these PLoP conferences, patterns are set out for criticism in a
two (or three-phase) process. In a PLoP conference, a paper and the included patterns
are first inspected by the program committee or a similar entity1. Then, the patterns
and the paper are enhanced with the help of and under the supervision of a person who
is an experienced pattern author. This process is called shepherding (Harrison, 1999).
However, the role of a shepherd is not to review the paper as such but to help the author
to improve it. Finally, the paper is discussed in a Writers’ workshop (Gabriel, 2002)
where a group of peers discusses the paper and the included patterns. The target of the
discussion is to provide the author of the paper with input to improve the paper. For the
pattern papers published in PLoP conferences, this process integrates as a part of the
overall pattern quality assurance process.
3.4 Design Pattern Formats
Design patterns are typically documented using a dedicated format. Especially, the
patterns by a specific author or patterns belonging to a specific pattern language, collection,
or publication unit, such as a book, often use a uniform format to help the reader to
understand and follow the patterns.
There are many formats available that differ slightly (Fowler, 2006). The various formats
promote various aspects and elements. Ideally, each pattern format has been developed
for a certain purpose. That is, the format has been selected to communicate the message
of the pattern as clearly, understandably, and efficiently as possible. Another possibility
is that the wide selection of formats is a result of divergent likings of various pattern
authors. According to Rising (1998a, p. 85), Deugo et al. (1999, slide 19), Fowler (2006),
and Appleton (2000), typical pattern formats include among others: AGCS, Alexandrian,
GOF, Canonical, Coplien, Portland, and Pattern-Oriented Software Architecture (POSA)
formats.
A pattern format may consider the elements of a pattern (Appleton, 2000), the semantics
of text formatting, and structuring of a pattern (Rising, 1998a, p. 85). The elements
of a pattern represent the section titles that are considered in a pattern. These section
titles indicate what information regarding the pattern is located under each section. The
structural semantics and formatting consider the visual style of the pattern. These aspects
include, among other things, the style of the pattern description. Is it narrative or more
structured under defined sections? In addition, the visual formatting may consider the
semantics of various highlighting approaches. For instance, small caps text often
indicates a pattern name when used within the description of a pattern.
According to Appleton (2000), the Canonical format takes the shared (or typical) elements
from various other formats. According to Fowler (2006), the Canonical format is a
synonym for the Coplien format, which only considers a subset of elements compared
with Appleton’s listing. In this thesis, Appleton’s view is considered the starting point.
1The practices vary between the conferences and organizers.
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3.5 The Pattern Format Used in this Thesis
The pattern format utilized in the patterns considered in this thesis represents a variation
of the Canonical format (Appleton, 2000). The format divides each pattern element under
a distinct section. The intelligibility of the format was one of the main reasons to select it
initially alongside the fact that it was also the format through which the design patterns
were initially introduced to the author. The applied pattern format has slightly changed
over the time. The variations have included the additions and removals of single pattern
elements.
An overview of the elements of the applied format and their relationships is given in Figure
3.1. The core of the pattern format includes context, problem, and solution elements.
These elements are supplemented with forces that discuss and bind the core elements
together. A solution induces consequences that often indicate new problems and define
new contexts in which new problems need to be solved. The examples and known use
elements ground a solution to more intuitive and concrete environments. Related patterns
help the reader to navigate in the pattern language by pointing out other relevant patterns
to be considered.
The definitions of the elements as considered in this thesis are the following:
Context The boundaries and the environment where the pattern is considered
applicable.
Problem An issue to be solved emerging from the context.
Forces Aspects to be taken into account when solving the problem in the
context. The purpose of forces is multidimensional. Firstly, they refine
the problem by providing insights into the problem. Secondly, they relate
to the context and nominate the aspects that are preferred over their
counterparts or show which aspects are contradictory in terms of the
solution. Thirdly, the previously mentioned aspects direct the solution.
In many cases, several solutions could be considerable, but the defined
forces direct the solution to the one given in the pattern.
Solution An approach, structure, functionality, or a combination of these that
resolves the forces in the context and introduces a framework, that can
be applied in the design, which typically requires further refinement to
be applied in the context of the system under development.
Consequences A collection of positive, negative, and sometimes neutral effects on the
system under design resulting the application of the pattern. The effects
can be used to judge whether or not a pattern should be applied. That
is, they can be used as a basis for decision making.
Example A case where the pattern can or could be applied. The purpose of
the case is to ground the potentially abstract solution to a more easily
approachable context. The case is not necessarily from a real world
application.
Known uses A case where the pattern has been applied. The case is identified from a
real world application, documentation, literature, or designer interview.
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Related patterns Patterns that can be considered alongside the current solution. These
solutions indicate, for instance, patterns that specialize, conflict, or
provide an alternative approach to the current solution.
Some elements that are used previously or rarely in the patterns include:
Intent A short introduction of the pattern including the core solution statement
supplemented with a short example case. This element was used in
[P5].
Resulting context The environment that exists after the application of a pattern. In
practice, the element defines a new context in which new problems may
emerge. This element appeared in the early patterns and it can be seen,
for instance, in (Rauhamäki et al., 2012).
Related standards A listing of standards or sections of standards that the solution may
comply with, support, or conflict with. This element appeared in
(Rauhamäki and Vepsäläinen, 2016).
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Figure 3.1: The pattern framework utilized in pattern documentation in the context of this
thesis illustrating the centric elements of a pattern: context, problem, and solution augmented
with the supporting elements and their relations. Derived from [P2].

4 On Design Patterns Supporting
Safety System Development
This short chapter summarizes the potential support that application of design patterns
may introduce in functional safety system development. In addition, the structure of the
following result chapters is briefly presented and justified at the end of the chapter.
4.1 Why Apply Design Patterns in Safety System
Development?
Arguably the design pattern approach is not the only one that can be applied in the design
of safety systems. However, the usage of design patterns can support the design and
development of functional safety systems. The support can be seen to cover all the phases
of the development process including requirements specification, design, implementation,
testing, and validation phases. Some of the patterns address only one of the phases whereas
others influence several. The supporting factors form the rationale to mine, document,
and apply design patterns in the domain of safety systems and their development.
Publications [P1] and [P2] discuss the potentially achievable improvements of applying
design patterns in functional safety system development and design. Some of the potential
benefits can be considered generic to the design patterns of any domain whereas others
are more specific to the functional safety system domain.
The main findings are summarized in the following sections. The findings are based
on the mentioned publications and they are augmented, when applicable, with findings
and experiences from the discussions and comments acquired during the interviews and
workshops of the DPSafe project.
Well-Tried Solutions
Standards considering functional safety system development including (IEC 61508-3, 2010;
ISO 13849-1, 2015) can be considered preferring well-tried solutions over novel ones. This
emerges, for instance, in Table B.2 of 61508-2:2010 and Section 6.2.4 ISO 13849-1:2015.
This is understandable as the components, solutions, approaches, and methods that have
demonstrated suitability and reliability in the past safety systems and their development
processes have already gained the empirical experience, which novel approaches lack.
When mined using an appropriate process, design patterns and the solutions they present
can be seen to reflect the concept of well-tried components. A design pattern is typically
considered forming when it has been identified three times from independent sources.
It is acknowledged that the known uses of a pattern do not suffice or comply with the
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concept of a well-tried solution or component mentioned in the standards. It is possible
that an approach with poor suitability in the context of functional safety systems has
been applied widely. This is especially possible if the patterns have been mined and
documented by researchers alone without feedback and refining discussions with industry
experts.
Path Through Design Decisions
Design patterns can be used to document solutions, approaches, and practices applied
commonly in safety system development. Individual solutions are valuable mainly in the
context of a single problem to be solved. Although this is valuable when a solution for
an individual problem is sought after, other benefits appear when multiple patterns are
used together. Patterns, and the solutions they present, often relate to each other in one
or more ways. When patterns are arranged and documented so that they form a larger
whole and relate to each other, a pattern language is formed.
The relations between the patterns of a pattern language can be seen as one of the
strengths of a pattern language from a design viewpoint (Buschmann et al., 2007, p. 15).
Typically, the relations form paths through the pattern language which can be seen, for
instance, in (Eloranta et al., 2014, p. 85) and (Buschmann et al., 2007, p. 40) and figures
5.5 and 6.5 of this thesis. The language approach supports the designer by indicating, for
instance, which patterns could be considered next and which patterns provide alternative
approaches to the current pattern. In the latter case, this information can support the
process of making a design decision as potential alternative approaches are indicated.
The consequences or forces of the individual alternative patterns can then be reviewed to
select the most suitable approach or to look for completely different approaches.
Transforming Experience in Explicit Format
Experience is a valuable resource in safety system development as in any engineering
discipline. Design patterns make an effort to transform the knowledge accumulated in the
heads of designers and existing system documentation into an explicit format. This makes
the information accessible also to other designers. In the context of functional safety
systems, such experience can add credibility of a solution through the previous known
use(s) of the solution. Design patterns (at least give a try to) document the positive and
negative consequences of a solution. This information may be obvious to the original
applier of the solution. However, the consequences and rationale may not appear, for
instance, in the documentation of the system where the approach has been used although,
according to van Heesch et al. (2012, sec. 2), such rationale for design decisions should be
provided. Design patterns are typically named. This enables and supports the usage of
patterns as a part of communication (Riehle, 2011, sec. 3.1). A solution can be referred
to with the corresponding pattern name in discussions and potentially in documentation
too with appropriate references.
Transfer of Information Between Parties
Patterns and pattern languages act as media that transmit information between parties
such as safety system development practitioners, researchers, and companies. Naturally,
there is a number of other ways to achieve the same effect. For instance, books, websites,
and other documentation media offer similar capabilities. Nevertheless, during the final
phases of the research, it was also noticed that the communal processing of patterns in
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the workshops motivated companies and their representatives to share their knowledge for
the benefit of all the participants. Especially the workshops (see Section 7.2) organized
in the final phases of the research supported this aspect of pattern mining work.
During the DPSafe project, both workshops and interviews were organized. The circulation
and sharing of information regarding approaches and practices during these events was
considered one of the main benefit of the project. During the events, the participants
shared opinions, views, approaches, and solutions they had used or encountered during
their daily work. This happened both in the workshops with people from different
companies as well as in interviews within specific companies.
The interviews and discussions resulted from the applied pattern mining approach. Similar
results could be achieved without pattern mining in mind. However, in the case of the
DPSafe project, pattern mining seemed to build grounds for the discussion, especially
between companies. This is most likely due to the purpose of the project that was to
gather and document information to benefit all the participants and their companies.
One of the factors for successful information sharing can also be seen in the project setup
which enabled the information sharing. The researchers acted and were considered as an
abstraction layer, that enabled making the initial pattern prototypes so that the company
providing the information could be abstracted away leaving only the pattern and the
solution to be discussed with all the participants.
Increasing Awareness of Potential Approaches
According to discussions with industry representatives, the development of functional safety
systems is partly seen as problematic due to the uncertainty related to the standards such
as (IEC 61508, 2010; ISO 13849-1, 2015). The issues seem to raise from the uncertainty
regarding the interpretation of the standards and their requirements. This is caused
partly by the degree of freedom that is built into the standards. That is, the standards
provide room for distinct, but justified, approaches. In such an environment it may be
hard to obtain sufficient self-assurance to suggest or apply certain approaches or solutions
due to the uncertainty if there is any doubt regarding the compatibility of the approach
or solution with the considered standards. As a result, a designer or a designer group
may be left asking questions. What kinds of techniques, solutions, or approaches comply
with the requirements? Is the taken approach compatible with a standard or a standard
requirement?
For these issues and uncertainties, design patterns can offer a potential solution. When
design patterns are gathered from industry representatives and materials, they reflect the
approaches, architectures, solutions, and methods applied in the industry. In such cases,
the company or designer, from which a pattern originates, has already used or is aware of
the use of the pattern and the solution suggested by it. For other companies and their
workers, the obtained approach may be unknown or it may be considered uncertain in
the context of a standard to be applied. In such cases, the awareness that an approach or
a solution has already been applied in a similar context may open new possibilities and
remove uncertainty regarding what is acceptable. In the context of the DPSafe project,
the spread of awareness and confidence was most likely boosted by the communal pattern
workshop approach in which industry representatives had the possibility to discuss the
patterns directly with each other.
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Alleviating Bureaucracy
The standards and regulations considering the development of functional safety systems
introduce long lists of requirements considering the development process, methods and
techniques to be used, and structures to be applied. The usage of certain methods and
approaches is practically mandatory, and the standards may require more documentation
and more thorough testing than would be carried out for a regular control system or
application. Thus, typically the development process of a functional safety system tends
to be costlier than a similar control system without the safety-related parts or need to
comply with a similar standard.
Due to the increased cost structure, in the most cases, it would be cheaper to reduce the
scope and/or size of the safety system to the minimum. From the author’s perspective,
the standards considering functional safety system development provide sparingly help in
this regard. However, the industry has identified ways to mitigate the scope of the safety
system and move some of the tasks out of the safety system scope to the control system
as indicated in Chapter 7. In this regard, the pattern approach has been used to identify
and document approaches to mitigate the unwanted effects of functional safety system
standards.
In addition to the safety system scope reduction and the solutions and approaches
documented, patterns can help to bridge a gap between the requirements given by
standards and the design that should comply with the standards. For instance, (ISO
13849-1, 2015) defines in Section 4.6.2:
For Safety-related embedded software (SRESW) for components with Required
Performance Level (PLr) c or d, the following additional measures shall be
applied:
. . .
modular and structured programming, separation in non-safety-related soft-
ware, limited module sizes with fully defined interfaces, use of design and
coding standards;
. . .
The highlighted part can be interpreted in many ways and provides some freedom regarding
the actual implementation. In this case, the Units of measurement pattern candidate,
suggesting a compile time unit management of program variables, provides an insight to
achieve the full definition of the interfaces of a module.
4.2 Presentation in the Result Chapters
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 illustrate the main results of the research, namely the design patterns
and the related pattern language. The chapters are organized as follows.
At the beginning of each chapter, a short introduction to the main categories and topics
of the discussed patterns is provided. In addition, a short overview of the origin of the
patterns is provided to ground the patterns discussed in the chapter on the timeline of the
research. The patterns discussed in Chapter 5 present older work whereas the patterns
discussed in Chapter 7 represent more recently documented patterns.
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The reason for the approach lies in the evolution of the pattern mining process that has
been applied during the research. The patterns in each chapter have been mined using
a slightly different mining process. The process has evolved from the initial approach
described in Section 5.2 to the one described in Section 7.2. Therefore, the applied pattern
mining approach is described in each result chapter.
The actual result section follows the pattern mining description. The main categories
of patterns discussed in the chapter are introduced. This introduction provides the
reader with an idea of the topics that the patterns consider. The category descriptions
are followed by patlets of the patterns belonging to the chapter. A patlet is a short
description of a pattern representing the core problem statement followed by the core
solution statement.
To assist the developers of safety systems, some of the patlets are completed with references
to related standards. The purpose of this is to indicate when a pattern supports, conflicts
or otherwise relates to a standard or its section to give the applier an idea of the effect
of a pattern in context of a standard. A related standard reference was added to the
patlets of such patterns that included a suitable reference to a standard in the pattern
description. The complete pattern descriptions can be found in the referenced articles or
report.
The patlets are given in table format. The name of the pattern is followed by the
publication where the pattern has been previously published. The rightmost column of
the table provides the status of the pattern. A pattern with three or more known uses is
marked with P to indicate a pattern and a pattern with less than three known uses is
marked with PC to indicate a pattern candidate. In Chapter 7, more detailed status
indicators are used.
Following the pattern descriptions, the patterns are sorted into the categories discussed
above. The categorization considers both the topic and purpose of the patterns. Following
the categorization, an illustration of the pattern language part is given to show the
relations between the presented patterns. Finally, a discussion section summarizes the
patterns, topics, and applied pattern mining process.

5 Control Systems, Safety Systems,
and Their Co-existence
5.1 Introduction
Architecture considers the fundamental structural and behavioural aspects of a functional
safety system. The topic of architecture is centric in a sense that it relates to and affects
nearly all the other aspects of the system. According to (Kruchten, 2004, p. 9-10):
architecture encompasses significant decisions about the following:
• The organization of a software system
• The selection of structural elements and their interfaces by which the
system is composed
• Their behaviour, as specified in the collaboration among those elements
• The composition of these structural and behavioral elements into pro-
gressively larger subsystems
• The architectural style that guides this organization: these elements and
their interfaces, their collaborations, and their composition
Architecture can also be considered as
the fundamental organization of a system, embodied in its components, their
relationships to each other and the environment, and the principles governing
its design and evolution. (IEEE 1471:2000, 2000, cited by Carnegie Mellon
University, 2015)
In the context of this thesis, many of the presented patterns can be considered to relate
to architecture in one way or another. Some patterns contribute to the structure, some
the operation, and some all the potential aspects of architecture in terms of functional
safety systems. One aspect where architectural decisions are made considering functional
safety development is the design of co-operation between safety and control systems.
Although safety and control systems have a similar form of operation, they have a distinct
purpose. A safety system tries to retain the safe operation of a system. A control system
also contributes to this, but its primary concern is to control the system to produce its
output with an optimal outcome. The optimal outcome may be, for instance, the achieved
production rate. In a such case, higher speeds, forces, and concentrations are typically
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required. However, from the safety point of view, lower speeds, forces, and concentrations
would be preferable as often these lead to more inherently safe design and operation.
Consequently, the objectives of the safety and control systems may be conflicting.
The co-operation and co-existence of safety and controls systems were one of the main
categories that emerged during the research for safety system patterns. Safety and control
systems both operate and affect the system under control. In addition, they both typically
utilize a rather similar operation principle. The system under control is measured or
observed to acquire information on the system state. The acquired information is used
to execute logic considering how the system should be controlled to achieve the purpose
of the controlling element (that is, the purpose of a control or safety system). Finally,
the system under control is affected by a set of actuators operated by control and safety
systems.
5.2 Initial Pattern Mining Approach
The pattern research of this thesis was initially started by searching for patterns from the
(IEC 61508, 2010). The standard status of the IEC 61508-3 was considered as a sufficient
proof of applicability of the solution. In this phase, the documented patterns were design
solutions to the requirements of the IEC 61508-3 standard. However, when familiarity
with the standard increased, it became obvious that it is hard to provide added value by
just looking at the standard. Instead, more relevant aspects could be found between the
standard and the actual designs. Thus, a new approach was incorporated.
The patterns presented in this chapter represent the first patterns documented during the
research and they are also the first ones outside the scope of the immediate IEC 61508-3
contexts. The work began around 2011. During the preceding (and forthcoming) years, a
set of projects considering control system development, architecture, and safety-related
software had been active. In these projects, a set of discussions with industry members
had occurred and views to the safety and control system development had been exchanged
with the industry representatives. These discussions had no direct purpose to serve
pattern mining. However, they were used as an inspiration to the first patterns of the
work.
In this phase of the research work, the pattern ideas, solutions, and approaches were
crafted to the pattern format without further analysis. The pattern mining process
applied in the initial phases of the research work is illustrated in Figure 5.1. The centric
aspect and the basis of the process was the identification of promising solutions and
approaches and the documentation of these ideas into prototype patterns. The ideas
for the prototype patterns emerged from discussions with industry representatives and
considerations of researchers. The industry representatives came from the domains of
control system engineering including control, safety-critical, and safety-related systems.
After the pattern prototype was written, it was internally reviewed by researchers and
revised if needed. Some of the pattern prototypes went through a mini workshop with
external academic participants before publishing.
In this phase of the research, and regardless of the source of the pattern idea, the lack
of three known uses of the solution or the approach was not considered an obstacle
to document and publish the patterns. Instead, it was considered more important to
document the interesting solutions in the pattern format with the extended information
regarding the context, forces, and consequences related to the solution and to obtain
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Figure 5.1: The pattern mining process applied in the initial phases of the research.
feedback on the prototype patterns from the pattern community through PLoP conferences.
The review process of the conferences and constructive criticism received in the workshops
is considered here as the quality control of the suggested patterns.
5.3 Results
The categories of the patterns considered in this chapter include architecture and co-
operation related aspects in terms of control and safety system and their development.
The categories (on the right-hand side) and the topics within the categories and their
relations are depicted in Figure 5.2.
The architecture category considers the structure and behaviour of the system, and the
principles regarding the operation and the design of the system. The System architecture
patterns include Hardware architecture as well as software architecture aspects, which
again are divided into structural and behavioural aspects. The Software functionality
topic considers the behavioural aspect of the software.
The co-operation category considers the roles of control and safety systems and their
separation, the co-existence of the systems, and finally the need to override a control
system if a safety system decides so. The included patterns build on the idea of separation
between control and safety systems, but some of them can be potentially applied also in
case the safety and control systems are integrated.
The Safety and control system separation topic is the starting point in the category. The
patterns in the topic consider separation and consequent responsibilities between safety
and control systems. When the safety and control systems are separated, the need to
operate and control the same system with distinct objectives arises. The Co-existence with
control system topic provides ideas and design solutions for such a situation. Finally, a
safety system must be able to decide whether a system operation, for instance, movement,
start-up, or energization is safe or not and consequently dictate whether the operation
is allowed or not. For this purpose, a set of Control system override patterns has been
documented. The purpose of these patterns is to provide a safety system with an ability
to override a control system and bring the system under control in a safe state.
It should be noted that all the patterns could be somehow categorized under the archi-
tecture category. They all tend to consider either the structure or the functionality of a
system. In addition, this may be implemented in either software or hardware.
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Figure 5.2: High level categorization of the patterns in this chapter.
5.3.1 Patterns for Control and Safety Systems and their
Co-existence
Table 5.1 summarizes the patterns for control and safety systems and their co-existence
presented in this thesis. The table gives the pattern name pattern, the short description
of the pattern patlet, and the status of the pattern, where P equals a pattern (with
at least three known uses) and a PC equals a pattern candidate, with less than three
known uses. Table 5.2 summarizes the patterns referenced in the patlets of Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Patterns for control and safety systems and their co-existence. The patlets have
been reproduced here from the referenced publications.
Pattern Patlet Status
Check physi-
cal response,
[P3]
Operations and commands executed in software may suc-
ceed or fail in the physical world though software con-
tinues execution. Therefore, use sensors to ensure that
operations executed in software have the presumed effect
in the physical world.
P
Control sig-
nal blocking,
[P8]
A safety system needs to have the ability to drive the
system under control or the process variable of interest
into a Safe state regardless of the operations of a control
system. Therefore, override a control signal produced by
a control system with a suitable blocking device controlled
by a safety system.
P
Control sys-
tem notifica-
tion, [P8]
The operation of a control system is disturbed when
a safety system overrides or restricts the operation of
the control system, which may cause the unexpected be-
haviour of the control system. Therefore, make a control
system aware of the state changes of a safety system so
that the control system can react accordingly.
P
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Pattern Patlet Status
Co-operative
safety re-
lated actua-
tion, [P8]
How to increase the consistency between the operation
of a safety system and a control system during situations
where the safety system overrides the control system
partly or completely? Let a safety system drive a control
system into a Safe state whenever a safe state needs
to be obtained (according to the safety system).
P
De-energized
safe state,
[P3]
Power supply for the safety system and the control system
as well as the system under control cannot be guaranteed,
which might inflict a hazardous state during blackout
or power loss in (part of the) safety system. Therefore,
design the safety system (and control system as well if
applicable) to take the Safe state when power is lost.
Related standards: (IEC 61508-7, 2010, section A.1.5)
P
Hardwired
safety, [P3]
Development of safety-related application software is
costly and provides no real benefit in the context of the
considered safety function. Therefore, use a hardware-
based safety system instead of application software to
implement the safety functionality.
Related standards: (IEC 61508, 2010)
P
Indirect re-
sponse check,
[P3]
Adding dedicated hardware for checking that operations
executed in software really occurred in the physical world
is costly and increases the complexity and the spatial
properties of the system. Therefore, check operation
success by indirect indication.
PC
Output inter-
locking, [P3]
Implementing protective functions in control algorithms
makes the control algorithms complex. Therefore, use an
interlock element alongside each control actuator output
in the control system.
P
Productive
safety, [P8]
A system under control should be kept in an operational
region for as long as possible to avoid the activation of
safety functionality while the functionality of a safety
system should be kept minimal in comparison to control
functionality. Therefore, implement corrective functions
in a control system and use the simplest approach for the
safety system functionality.
P
Safety lim-
iter, [P8]
A safety system needs to have the ability to drive a system
under control or a process variable of interest into a Safe
state regardless of the operations of a control system.
Therefore, let the safety system manipulate the control
signal before directing the control signal to the actuator.
PC
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Pattern Patlet Status
Separated
override, [P8]
A safety system needs to have the ability to drive the
system under control or one of its process variables into
a Safe state regardless of the operations of a control
system. Therefore, use separate actuators for safety and
control systems.
P
Separated
safety, [P8]
Designing a whole control system according to safety
standards is a costly, bureaucratic, and slow process.
Therefore, divide and separate the system control func-
tionality into two separate entities: a control system and
a safety system.
Related standards: (IEC 61508, 2010; ISO 13849-1, 2015)
P
Shared safety
actuator, [P8]
Providing each subsystem with a dedicated safety actu-
ator when the same input variable is used by multiple
subsystems increases the number of needed safety ac-
tuators in the system. Therefore, use a shared safety
actuator for all the subsystems.
P
Table 5.2: External patterns referenced in the aforementioned sources. The patlets have been
reproduced here from the referenced publications.
Pattern Patlet Status
Control sys-
tem, (Eloranta
et al., 2014)
The productivity of a work machine cannot be increased
any further using traditional ways of building the machine
– using hydraulics, electronics and mechanics. There-
fore, implement control system software that controls the
machine and has interfaces to communicate with other
machines and systems.
P
Limit number
of retries,
(Rauhamäki
et al., 2015)
A retry approach to achieve fault tolerance may lead to
an infinite loop. Therefore, limit the number of retries per
occurred fault to a reasonable level within time tolerances.
PC
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Safe state,
(Eloranta et al.,
2014)
When the control system tries to control a part of the ma-
chine that is malfunctioning, the machine may respond
in an unpredictable way. Consequently, the machine
may harm the operator, machine or surroundings. These
kinds of situations should not take place. Therefore,
design a safe state that can be entered if the control
system encounters a malfunction that cannot be handled
autonomously. The safe state is such that it prevents the
machine from causing harm. The safe state is device and
functionality dependent and is not necessarily the same
as the unpowered state.
P
Small sub-
system fault
detection,
(Rauhamäki
et al., 2015)
It is problematic to transfer substantial amounts of infor-
mation to high-level subsystems considering faults. There-
fore, apply fault detection on as low a subsystem level as
possible and aggregate fault information for higher-level
subsystems.
PC
5.3.2 Pattern Topic Categorization
Figure 5.3 categorizes the patterns given in Table 5.1 under the categories defined in
Figure 5.2. The figure also indicates the relations between the E/E/PE safety system
pattern (see Table 6.1) and the topics considered here, to show the relations between
patterns discussed in different chapters. The topics describe the main area of concern
regarding the included patterns. That is, for instance, the topic of the Hardwired
safety pattern is Hardware architecture.
5.3.3 Pattern Purpose Categorization
Figure 5.4 illustrates the purpose of the patterns. Here, the purpose describes the target
outcome or result of the application of the pattern. In the context of the patterns discussed
in this chapter, the following purpose categories were defined. It can be argued that
each or most of the patterns illustrated in Figure 5.4 could be included in more than one
purpose category, but for the sake of clarity, such more refined categorization is omitted
here.
Control and safety system co-existence The main objectives of control and safety systems
differ substantially and a safety system is typi-
cally able to override a control system. Thus, it is
beneficial for both systems that they operate in a
coherent way.
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Figure 5.4: Control, safety and co-existence patterns arranged according to their purposes
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Overriding capability A safety system typically requires the ability to
override a control system to reach and retain the
safe state considering the system under control.
The patterns in this purpose category describe
means to achieve such capability.
Fault tolerance These patterns support the ability of a safety sys-
tem to retain safety in the presence of faults. Typi-
cally, this means reverting the system under control
into a safe state rather than actually tolerating the
fault through recovery.
Command success confirmation A system controlling a physical entity does not
know whether or not a command or operation
executed in the software domain has produced the
desired outcome in the physical world unless the
outcome is checked.
Safety system scope reduction The smaller the scope of a safety system is, the less
work the development of the safety system likely
involves.
Software scope reduction The development of safety-related software in the
IEC 61508 context involves several phases, docu-
mentation, high testing effort, and the application
of suitable methods and tools. Thus, mitigating
or eliminating the need for safety-related software
can save development effort and costs.
Hardware reduction The amount of hardware required is a considerable
factor in high volume systems, in which spatial,
weight, and cost requirements are key factors of
the competitive strength.
5.3.4 Pattern Language Part
Figure 5.5 illustrates the part of the pattern language composed out of the patterns given
in Table 5.1. Correspondingly, the patterns with dash and dash dot dot outlines are given
in Table 5.2. The categories are omitted from this figure for clarity. The language part is
compiled based on similar sub-illustrations given in [P3] and [P8].
The centric pattern of this part of the language is the Separated safety pattern. It
is considered as a starting point or a prerequisite for the subsequent patterns. That is,
one is usually expected to start with this pattern and then apply others as needed. For
instance, after Separated safety has been applied, one could consider reducing the
functionality of a safety system by applying the Productive safety pattern and to
provide the safety system with a way to override the control system by applying the
Separated override pattern.
5.4 Discussion
This chapter introduced the first set of patterns documented and published during the
research. The patterns consider topics related to control systems, safety systems, and
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Figure 5.5: Pattern language part of the control, safety and co-existence patterns
their co-existence. All the patterns discussed in this chapter can be considered belonging
to one of these topics. The rather broad topic definition reflects the explorative nature of
the initial steps of the research work.
The pattern mining approach applied in this part of the research is not sufficiently credible
as such. For some of the patterns, the initial idea emerged from discussions with industry
representatives, but for others, the initial idea was formulated by the researchers. It is
acknowledged that at least the latter approach does not represent a completely sound
approach to design pattern mining. However, for most of the patterns and pattern
candidates, the credibility through three known uses was gained in the later phases of the
research. Therefore, the patterns identified and documented in this phase proved to be a
solid part of the pattern language as the research proceeded. This reflects the evolution
of the research approach.
6 Hazard Management Process and
Risk Reduction
6.1 Introduction
Before any decisions on potential or possible risk reduction methods can be made, hazards
and corresponding risks need to be identified. Unless the risks and hazards are known,
mitigation methods cannot be justifiably selected and applied. In this chapter, design
patterns for the early phases of safety system development are considered. In some
cases, it may appear that actually no functional safety systems are needed to reduce
risks. However, this does not release the system developers from hazard and risk analysis
because to arguably decide not to apply a functional safety system, one has to justify the
decision.
Standards such as (IEC 61508, 2010) and (ISO 13849-1, 2015) specify a hazard and
risk analysis as an important part of the development of a safety-related system. The
process begins with a system scope definition followed by a hazard and risk analysis
as also discussed in [P2]. Only after these steps, one goes to the selection of the risk
mitigation methods. Furthermore, the application of a functional safety system should
not be the primary approach; one should first consider hazard elimination and a passive
safety system instead of an active functional safety system (Center for Chemical Process
Safety, 2012, p. 123-124).
The hazard management process focuses on engineering approaches to achieve required
risk reduction from the system developer point of view. However, as presented by Leveson
(2009, p. 6), also system operation and operators participate in the overall safety control
structure. Therefore, human aspects should not be left outside the scope of hazard and
risk management.
6.2 Evolved Pattern Mining Approach
The initial pattern mining process applied in the first phases of the research was arguably
not sufficient as such to obtain credible patterns. A considerable trigger to change the
pattern mining and documentation process occurred in the European Conference on
Pattern Languages of Programs (EuroPLoP) 2013 where it was stated that the patterns
are well written, but they are prototype patterns lacking the three known uses. This was
seen as a drawback of the patterns and mining process so far. The dearth of known uses
was acknowledged, and the pattern mining process was corrected accordingly.
The evolved pattern mining process is depicted in Figure 6.1. The main difference with
regard to the initial pattern mining process (described in Section 5.2) is the introduction
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Figure 6.1: The evolved pattern mining process applied in the research
of a step to identify three known uses for the solutions described in the pattern.
At least three known uses were searched for the solutions presented in the patterns before
they were submitted and published in PLoP conferences. These three known uses were
not directly obtained from industry representatives or system documentation. Instead,
the known uses were collected using literature sources or experiences from real machines
applying a user point of view. Although this cannot be considered an ideal approach
from the practitioner point of view, it still provides the patterns with more credibility
compared to a situation with no known uses at all.
6.3 Results
The category of patterns considered in this chapter includes Hazard management in terms
of control and safety system and their development. The category with the included
subcategories is depicted in Figure 6.2.
The patterns in this category discuss how the safety aspect can be taken into account in
the design and development process of a system. The consideration includes processes,
strategies, and functionality approaches. The abstraction level of the patterns varies
between the topics. The Hazard management process patterns illustrate an abstract
approach to hazard management. The patterns in this topic suggest a set of basic
approaches to detect and mitigate hazards. In the Hazard management strategy topic,
abstract approaches are made more concrete, indicating how the basic approaches can
be implemented in systems. Finally, in the Safety functionality approach topic, actual
functions to mitigate certain hazards in certain systems are described. The rationale for
the categorization is to provide the user with the core idea or principle of the hazard
management approach as well as a more practical illustration of the approach.
Human-Machine responsibilities are also considered in the category of Hazard management
patterns. A human being is both the protected target and a potential co-operator or factor
in achieving safe operation of the system under consideration. Therefore, the human
viewpoint should be considered alongside the technical methods in the risk reduction
process.
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6.3.1 Patterns for Hazard Management Process
Table 6.1 summarizes the patterns for hazard management process presented in this thesis.
The table gives the pattern name pattern, the short description of the pattern patlet,
and the status of the pattern where P equals a pattern (with at least three known uses)
and a PC equals a pattern candidate, with less than three known uses.
Table 6.1: Patterns for hazard management. The patlets have been reproduced here from the
referenced publications.
Pattern Patlet Status
Safety risk
identifica-
tion, [P4]
To make conscious decisions considering hazard and risk
management, information on these aspects needs to be
available. Therefore, use structured and/or systematic
method(s) in order to identify the hazards and associated
risks introduced by the system.
Related standards: (IEC 61508, 2010; ISO 12100:2010,
2010; ISO 13849-1, 2015)
P
Eliminate haz-
ard, [P4]
You want to maximize the likelihood that a hazard in-
troduced by a system cannot cause harm in any part
of the system lifecycle. Therefore, eliminate the hazard
completely by removing the component introducing the
hazard from the system.
P
Substitute
hazard, [P4]
A hazard needs to be eliminated from the system. There-
fore, substitute the hazardous element with a non-
hazardous or at least less hazardous element.
P
Passive pro-
tective mea-
sure, [P6]
A hazard or a hazardous element remains in the system,
but the related risk needs to be mitigated. Therefore, use
a passive protective measure to mitigate the risk by non-
functional design solutions, equipment, or system design
features that mitigate the risk related to the hazard.
P
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Pattern Patlet Status
Active pro-
tective mea-
sure, [P6]
A hazard or a hazardous element remains in the system
and the related risk needs to be mitigated. Therefore,
use an active protective measure to mitigate the risk by
affecting system operation through a defined functionality
so that the risk is reduced.
P
Isolate haz-
ard, [P4]
A hazardous element needs to remain in the system and,
with the current exposure profile, the related risk is in-
tolerable. Therefore, isolate the hazard by physically
isolating the hazardous element from the environment
and people.
P
E/E/PE
safety system,
[P4]
An active protective measure of relatively complex func-
tionality needs to be implemented. Therefore, use an
electric, electronic or programmable electronic (E/E/PE)
safety system to implement the protective measure func-
tionality.
Related standards: (IEC 61508, 2010; ISO 13849-1, 2015)
P
Interrupted
hazardous
action, [P5]
A user operated system element may enter a hazardous
operating range due to actions initiated by an opera-
tor, but without the operator noticing this. Therefore,
interrupt the hazardous system operation before the haz-
ardous operation range is reached and force the operator
to acknowledge this.
P
Interruptible
hazardous
zone, [P5]
The hazardous zone or element needs to be easily accessi-
ble, but hazardous conditions within the zone may exist in
defined situations. Therefore, implement an interlocking
guard over the hazardous element or zone.
P
Locked haz-
ardous zone,
[P5]
A hazardous zone or element needs to be easily accessible,
but hazardous conditions within the zone may exist in
defined situations. Therefore, implement a locking guard
to cover the hazardous element or zone.
P
Automated
safety system,
[P7]
Humans are slow and unreliable decision makers and can-
not deterministically react on random events. Therefore,
avoid humans as a part of the functionality of a safety
system .
P
Manual
safety abil-
ity, [P7]
E/E/PE safety systems have limited possibilities to ob-
serve and interact with their environment and system.
Therefore, provide the human operators with the ability
to manually drive the system into a safe state.
P
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6.3.2 Pattern Topic Categorization
Figure 6.3 categorizes the patterns given in Table 6.1 under the topics defined in Figure
6.2. The topics describe the main area of concern regarding the included patterns. For
instance, the topic of the Substitute hazard pattern belongs to Hazard management
strategy. The figure also indicates the relations between the E/E/PE safety system
pattern (see Table 6.1) and the topics introduced in Chapter 5.
6.3.3 Pattern Purpose Categorization
Figure 6.4 illustrates the purpose of the patterns presented in this chapter. Here, the
purpose describes the target outcome or result of the application of the pattern. In the
context of the patterns discussed in this chapter, the following purpose categories were
defined. It can be argued that each or most of the patterns illustrated in Figure 6.4
could be included in more than one purpose category, but for the sake of clarity, such
categorization is omitted here.
Foundation for risk management To be able to make justifiable decisions on the risk mit-
igation methods and approaches, the hazards and cor-
responding risks need to be known. Unless the risks
are known, excessive or inadequate mitigation is likely
to occur. Both of the cases come with cost overhead.
The former case introduces additional development and
system costs as too high a SIL is complied with or unnec-
essary safety measures are implemented in the system.
In the latter case, costs are saved during development
time, but the risks are more likely to be realized in the
later phases of the system life cycle.
Risk elimination The patterns in this category aim to eliminate, that
is, to remove the hazard or hazard source completely
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Figure 6.4: Hazard and risk management patterns arranged according to their purposes
from the system under development. The eliminated
hazards introduce no risks throughout the system life
cycle. Therefore, the approach is effective. For instance,
if asbestos is eliminated from the system, it cannot intro-
duce risks. However, a substitute or alternative approach
can introduce similar or different risks.
Risk mitigation In some cases, hazards cannot be completely eliminated
from the system. In such cases, the related risks need
to be mitigated. The patterns in this category aim to
reduce the risk by decreasing the likelihood of the hazard
occurrence or severity of the consequences.
Hazard occurrence mitigation The patterns in this category aim specifically at reducing
the realization likelihood of a hazard. The hazard remains
in the system under consideration, but this is recognized,
and the realization likelihood is targeted.
Human interference possibility Machines are superior to people in some tasks. For ex-
ample, a reaction time of a human (approximately 200
millisecond (Kosinski and Cummings, 1999, p. 79)) is
typically relatively high compared to computer reaction
time and human factors are involved in many incidents in
process and related industries (Broadribb, 2012). How-
ever, this does not indicate that people should not be able
to take the system into a safe state. Instead, machines
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Figure 6.5: Pattern language part of the hazard and risk management patterns
and control systems have intrinsic weaknesses, too, and
people can remedy (at least partially) these weaknesses.
6.3.4 Pattern Language Part
Figure 6.5 illustrates the part of the pattern language composed of the patterns given in
Table 6.1. The patterns with dashed outlines (Separated safety and Check physical
response) are given in Table 5.1. Pattern categories are omitted from this figure for
clarity. The language part is compiled based on similar sub-illustrations given in [P4],
[P5], and [P6].
The root pattern of the whole pattern language and consequently also this part of the
language is the Safety risk identification pattern. The pattern suggests the usage of
systematic methods of identifying the risks and hazards related to the system in design.
Only after the hazards and risks are known, justifiable argumentation on possible risk
mitigation methods can be considered.
The subsequent patterns Eliminate hazard and Substitute hazard propose removing
a risk by the removal of the related hazard. If the hazard cannot occur, the risk is also
removed. If the hazard cannot be removed, one should consider a Passive protective
measure or an Active protective measure to mitigate the risk. These measures
do not remove the hazard but decrease the likelihood of the occurrence or the severity
of the consequences of the hazard. The Isolate hazard and the E/E/PE safety
system are corresponding approaches to implement the aforementioned measures. Finally,
the Locked hazardous zone, Interruptible hazardous zone, and Interrupted
hazardous action build on the aforementioned and more abstract approaches.
The Automated safety system and the Manual safety ability patterns consider
the human perspective on safety system operation. These patterns are connected to the
E/E/PE safety system pattern and provide an additional insight into the design of
such a system.
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6.4 Discussion
The patterns in this section considered hazard and risk management. The patterns were
categorized into one main category and four topics. Each topic had a different viewpoint
and abstraction level considering hazard and risk management.
The Hazard management process topic introduces a set of engineering or development
time methods and approaches for risk mitigation. These methods are under the control
of the system designer or manufacturer and they are therefore considered preferable
to other approaches. Hazards can also be managed through administrative means and
personal protective devices (NIOSH, 2015), (Spellman and Bieber, 2009, p. 16). The
administrative measures include, among others, training, instructions, warning signs, and
shift systems. In these measures, an employer or other organization needs to provide the
measures. The PPE include protective measures that are worn by employees and people
operating in the hazardous zone. PPEs include, among others, hearing protectors, eye
shields, boiler suits, and helmets.
The main problem with both the aforementioned approaches is the absence of control
from designer and manufacturer perspectives. The system manufacturer cannot force
an organization to comply with the administrative measures or force people to wear
the required PPE. Therefore, this thesis focuses on the measures the designer and
manufacturer of the system can control.
The patterns discussed in this chapter were obtained by applying an evolved pattern
mining process. However, the process lacked direct co-operation with industry and known
uses from automation systems. Still, the known uses from literature and experience were
obtained to the patterns to improve their credibility.
7 Functional Safety System
Development
The domain of functional safety system development is broad and includes several aspects.
The patterns in this chapter regard architecture, co-operation and development aspects
of functional safety systems and their development. The patterns augment the patterns,
categories, and topics introduced in chapters 5 and 6. The pattern mining approach
applied to obtain the patterns in this chapter also produced new known uses for the
patterns discussed in chapters 5 and 6.
7.1 Introduction
The final version of the pattern mining process was applied in the DPSafe project. During
the project, a solid connection with functional safety system development practitioners
was established. Total of 18 interviews were carried out in 13 companies. The main
target of the project was to acquire new design patterns for the participating companies.
During the project new known uses for the previously obtained and documented patterns
(discussed in chapters 5 and 6) were searched and found from real world applications and
developers. Consequently, most of the pattern candidates documented beforehand were
validated during the project, in which the known uses were discovered.
In the DPSafe project, the pattern mining process was not primarily carried out from an
academic viewpoint. The purpose of the project was to spread practices and solutions
applied in functional safety systems and their development between FIMA members. The
known uses were seen as a valuable asset for the patterns, but spreading the ideas was
considered more valuable. Therefore, also pattern candidates with less than three known
uses were documented and reported.
7.2 Final Pattern Mining Process and Validation Approach
The final pattern mining process is described in the following subsections and an outline
of the process is depicted in Figure 7.1. The research process was split into three main
phases: the pattern mining phase, the workshop phase, and the finalizing phase. In the
pattern mining phase, data was obtained through interviewing companies considering
their practices, solutions, and principles regarding the development of functional safety
systems. Pattern candidates were sketched according to the obtained data and material.
Then, selected patterns were discussed in workshops. Finally, the patterns and pattern
candidates were categorized and compiled into a pattern language in the finalization
phase.
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Figure 7.1: The final pattern mining process applied in the research
The new patterns and pattern candidates mined using this process were documented as a
technical report (Rauhamäki and Vepsäläinen, 2016) produced for FIMA. The following
subsections are reproduced here based on the report with major extensions, clarifications,
and modifications.
7.2.1 Pattern Mining Phase
The first step of the pattern mining phase was the material collection effort. The main
method of collecting material for the study was interviews with participating companies.
The aim of the interviews was to gather data considering safety system development. The
interviews were carried out applying a semi-structured interview approach (Edwards and
Holland, 2013, p. 29) (Harrell and Bradley, 2009, p. 27). The researchers had a question
list prepared that was used as a basis for the interview. However, the interviews were
kept purposefully free-form. That is, the question list was not obeyed if the discussion
was flowing freely under the subject of interest. Probe questions were used to gain further
information on specific subjects.
The interview method is one of the methods suggested for pattern mining (Rising, 1998b,
p. 46, 91-92) (Kerth and Cunningham, 1997, p. 56). For most of the interviews, two
interviewers participated, which was found beneficial for the interview as also suggested
by Hove and Anda (2005, sec. 4.1.2). The interviews were not recorded. Instead, notes
were taken. This removed the possibility to go through the interview again, but also
eliminated the amount of work needed to transcript the recorded interview. However, the
notes still needed some post-interview editing such as typing error corrections, filling in
missing words, and generally making the text more readable. After the editing work, the
interview materials were compared and combined. When the interview notes had been
processed and the pattern candidates had been documented, the interviewees had the
possibility to review the notes and the pattern candidates. In some cases, misunderstood
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notes and pattern candidates were corrected as a result of this approach.
The second step in the pattern mining phase was to analyse the collected material. In
this step, the acquired material was studied to identify interesting pieces of information.
The primary focus was to find solutions and approaches used in the development of safety
systems. Both new and already emerged solutions (pattern matching) were considered
desirable findings. In addition, other items such as rationale, context, consequences, and
examples of the solutions were under interest as they supported composing new pattern
candidates as well as enhancing the existing ones.
Identifying relations between the patterns and solutions was a part of the pattern language
building effort. Relationships and structure between patterns were already considered
during pattern mining process. For instance, should a general idea be presented on a
separate pattern and the more practical implementation patterns in their own? Pattern
matching work was carried out alongside the material analysis and relation building steps.
The purpose was to find new instances or uses of existing patterns. The importance of
this step is high as known uses validate the pattern candidates.
When a new solution or approach was identified, it was documented as a pattern candidate
in a design pattern format (see Section 3.5). The pattern candidates were sketched based
on the obtained material and personal experience. If a new known use or new additional
information regarding an existing pattern or pattern candidate was observed, the existing
pattern was updated accordingly. When the material had been analysed, the obtained
pattern candidates and patterns were moved to a repository.
7.2.2 Workshop Phase
The workshop phase resembles the workshop phase applied in PLoP conferences (see
Section 3.3).
The intent of the workshop phase was to refine the documented patterns and pattern
candidates with a broad set of comments from different companies. The workshop process
was as follows: patterns and pattern candidates to be discussed were selected by the
researchers from the repository. Each workshop participant was assigned a pattern to
be read and commented before the workshop. The purpose of this was to ensure at
least one of the workshop participants had read the pattern (candidate) to be discussed
thoroughly. Discussion about each pattern was started with a five minutes reading period
so that all participants would have time to familiarize themselves with the pattern to be
discussed. After this, the assigned reader started the discussion by providing the initial
comments. Typically, after this, the discussion went on and each participant had a chance
to comment and discuss. The researchers wrote down the comments and discussion.
Finally, researchers might ask clarifying questions and summarize the main findings.
On average, six pattern candidates were discussed in a single workshop day. After the
workshop, a refined version of the patterns was written according to the comments given
in the workshop. The workshop discussions and feedback yielded more insight into the
patterns and several new known uses also emerged. On the other hand, some pattern
candidates received justified criticism which either resulted in major changes in content
or a change in the pattern candidate status.
The results of the previous workshop were briefly summarized at the beginning of the
next workshop where the participants had a chance to provide additional comments. The
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Figure 7.2: The potential states of patterns during the pattern mining process
comments were taken into account before updating the repository with an enhanced
version of each pattern (candidate).
7.2.3 Finalization Phase
In the finalization phase, patterns and pattern candidates were categorized, and a pattern
language was compiled based on the relationships of the patterns. The patterns were
categorized according to their purpose and the parts of the system their application is
likely to affect. In this thesis, the latter categorization is considered to be the topics of
the patterns. The finalization tasks were carried out at the end of the project. Some of
the pattern (candidates) were not discussed in a workshop during the DPSafe project.
However, workshops continued in a follow-up project.
Figure 7.2 illustrates the potential states of patterns and pattern candidates as a result of
the pattern mining approach described in this section. The pattern (candidates) started
as ideas emerging from interview materials. Each potential pattern candidate (PC) was
documented. If three known uses were identified for a candidate, it was promoted to a
pattern (P). Both patterns and pattern candidates were discussed in workshops providing
them with workshopped pattern (WP) and workshopped pattern candidate (WPC)
statuses respectively. A couple of patterns were considered controversial or discouraged by
a workshop discussion. These pattern candidates were given the controversial/discouraged
(CD) status.
7.3 Results
The categories of patterns considered in this chapter include co-operation, architecture, and
development related topics in terms of control and safety systems and their development.
The categories (on the right-hand side) and the included topics and their relations are
depicted in Figure 7.3. In addition, the categories and topics also indicate the expected
part or scope of the system, which is likely affected by the application of a pattern.
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Figure 7.3: High level categorization of the patterns in this chapter
The Co-operation category represents the same category as introduced in Section 5.3. In
the context of this chapter, the category is extended with the Co-operation with control
system topic. The patterns in this topic consider how a safety system can co-operate
and potentially benefit from the control system. For instance, some tasks that are not
directly included in the safety system core functionality can be transferred to the control
system, thus increasing the simplicity of the safety system. In addition, new patterns are
introduced in the Co-existence with control system topic.
The Architecture category represents the same category as introduced in Section 5.3. In
the context of this chapter, the category is extended with new topics and new patterns
belonging to the topics already introduced in Section 5.3. The topic of Software architecture
is added. This topic includes both the Software structure and Software functionality
topics. The Communication topic suggests approaches to organizing the communication
within the nodes or processing units of the safety system. The Hardware architecture
topic introduced in Section 5.3 is extended with the Hardware structure topic, which
considers the organization of the hardware components of a functional safety system.
The Development category considers aspects that are related to the development and
manufacturing process of the safety system instead of the functionality and structure of
the system. The development process may produce or use certain Support tools alongside
the process. These tools may include, among others, programming devices, software, and
compilers. A Safety function specification is a part of the development process where the
functions are defined and assigned to nodes.
7.3.1 Patterns for Functional Safety System Development
Table 7.1 summarizes the patterns for functional safety system development presented in
this thesis. The table gives the pattern name pattern, the short description of the pattern
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patlet, and the status of the pattern. The information given is based on (Rauhamäki
and Vepsäläinen, 2016). However, the statuses of the pattern and pattern candidates
resemble the current situation. The available statuses are described in Figure 7.2.
Table 7.1: Patterns for functional safety system development. The patlets have been reproduced
here with updates from (Rauhamäki and Vepsäläinen, 2016).
Pattern Patlet Status
Black chan-
nel
A message bus is a part of a safety function and it needs
to conform to the applicable safety standards. Therefore,
implement a black channel safety features over the mes-
sage bus. In practice, set up a safety protocol between
the standard bus protocol and the application layer.
Related standards: (IEC 61508-2, 2010) referring to to
(IEC 61784-3, 2016; IEC 62280, 2014)
WP
Clock-pulse
synchroniza-
tion
A synchronized action should take place in distributed
nodes attached to a message bus. Therefore, define a
synchronization message that is used to trigger a syn-
chronized action in all the nodes attached to the message
bus.
CD
Certified pro-
cessing hard-
ware
A design and development process to produce processing
hardware compatible with standards considering func-
tional safety system development likely results high de-
velopment costs. Therefore, use certified processing hard-
ware in a safety system implementing a safety function.
In many cases, this eases the development process of the
safety function considerably as the development team
does not have to take the processing hardware itself into
account.
Related standards: (IEC 61131-6, 2012; IEC 62061, 2005;
ISO 13849-1, 2015)
WP
Control sys-
tem OK condi-
tion
A control system should not try to operate a system under
control when a safety system is not available, operational,
or working as specified. Therefore, let the OK-status
information of the safety system be a condition to the
normal operation of the control system.
WP
Core problem
focus
Limited resources of programmers and developers should
be directed to ensure that a safety function to be devel-
oped operates as desired. Therefore, select and favour
programming languages that reduce the need of the pro-
grammers to focus on the computer routine driving in
favour of solving the actual problem.
WPC
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Pattern Patlet Status
Cross moni-
toring
In multi-channel safety function architecture individual
nodes should make sure that they are in a consistent state
with the other nodes. Therefore, arrange a communica-
tion channel between the nodes and send state/status
information between the channels so that each node has
sufficient information to deduce itself being in a consistent
state with others.
Related standards: (ISO 13849-1, 2015)
P
Externalized
parametrisa-
tion
A change in a coded parameter within a safety-related
software part results in a change in the software part
and introduces a need to follow an applicable software
modification process which produces additional work and
costs. Therefore, externalize the factors (parameters)
from the safety-related part of software to enable changes
to the functionality and configuration without changes in
the software itself.
Related standards: (IEC 61508-3, 2010; ISO 13849-1,
2015)
WP
Flashed pa-
rameters
A set of parameters needs to be stored into a non-volatile
structure outside the software. Therefore, store the pa-
rameters in an electrically erasable and reprogrammable,
non-volatile memory such as Flash memory to separate
the parameters from the software code.
Related standards: (IEC 61508-3, 2010)
WP
Generic pro-
cessing hard-
ware
Safety-related software needs to be run on a processing
unit, but ready-made and certified safety system proces-
sors are relatively expensive hardware units. Therefore,
use a generic processor hardware in the safety function
instead of a ready-made and certified hardware unit, but
also develop all the required diagnostic functionalities
and compile required documentation to comply with the
followed standard.
Related standards: introduces challenges with (IEC
61131-6, 2012; Machinery directive, 2006)
WPC
I/O output
grouping
How to arrange the de-energization of actuators and
subsystems without using a relay for each of them? Map
the outputs to the I/O devices so that the output channels
that need to and can be de-energized simultaneously are
in same I/O module.
WPC
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Pattern Patlet Status
Independent
output block
Although an output monitoring functionality is a part of
the overall safety function logic, it does not represent the
core functionality of the safety function. Therefore, im-
plement the output monitoring activities in the (software)
output blocks that produce the outputs and communicate
with the actuators.
Related standards: (ISO 13849-1, 2015)
WPC
Interference
blocking
platform
Non-interference between software elements needs to be
established and justifiably demonstrated. Therefore, use
a premade framework, operating system, firmware, plat-
form, etc. that provides the non-interference between the
software elements.
WPC
Layered
safety archi-
tecture
How to divide responsibilities of the layers related to
checking the safety of commands so that the resulting
system (whole) is safe although the system can be large
and complex and the layers developed by different teams?
Each layer in the hierarchy performs safety checks for
both the commands that they send to lower levels and
for commands that they receive from upper levels.
WPC
Local utility
logic
Non-safety-related functionality should be included into a
multichannel safety system architecture. Therefore, add
a dedicated local utility logic/processor to the system,
which takes care of all the non-safety-related aspects that
do not directly influence the safety function itself.
Related standards: (IEC 61508-3, 2010; ISO 13849-1,
2015)
WP
Monitored
safety limit
A safety system has to be able to dynamically restrict the
values of the process variables of a machine to safe ranges
without the need to implement whole control loops in
the safety system. Therefore, make a control system of
the machine subordinate to the safety system so that the
control system tries to keep the process variables within
safe ranges, and the safety system intervenes if necessary.
WP
Open loop
limp home
In a case of a sensor failure, the sensor data cannot
be trusted, and thus the produced information cannot
be used as a basis for closed-loop control of a system.
Therefore, by-pass the closed-loop controls, for example,
machine velocity control, and use direct controls from an
operator and drive the system using an open loop control
scheme.
WPC
7.3. Results 59
Table 7.1 – continued from previous page
Pattern Patlet Status
Outsourced
display inter-
face
Information including the state, operation, and parameter
values regarding a safety system should be presented to
the user, but adding a display unit in the scope of the
safety system increases complexity, cost, and development
effort. Therefore, use a control system (or other similar
resource that is external to the safety systems) to provide
users with the data and information concerning the safety
system.
WP
Outsourced
failure analy-
sis
The core functionality of a safety system is to produce the
decision: whether or not to activate the safety function. In
several cases the system and its users would benefit from
additional analysis functions such as analysis of failures
in the safety system. However, addition of functionality
in the safety system scope increases its complexity and
consequently the development effort of the safety system.
Therefore, transfer the responsibility for the analyses
of data, including the analysis of fault situations, to a
control system which is outside the safety system scope.
WP
Outsourced
safety calcu-
lations
Deploying complex or resource intensive calculations
within the safety system software is hindered due to
restrictions resulting from the development or execution
environment, or the requirements of a followed standard.
Therefore, execute the algorithms requiring complex cal-
culations and/or functionality outside the safety system
scope.
Related standards: (IEC 61508, 2010)
WPC
Parametrized
limp-mode
A limp-mode requires distinct functionality or operation
and this need to be implemented alongside normal system
control functionality. Therefore, on activation of the
limp-mode, load limp-mode dedicated parameters to the
control software to alter the operation of the system
accordingly to the mode.
PC
Progressing
safety re-
strictions
Activation of a safety function will decrease the potential
of a machine to cause harm, but the activation of a safety
function also likely causes an interruption in use that
is typically an unwanted side-effect. Therefore, react to
evolving hazardous situations by restricting, for instance,
power and speed of the machine, and warn users so that
appropriate actions are taken in time and shutting down
the machine is avoided.
WP
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Pattern Patlet Status
Reference
point switch
A continuous measurement (sensor) can drift from the
actual value due to, for example, wearing, aging, heating,
and catching dirt in the measuring element. Due to the
drift, the measurements provided can compromise safety
functions. For example, a measure could never reach
a zero point. Therefore, in addition to the continuous
measurement, add a (secondary) binary measurement
that is used to provide a reference point to calibrate the
continuous measurement.
WP
Safety
adapter
Including the possibility to interface with all the possible
data providers would increase the complexity of the safety
system in terms of software and hardware. Therefore,
implement interfacing, pre-processing, and filtering of the
measurement (or other kinds of data) in a safety adapter
component that plugs into the safety system.
WP
Safety doc-
umentation
templates
Producing an acceptable documentation for a safety sys-
tem, and achieving increased confidence of compliance
with a followed standard is not a trivial task initially.
Therefore, develop and apply documentation templates
for (the software parts of) the safety system development
to support the certification and development processes.
Related standards: (IEC 61508-3, 2010, Annex A and B)
WP
Single packet
tactic
When a failed element recovers into a normal opera-
tional state, the communication between the element and
other connected elements should need to continue in a
normal way. Specifically, the recovery should happen
without the need to explicitly setup the communication
(i.e. handshake etc.). Therefore, implement a stateless
communication scheme between the communicating ele-
ments so that each sent and received package includes all
the information required by the consumer.
WPC
Software
fuse
After the safe state has been entered, it must be made
sure that the state is maintained until appropriate actions
are taken by the operator. Therefore, when entering the
safe state, transfer the safety system into an inactive
state from which it cannot be recovered except through
a restart.
WPC
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Pattern Patlet Status
State change
permission
Transitions between states of a system may have undesired
consequences if taken when components and subsystems
have inconsistent states, e.g., when some components and
elements are in inappropriate ranges. Therefore, check
that a state transition is safe and will not cause danger
before initiating the transition.
WP
Synchronized
control
device actua-
tion
A system should ensure that controls are actually affected
by the user as intended. Therefore, implement a checking
functionality to ensure that a control is not permanently
forced (e.g. taped) into a certain state that enables usage
in single hand mode.
Related standards: (ISO 13851, 2002)
WP
Traceability-
driven change
management
How to minimize the re-work related to changes in exist-
ing safety systems of machines when changes are required
or when all future configurations are not known before-
hand so that parametrisation could be used? Start by
identifying the first artefacts in the traceability chain that
require modifications because of the changes.
Related standards: (IEC 61508-3, 2010, sections 7.4, 7.8.2,
Annex A)
WP
Two-level
safety func-
tions
A complete shutdown of a machine including electron-
ics, hydraulic, motors, etc., is typically able to take the
machine into a Safe state (Eloranta et al., 2014), but
such an approach can also decrease the availability of
the machine and increase the time to revert back to op-
erational state. Therefore, apply two kinds of stopping
approaches. The primary one tries to stop the machine
in a controlled manner whereas the secondary one relies
on shutting down the machine completely.
WP
United in-
tegrity level
In order to deploy software elements of different integrity
levels (PL/SIL) on a single execution environment, the
separation between the software elements needs to be
shown and documented. This increases complexity of
the system and the development effort, e.g., in terms of
documentation. Therefore, elevate the integrity level of
each element deployed on a shared execution environment
to match the highest required integrity level of all the
software elements.
Related standards: (IEC 61508-3, 2010, section 7.4.2.9)
WP
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Pattern Patlet Status
Units of mea-
surement
Applying different units of measurement may cause logi-
cal mistakes in a software operation and result in severe
consequences in the context of safety functionality. There-
fore, take units of measurement (e.g., length, time, or
mass) and a unit prefixes (e.g., mega, nano, or pico) as a
part of a strong type system.
Related standards: (ISO 13849-1, 2015, section 4.6.2)
WPC
Tedious safe
state by-pass
An existence of a way to overcome restrictions introduced
by a safety (or similar) system may encourage to use a
system to an unintended purpose even though such func-
tionality should only be used to transfer the system from
an acute hazardous state to more suitable one. Therefore,
make the safety function bypass possible, but ensure that
nobody wants to use the by-pass mode for anything but
the emergency situation.
WP
User-warning
hazard indica-
tion
How to assist a user of a system to achieve safe operation
of the system in presence of underlying hazards for which
it is not necessary to develop safety functions? Inform
the user about the detected hazardous situation and leave
the responsibility of appropriate reaction to the user.
WP
Validate non-
trusted input
data
Data needs to be fed into a safety system outside its
scope, for instance, through a non-safety-related part
of the system which effectively invalidates the integrity
and credibility of the data from safety system point of
view. Therefore, ask for user confirmation that the data
is correct.
WP
XOR-
monitoring
An AND gate produces correct output in case of input
combinations of 0 0, 0 1 or 1 0 -> Control = 0, but it
cannot indicate fault states of the inputs (1 0 and 0 1).
Therefore, add an XOR gate parallel to the AND gate
and provide it with the same inputs as the AND gate to
produce an alert signal for further use.
WPC
7.3.2 Pattern Topic Categorization
Figure 7.4 categorizes the patterns given in table 7.1 under the topics defined in Figure
7.3. The topics describe the main area of concern regarding the included patterns. That
is, for instance, the topic of the Monitored safety limit pattern belongs to System
architecture.
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Figure 7.4: Functional safety system development patterns arranged according to their topic.
Reproduced from (Rauhamäki and Vepsäläinen, 2016).
7.3.3 Pattern Purpose Categorization
Figure 7.5 illustrates the purpose of the patterns. Here, the purpose describes the target
outcome or result or the aspect enhanced, supported, or increased as a result of the
application of the pattern. Some of the patterns illustrated in Figure 7.5 have been
included in multiple categories. Some of the patterns could be potentially included in a
number of other categories too, but for the sake of clarity, such a detailed categorization
is omitted here. The following list defines the purpose categories in which the patterns
presented in this chapter belong to. Where named identically, the categories extend the
purpose categories introduced in Section 5.3.3.
Control system co-existence A control system can supplement the safety system and
potentially take some of the tasks that should be otherwise
implemented by the safety system. The latter approach
likely reduces the development cost of the safety system
so there is a rationale to minimize the scope of the safety
system in terms of functionality.
Quality attribute enhancement A set of quality attributes can be used to reflect the quality
of a system. Application of a design pattern typically
promotes some of the attributes but may hinder others. In
this classification, the most dominant attribute has been
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Figure 7.5: Functional safety system development patterns arranged according to their purposes
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considered when the patterns have been assigned to the
categories.
Safety functionality In some cases, a relatively straightforward functionality
for a safety system is sufficient. However, in some cases,
more elaborated functionality is desirable due to, among
other things, performance or user experience reasons. The
patterns in this category support achieving advanced safety
functionality.
Division of responsibility In a typical case, the elements of a safety system need
to be partitioned and modularized. The patterns in this
category suggest an approach to assign responsibilities to
the modules and parts of the system. Both hardware and
software aspects need to be considered.
Distribution In some cases, a safety system may utilize multiple nodes
operating in collaboration to implement a safety function.
The patterns in this category aim to enable the distribution.
Communication arrangement This category is related to the distribution category. When
the nodes or elements of a system are distributed, they
need to communicate in order to implement the desired
functionality.
Fault tolerance These patterns support the ability of a safety system to
retain safety in the presence of faults. Typically, this means
reverting the system under control into a safe state when
a failure or error is identified.
Variability support Changing a safety system in terms of software or hardware
is not a trivial or easy task. Therefore, such a situation
should be avoided. One way to achieve this is to add
variability to the safety system so that it can adapt to the
current and potentially future uses and environments.
Hardware Although safety system logic is implemented in software,
some hardware is still needed. The selection and structure
of hardware typically affect the development process and
the price of the safety system in terms of hardware. The
patterns in this category suggest approaches to various
situations to select a suitable hardware configuration for
the system in design.
User consideration Users can both augment and hinder the operation of a
safety system. Therefore, user actions should be consid-
ered in safety system design by providing the user with
possibilities to retain the system in its safe operating range
and on the other hand trying to enforce the users to operate
the system as it was designed.
Development process In the context of safety system development, the develop-
ment process typically generates a considerable amount of
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costs. Approaches to minimize and ease the process help
to reduce the development cost similarly.
7.3.4 Pattern Language Part
Figure 7.6 illustrates the pattern language related to the patterns and pattern candidates
presented in this chapter (solid line) and documented in (Rauhamäki and Vepsäläinen,
2016). The language has been augmented with selected patterns of author’s previous
work (dash line) including patterns and pattern candidates from (Rauhamäki et al., 2015).
To supplement the language even further, patterns from external sources have also been
included to provide connections between pattern languages. The external patterns (dash
dot dot line) are referenced from (Eloranta et al., 2014; Freeman et al., 2004; Hanmer,
2007).
The language part shown here is made from the point of view of the patterns and pattern
candidates presented in this chapter. Therefore, it does not directly reflect the pattern
language parts given in Figures 5.5 and 6.5. Nevertheless, Separated safety can be
seen as a centric pattern also in this language part. It provides grounds for various other
patterns expanding into larger pattern groups in the language.
7.4 Discussion
The patterns presented in this chapter do not necessarily increase the overall safety of
the target system as such. Instead, they help the system designer and manufacturers to
implement the safety functions in a cost efficient and development efficient way. However,
this can also be seen as a viewpoint to increase safety. It is not always necessary to put
every potential element of the safety-related parts of the control system to the safety
system. This increases development effort as the standards considering functional safety
system (software) development typically require tasks that are not necessary for normal
control application development. The saved development effort can then be invested in
new safety functions or other issues such as the removal of a hazard, which also promote
the overall safety properties of the system in design.
The pattern candidate approach worked well. It was found efficient to present the idea of a
solution or an approach in the form of a pattern candidate to the industry representatives.
This helped to gain feedback and new known uses regarding the candidates.
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Figure 7.6: Pattern language part of the functional safety system development patterns.
Reproduced from (Rauhamäki and Vepsäläinen, 2016).

8 Summary and Discussion
8.1 Research Questions Revisited
RQ1: How can design patterns support the development of functional safety
systems?
When mined with an appropriate approach, design patterns present solutions and ap-
proaches that have been successfully applied in the design and development of functional
safety systems. In such cases, patterns can be considered to reflect the concepts of
well-tried solutions or components preferred by standards such as (IEC 61508, 2010; ISO
13849-1, 2015). When patterns are arranged in the format of a pattern language, the
design process can at least partially become a decision-making process where the relations
between the patterns indicate the suggested order and other inter-pattern aspects. In the
context of functional safety systems, design patterns can help to alleviate the bureaucracy
by indicating approaches to fulfil certain requirements or sections of standards or direc-
tives. Another way to cope with the standards and their requirements is to find ways to
minimize the scope of functional safety systems, for which the patterns in the context of
this thesis were also identified.
In addition to patterns and the pattern languages, a pattern mining process is also a
resource that can be used to support the development of functional safety systems. A
mining process aims to transfer tacit knowledge from the designers’ experience and the
documentation of existing systems into the explicit format of the design patterns and
pattern languages. Patterns help to transfer information between parties, partly because
of the information becoming explicit. In addition, if a pattern mining process involves
multiple industrial participants and workshops, discussions between the parties help to
spread knowledge and ideas in the industry. Finally, the same aspects can help to increase
the awareness of the applied solutions. The increased awareness can encourage one to
apply a similar approach and thus increase the available solution space from which to
select the most suitable approaches to the design in hand.
RQ2: Is there a set of commonly applied solutions for functional safety system
designs utilized and known by domain experts and practitioners? Which topic
categories do the solutions contribute and belong to? What purposes do the solutions
serve?
Solutions for functional safety systems, their structure, functionality, and development
applied commonly in various machines and systems were identified. For many of the
solutions and approaches, at least three independent known uses were found during the
research. The solutions and approaches having at least three known uses were considered
patterns in the context of this thesis whereas the solutions which lack at least three known
uses were considered pattern candidates. In addition to the three known uses, the patterns
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and pattern candidates were exposed to criticism and discussion in pattern workshops.
The discussions supported the existence and applicability of several of the patterns and
pattern candidates. However, some of the solutions and approaches documented in the
patterns received justified criticism, and therefore the usage of the corresponding patterns
was discouraged.
The identified patterns considered several topics including architecture, co-operation
and co-existence with a control system, hazard management, and development processes
regarding functional safety systems. The patterns promoted and enhanced, among
others, fault tolerance, safety system scope reduction, co-operation, hazard and risk
mitigation, functionality, and user consideration. Most of the patterns emerged from
machinery applications, but some of them were recognized to also apply in process control
applications.
RQ3: How do the design patterns for functional safety system development
relate to each other? What kind of whole emerges from the identified design patterns?
What kind of relationships can be used the describe the relations between the design
patterns?
The pattern language and the relations between the patterns have been formed incremen-
tally through the research process. The pattern language parts presented in chapters 5, 6,
and 7 link to and complement each other and patterns from other pattern languages to
build a broader whole than the individual parts of the language alone. An illustration
of the whole pattern language based on the patterns presented in this thesis is given in
Figure 8.1.
The patterns can, among other things, support, detail, benefit from, require the presence
of, utilize, enable, realize in, and provide an alternative to other patterns. In addition,
the patterns can be arranged to a typical or preferred order of application. The relations
between the patterns form the resulting pattern language. The pattern language format
helps a user of the patterns to select and apply suitable patterns. The relations between
the patterns form paths through the language that supports especially designers with less
experience in functional safety system design and development.
RQ4: How to document emerging solution models and approaches applied
in the field of functional safety system engineering into a design pattern
format? Is the generic design pattern format suitable for documenting the commonly
known solutions? Is there a need for a specialized format or elements to be used for the
solutions in the functional safety system domain?
The identified solutions were documented in a design pattern format applying a modified
version of the canonical pattern format. The applied format utilizes the fields introduced
by the canonical format, excluding the resulting context and rationale fields. The resulting
context field was considered to be redundant with the context emerging from the solution
description. Similarly, the rationale was reflected in the consequences field, stating the
pros and cons of the approach.
The only safety system specific field used is the related standards field. This field provides
links to the standards and their sections that the described solution may, among others,
implement, support, hinder or conflict with. The field was used whenever a clear relation
to a certain standards or preferably a standard section was identified. When a certain
standard is followed in the development of a functional safety system, the developer needs
to ensure and justify that all the requirements of the standard are fulfilled. When a
pattern is applied, the link makes it easier to trace which standard section the solution
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covers completely or partly. This eases the burden of the developer as the relevant
standard sections can be identified with less effort.
During the pattern workshops (described in sections 3.3 and 7.2.2) it was noted that, in
most cases, the participants were able to understand the patterns and read the approach
as intended. This aspect supports the pattern approach as a format to document the
solutions applied in the development of functional safety systems.
8.2 Discussion of the Study
8.2.1 Pattern Mining Approach
The patterns and the pattern language described in this thesis are targeted for the domain
of functional safety systems. The goal for the research work carried out for this study has
been to provide support for the designers of functional safety systems. This has affected
the applied pattern mining process. The development of functional safety systems is
heavily based on standards. The standards provide requirements and recommendations
considering the work and design flows, architecture and methods to be used in the
development process of functional safety systems. Therefore, the applicable standards
can also be seen as a possible foundation for design patterns considering functional safety
systems and their development.
As a general guideline in the pattern community, a credible pattern is expected to have
three known uses (Holzner, 2006, p. 282) (Kohls and Panke, 2010) (Eloranta et al., 2014,
p. 88). This aspect forms a guideline for pattern mining as a mark of credibility of
the pattern. Still, a design solution without three known uses can be considered useful.
The solution or approach can, regardless of the number of the known instances, solve a
problem encountered by a designer. In the context of this thesis, three known uses have
been pursued for all the patterns. However, the lack of three known uses has not been
taken as a restriction to propose pattern if it has had the potential to support a designer.
In the initial pattern mining process (see Section 5.2), the guideline of three known uses
was overridden by the potential to provide the designers with ideas and approaches to be
applied in the development of the functional safety systems. This made it possible to
introduce the pattern candidates for public discussion in an early state of the research.
Later, known uses from the industry and literature were obtained for the patterns.
The evolved version of the pattern mining process (see Section 6.2) gave more thought on
the three known uses required for patterns. Consequently, three known uses were obtained
before a pattern was published. Regardless, this phase of the study leaned on literature
sources rather than known uses from the practitioners or the documentation of real world
applications. Still, the resulting patterns align well with the applicable standards and
practices considering functional safety system development and achieving safety.
The final pattern mining approach (see Section 7.2) was the closest match with the
process described by Eloranta (2015, p. 39). In this phase of the study, co-operation with
practitioners from industry was established to first identify new applied solutions and then
learn new known uses for them and previously identified patterns. Although interviews
were a centric data collection method in this phase of research, pattern candidates were
also used. That is, patterns without three known uses were also shown to industry
representatives. It is acknowledged that such an approach to gather known uses can
be problematic as the interviewee could try to match a more or less different solution
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to the pattern. However, the same problem can also occur when a researcher matches
the statements of interviewees to existing patterns. During the interviews, the industry
representatives had the opportunity to decline that the approach is known or used or
leave the question unanswered.
The early documentation and publication of the patterns also had some apparent benefits.
The most visible benefit was the ease of discussion with practitioners. It was relatively
easy to begin a discussion with industry representatives considering a solution or approach
by showing an initial concept, draft, or picture of the solution. During the DPSafe project,
many of the known uses were found by showing and discussing a pattern draft. One of
the factors may relate to the fear of giving away a valuable piece of information. However,
as the pattern is already documented, it may encourage the interviewees to share their
knowledge as it is already apparent that the researcher knows the pattern. In such a
case, the interviewed persons do not disclose unique organizational secrets by providing
or sharing the solution with the researchers.
8.2.2 Applicability of the Patterns
The patterns for which known uses from industry have been identified have also been
implicitly applied in industrial project environments. These patterns include at least the
ones mentioned in Functional Safety System Designer’s Handbook - Design Patterns for
Safety System Development (Rauhamäki and Vepsäläinen, 2016), Chapter 7, and many
of the ones presented in Chapter 5 for which new known uses were identified during the
DPSafe project. However, the documented patterns and the pattern language have not
been tested in a new real-world project environment after the patterns and the pattern
language have been compiled. In discussions with industry representatives, the patterns
and the pattern language have been mentioned as having a good potential and value.
The value was seen in the mined patterns, the pattern language, and the pattern mining
process. For example, a DPSafe project participant mentioned that ‘the project implied a
very good value for the invested resources.’ The participants have considered the patterns
to provide new ideas and support the use of the approaches as some demonstration of
previous usage has been given. However, no organized test to validate the patterns and
their suitability in practical design work has been established. In the context of this
thesis, the validity of each pattern lies on the known uses and the workshop discussions
regarding the patterns.
The produced pattern language cannot be considered to cover all the aspects related to
the development of functional safety systems. Arguably, some categories and topics are
omitted and missing from the language. However, patterns and pattern languages are
artifacts that should be considered to be constantly evolving. This, alongside an open
community of industry representatives to be approached with the pattern mining process
described in Section 7.2, provides a good premise for extending and enhancing the pattern
language as well as the individual patterns of the language.
8.3 Future Work
The future work related to the thesis includes the extension of the pattern language as well
as the validation of the patterns. The need to extend the language emerges from the fact
that the pattern language and the patterns do not fully cover the field of functional safety
system development. Most likely, new patterns to augment the current language could be
discovered by organizing more interviews or obtaining documents etc. of functional safety
8.3. Future Work 73
systems to be researched and studied. The patterns and the pattern language provide a
core collection of the results that have been obtained so far rather than a final truth or
state of the matters. This also reflects the nature of design patterns. They are constantly
evolving artifacts that should never be considered finished, instead of being once written
and cemented ever after.
Another work not considered in this thesis is the validation of the patterns. This can be
seen to include two viewpoints: gathering more known uses for the patterns and trying to
apply them in industrial development projects. Known uses can be, for instance, obtained
by arranging interviews on functional safety systems and their development as done in
the final pattern mining approach of this thesis. When a new known use is identified, it
is quite straightforward to augment the known use in the pattern description.
The latter aspect, that is, the validation of the patterns in industrial development projects,
is intentionally left outside the scope of the thesis. Arranging such a validation would
require a completely different research approach and experimentation compared with
the approach in the context of this thesis. The interesting questions here would include,
among others:
• What kind of effect do a design pattern approach provide on development efficiency?
• Do design patterns help to increase the quality of functional safety systems in terms
of, for example, cost efficiency, dependability, or new safety functions?
• Is it easier for a novice designer to start with or without patterns?
• How would the patterns and the pattern language be applied in practical designs?
Would they be used separately or sequentially as suggested by the language?
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Figure 8.1: Pattern language for functional safety system design and development
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Abstract—Development of safety systems for modern industrial 
control applications is challenged on the one hand by ever 
growing systems and on the other hand by increasing cost 
pressures. That is, design process efficiency is a crucial aspect. 
How to efficiently utilize existing engineering knowledge and 
document suitable approaches to the common problems of the 
domain? Design patterns provide a design process with 
solutions. Design patterns can represent existing knowledge 
from past projects or illustrate solution blueprints inspired 
indirectly, e.g., by safety standards. Thus, they provide a 
designer with support for design decisions during a 
development process. 
Keywords-design pattern; safety; control system; engineering 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Safety awareness is constantly increasing across 
engineering disciplines, regulative governing bodies as well 
as customers. This trend results in an increasing demand for 
higher safety integrity levels as well as broadens the product 
spectrum in which safety systems are deployed. On the other 
hand, safety system engineering has a constantly increasing 
need to make the design process efficient in terms of 
schedule and cost. These issues lead to pressure to increase 
the efficiency of the safety system development process. 
Engineering industry produces vast amounts of tacit and 
explicit knowledge during customer and R&D projects. This 
knowledge is a valuable resource that can be used to increase 
efficiency when available in a suitable format. Explicit 
project knowledge is typically left as is, i.e., produced 
knowledge is archived, but it is not indexed or otherwise 
edited to be easily accessible. Engineers can access the 
information, but they need to know exactly the project id, 
subsystem, diagram etc. to locate the existing solution to the 
problem they are working with. In the context of safety 
system development explicit existing knowledge could be, 
for example, a solution to arrange communication between 
safety-critical and non-safety-critical subsystems according 
to a safety standard. Tacit knowledge is another source of 
valuable engineering knowledge. Tacit knowledge is 
knowledge of individuals or organizations, not available in 
explicit documented format. In a context of safety system 
development tacit knowledge could be for instance a  
solution model of an engineer to a certain problem.  
Development of a safety system is bureaucratic and 
costly, typically regulated by legislation, regulations and 
standards, which set requirements for the development 
process. Typical requirements are sets of certain safety 
functions that need to be implemented in the system and 
collections of methods and techniques that need to be 
utilized to achieve sufficient safety integrity levels of the 
safety functions to reduce risks into a tolerable level. The 
standards, legislation and regulations require various matters, 
but give little to no solutions on how these requirements can 
be fulfilled not to mention guidance for practical safety 
function implementation. 
Our proposed solution for the problems above is 
application of design patterns in the field of safety system 
development. Design patterns document solutions to 
problems commonly encountered and they have proven their 
value in engineering disciplines such as software engineering 
[1]. In software engineering large amounts of patterns have 
been identified and documented. 
The contribution of this article is to show how design 
patterns could benefit the engineering process also the in 
domain of safety system development. We indicate the 
rationale to use design patterns in the safety system 
engineering domain, which is not similar to traditional 
software engineering though some reasons of use are 
obviously the same. Problematic issues related to patterns in 
context of safety system engineering are discussed to provide 
a broader viewpoint. This also provides a premise and 
rationale for further studies considering the topic. 
The article is organized as follows. In section II we 
provide background information on design patterns and the 
domain. Section III presents related work and positions the 
research. In section IV we present a generalized model of a 
development process in which safety related aspects are 
involved and illustrate pattern usage in such a process. In 
section V the justification for the usage of design patterns in 
context of the safety system development is discussed in 
detail. In section VI, the challenging issues of design pattern 
usage in the domain are pointed out. Sections VII and VIII 
discuss future work and conclude the article respectively. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Patterns in engineering 
The concept of design patterns originates from 
Christopher Alexander’s book: A Pattern Language: Towns, 
Buildings, Construction [2]. The book illustrates 253 patterns 
considering architecture, urban design and community 
habitability. Thus, the roots of design patterns are originated 
in a domain that has been studied and used for hundreds of 
years. This illustrates the original nature of design patterns, 
which is to document solutions identified from real world 
applications. 
Alexander defines design patterns as abstracted solutions 
to recurring design problems in a given context [2]. This 
definition is also adopted by the Design Patterns: Elements 
of Reusable Object-Oriented Software [3], which considers 
design patterns in the domain of software engineering. The 
definition includes the three main elements of a design 
pattern: context, problem and solution. Patterns illustrate 
solutions to problems that can be applied, in a suitable 
context, many times but never end up with completely 
identical solutions.  
An analogy for pattern solution application can be found 
in interior furnishing. An apartment building may have 
dozens of apartments with the same floor plan, but none of 
the apartments is similar in interior decoration. When 
residents move in an apartment, they furnish it, i.e., let us 
assume they apply an imaginary “Furnish for habitability” 
pattern. The context of the pattern is an unfurnished and 
empty apartment, the problem is the low habitability of an 
unfurnished apartment and the solution is to furnish the 
apartment with furniture, textiles and other decoration 
elements to improve habitability. As none of the apartments 
have identical furnishing the “Furnish for habitability” 
pattern has been applied multiple times but ending up with a 
distinct outcome each time. 
Process patterns illustrate processes used to complete a 
task. The purpose is to divide the execution of a task into 
steps and provide instructions how to execute the steps to 
complete the whole task. [4]. Process patterns also represent 
the context, problem, solution paradigm. 
B. Two kinds of control systems 
Safety systems often, though not always, co-exist and 
sometimes also co-operate with ordinary control systems. A 
control system is a system consisting of sensor(s), logic(s) 
and actuator(s). In this sense, a control system is similar to 
an E/E/PE (Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic) 
safety system. 
The purpose of a control system is, however, different 
from the purpose of a safety system. The main purpose of a 
control system is to control a machine or a process to 
produce a desired output, e.g., rolls of paper or printed circuit 
boards. The purpose of a safety system is to ensure the safety 
of humans, environment and machinery itself, i.e., the main 
concern of a safety system is to prevent the realization of 
hazards. 
The problem is that the tasks of these two systems 
differentiate in purpose. A safety system tries to retain the 
system in a safe operation state whereas a control system 
tries to maximize the output of the system. To carry out the 
tasks the same process variables need to be considered. The 
situation is even worse as the systems often have opposite 
preferences considering the state of the system. 
C. Some patterns for functional safety system development 
In our recent research projects, we have focused on 
safety system principles and architectures. It was noted that 
patterns for safety systems are not available although 
patterns for the related domains are considered (see section 
III). However, we see potential in patterns in the domain of 
safety system development. During the recent projects, we 
have identified and developed patterns for the development 
of safety systems. Table I summarizes the patterns published 
in VikingPlop’12 [5]. 
The patterns consider various aspects of safety systems. 
The Separated safety and the Productive safety patterns 
consider the co-existence and distribution of liabilities 
between the safety and main control systems. The Separated 
override, De-energized override and Safety limiter patterns 
illustrate approaches to override the main control system 
with a safety system. The approaches have distinct 
redeeming features and downsides. For instance, the 
Separated override pattern emphasizes separation between 
the systems whereas the Safety limiter pattern allows 
cooperation between the systems and reduces the amount of 
needed hardware. The Hardwired safety pattern proposes 
usage of a hardwired safety system instead of a software 
based solution in a suitable context. 
TABLE I.  FUNCTIONAL SAFETY SYSTEM PATTERNS [5] 
Pattern Description 
Separated 
safety 
Development of a complete system according to safety 
regulations is a bureaucratic and slow process. Therefore, 
divide the system into basic control and safety systems and 
develop only the safety system according to safety 
regulations. 
Productive 
safety 
A control system utilizes advanced and complex corrective 
functions to keep the controlled process in the operational 
state. These functions are very hard to implement in a 
safety system. Therefore, implement the corrective 
functions in a basic control system and use simple(st) 
approach for the safety system. 
Separated 
override 
A safety system must be able to override a basic control 
system whenever systems control same process quantities. 
Therefore, provide the safety system with a separate 
actuator to obtain a safe state. 
De-
energized 
override 
A safety system must be able to override a basic control 
system whenever systems control same process quantities. 
Therefore, let the  safety system use de-energization of the 
basic control system’s actuator(s) to obtain a safe state. 
Safety 
limiter 
A safety system must be able to override basic control 
system whenever systems control same process quantities. 
Therefore, disengage the basic control system completely 
from the actuator and let the safety system control the 
actuator. Route the output of the basic control system to 
the safety system and let the safety system treat the control 
value so that safe operation is ensured. 
Hardwired 
safety 
Development of safety-related application software for 
simple safety function is bureaucratic, time consuming and 
costly. Therefore, instead of a software-based solution, use 
a hardware-based safety system. 
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III. RELATED WORK 
Design patterns have been studied and documented in the 
field of software engineering extensively covering for 
example object-oriented software [3] and [6], Pattern-
oriented architecture [7] and [8], enterprise applications [9], 
[10], and service-oriented architecture [11]. These books 
concentrate on software engineering for desktop and server-
side applications and architectures. Though these patterns 
may be usable in safety system development they are not 
focused on safety aspects. 
Fault tolerance is a part of safety system design as safety 
systems should preferably be fault-tolerant to be able to 
operate under fault conditions and ensure safety. However, 
fault-tolerance is not a sufficient condition for safety. Fault-
tolerant software can be hazardous in a safety system if the 
functionality of the software is hazardous, e.g., due to 
erroneously set requirements. Design patterns for fault-
tolerant software systems have been introduced, for example, 
by Hanmer [12]. 
E/E/PE safety systems include both hardware and 
software components. Armoush [13] and Douglass [14] 
introduce design patterns covering software and hardware 
aspects of safety systems. The presented patterns are focused 
on redundancy, which, again, is an approach to increase 
reliability and fault-tolerance of a system. 
Eloranta, Koskinen, Leppänen and Reijonen [15] have 
studied distributed machine control systems and documented 
patterns for the design of such systems. Some of the patterns 
are also related to functional safety aspects. The application 
domain of the above patterns is closely related to our design 
patterns considering safety system development and 
architecture [5]. 
Koskinen, Vuori and Katara have studied and developed 
process patterns for the application of the IEC 61508-3 
standard. In their article [4] they stated that process patterns 
can speed up the training of inexperienced engineers and 
remove ambiguities typically related to safety standard 
application. This provides additional support for the usage of 
patterns in the domain of safety systems. 
Riehle [1] properly points out three main usage areas of 
design patterns in current software industry practice. These 
areas are communication, implementation and 
documentation. In this article, we consider how these usage 
areas are transferable into safety system engineering.  
IV. GENERALIZED SAFETY SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT 
PROCESS 
In this section, a generalized process for the development 
of safety-related E/E/PE systems is illustrated. The purpose 
is to provide an idea about how pattern usage can relate to 
such a process. The illustrated process is inspired by the IEC 
61508-1 overall safety lifecycle [16] and eight steps to safety 
[14].  
Development of a safety system begins with the 
definition of the overall scope of the EUC (Equipment Under 
Control) and the concept of the system. In this phase 
understanding about the system and its environment is built. 
In this context process patterns can be used to identify EUC 
related aspects (e.g., what are typical characteristics of, for 
example, bending machines) and typical machinery 
concepts. 
Hazard and risk analysis follows the scope definition. 
Hazard and risk analysis forms a significant part of the 
development process as the results directly impact on the 
coverage of the safety system and selection of safety 
measures and safety integrity levels. Patterns can be used to 
identify typical hazards related to specific systems 
(machinery type) and processes (operations executed by the 
machinery). Process patterns can be used to describe and 
interpret the phases of the hazard and risk analysis as 
required by the followed standard.  
When the risks are defined, the requirements for the risk 
mitigation methods are documented in the requirement 
specification phase. This includes the definition of the risk 
mitigation methods, safety functions, and the non-functional 
requirements and safety integrity levels related to them. 
Patterns can be used to document typical approaches to 
mitigate risks with the positive and negative effects related to 
the approaches thus providing support for decision making. 
The requirement specification phase can also be supported 
with process patterns. For instance, the Software Safety 
Requirements Specification pattern in [4] illustrates a 
requirement specification process mined from the IEC 61508 
to provide help and document the sub phases of this 
development phase. 
As the requirements for safety measures and functions 
are defined the process can continue on to the realization of 
safety system. The phase consists of design and 
implementation of the safety system. In this phase of 
development process, patterns have value as the level of 
abstraction suits well to describe solutions to design and 
implementation problems. The patterns provide designers 
with documented solutions to commonly encountered safety 
design problems. However, the patterns also provide 
information about consequences related to application of 
them. This enables an engineer to select the most suitable 
solution by justifying the consequences. For instance, the 
three override patterns described in Table I illustrate 
different approaches to a design problem where a safety 
system should be able to override a control system. Each of 
the solutions has their own consequences and the designer 
can choose the one that is the best fit for the system under 
development. Process patterns can support the realization 
process by, e.g., providing support to carry out the recurring 
phases of development such as the modification or 
architectural design of the software [4]. 
The implementation part of the realization phase can be 
supported with design patterns as in this phase engineers 
encounter a large number of common problems where design 
patterns are able to provide solutions. The patterns applied in 
the implementation phase often represent a lower level of 
abstraction and provide focused solution models to lower 
level implementation problems. 
The rest of the development process relate to validation, 
verification, testing, installation and maintenance aspects. 
Process patterns for validation and verification document and 
help to follow the processes. For instance, patterns for 
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validation and verification in context of the IEC 61508 are 
provided in [4]. Maintenance of long life cycle systems 
benefits from the usage of design patterns as known solution 
models are used. 
V. RATIONALE FOR DESIGN PATTERN USAGE IN SAFETY 
SYSTEM ENGINEERING 
As illustrated in Section II/A design patterns have 
redeeming features in context of the software engineering 
domain. However, the software engineering domain, at least 
desktop software engineering, is different from safety system 
engineering. Of course, software systems are a part of 
modern safety systems, but the nature of a pure software 
system is distinct from a safety system. In the following 
subsections rationale for the usage of design patterns in 
safety system engineering is discussed. 
A. Ability to avoid physical damage 
Normal application/desktop software, run on a personal 
computer, mobile device, server or similar device, has 
limited possibilities to interact with its environment. 
Potential physical risks associated with such devices and 
applications are, for example, overheating, electric shock, 
battery malfunctions and fans none of which are directly 
controllable by the application software ran in the system. 
That is not to say that application software cannot be critical. 
For example, a failure of banking, insurance or other large 
scale business system may inflict massive losses to its 
owners in form of revenue or work contribution losses and is 
thus considered critical. However, no (direct) human, 
environmental or machinery related hazards exist in such 
cases. 
Systems in which safety systems are deployed are able to 
cause hazardous situations for humans, environment and 
hardware by their nature (if not, no safety control system 
would be required). Industrial and machinery control 
systems operate actuators (e.g., fans, valves, and heaters) 
process devices (e.g., conveyors, robots, and guillotines) and 
substances (e.g., toxic chemicals or hot fluids) that are 
hazardous for humans, environment and the systems itself. 
As the safety systems are dedicated to mitigate risk related to 
such machinery they are expected and required to have 
certain level integrity to carry out the safety functions. 
Design patterns document good approaches, practices 
and solutions common in safety system development. This 
provides designers with tried solutions to problems as well as 
removes the need to reinvent the wheel thus resulting in a 
more productive development process as well as solutions 
with a justified approach. The development burden is 
decreased and the designers can focus on details as patterns 
describe the main solution model. 
B. Experience as a valuable resource in safety system 
development 
In the field of safety system engineering, well-tried 
solutions are welcome as they have additional empirical data 
to back up applicability. By identifying patterns from 
existing projects and designs and making the solutions 
explicit in patterns, experience can be transferred from one 
engineer to another. Design patterns support the illustration 
of experience in explicit format by requiring the pattern 
writer to consider different aspects of the solution. This work 
is carried out in consideration on the context in which the 
solution can be used, consequences and the resulting context 
related to the solution. Patterns document (or at least they 
should document) also negative consequences, preconditions 
and assumptions related to pattern application. This provides 
engineers with a foundation to use or not to use certain 
solutions and compare them against each other to select the 
best approach for the problem under consideration. 
A good approach is to document the proven solutions of 
past projects into patterns to be used in forthcoming projects. 
In this way, the patterns are directly related to the domain, 
they can be written to solve a dedicated problem and the 
consequences are known. That is not to say one should limit 
to such patterns only. Third-party patterns may provide 
fruitful insight into other kinds of solution models and open 
new kinds of approach possibilities to solve a certain kind of 
problem with more desirable consequences. 
Experience illustrated in format of patterns, also provides 
a name for the solutions and approaches. This enables the 
usage of patterns as a part of communication [1], but requires 
that the patterns have reached awareness of the engineering 
community using them. When this point is achieved, patterns 
can be used in communication to illustrate the solutions and 
approaches described in design patterns. For example, safety 
system engineers could discuss about how to override a 
control system with a safety system: “I think separated 
override [5] would be a good approach in this situation.”, “I 
disagree; I find separated override an excessive action as it 
would require an additional safety actuator. Maybe we 
should consider de-energized override [5] instead”, “That is 
true, de-energized override is a more cost-effective approach 
in this case.” 
C. Alleviating bureaucracy 
Development of safety systems is regulated by directives, 
legislation and standards such as [17], [18], [19]. Such 
documents are written partly from a legislative point of view, 
are too generic to cover various applications and domains, 
and do not (want to) strictly enforce a certain approach. 
These aspects restrict the documents from providing solution 
models. Rather such documents require various techniques, 
methods, and processes to be used in the development of 
safety systems, but give minor importance on examples or 
other guidelines for any specific implementation. In addition, 
the documents are massive, often hundreds of pages long, 
which makes finding solutions difficult. This does not mean 
standards etc. are useless; they just have a different view to 
safety systems compared with patterns. The standards 
provide a framework that is applied in a certain way to 
develop the system. The framework describes methods and 
techniques to develop safety systems and, e.g., define what 
to verify and validate when a safety system is being 
developed. This is certainly a valuable aspect in safety 
system development. 
The purpose of patterns in this context is to supplement 
the standards and document the solution models and 
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approaches compliant with the given requirements. The IEC 
61508-3 [20], for instance, illustrates a number of techniques 
and measures to be used in the development of safety-critical 
software. However, little information on how these 
techniques shall be used and what kind of solution models 
they (may) produce is given. Especially safety-related 
standards can prove hard for a person with limited 
experience in the development of safety systems [4]. With 
design patterns, solutions and approaches to implement 
techniques and measures required in standards can be 
documented, which illustrates the usage of design patterns as 
a source of implementation [1]. Process patterns can be used 
to capture the recurring tasks in the development of a safety 
system [4]. 
In context of safety system development the value of 
patterns is fully established when patterns are mined from a 
system that has already found compliant with a safety 
standard. This adds confidence in the solution model validity 
in context of the considered safety standard. Such patterns 
can increase development process efficiency as the solution 
model can be used in other systems with a fairly good 
confidence as long as the context described in the pattern 
matches the context in which the pattern is applied. The 
solution, approach or method once approved in a 
certification process or assessment for standard compliance, 
for instance, is useful as it provides at least the main solution 
framework for the problem under consideration. 
Development of a safety system also requires extensive 
documentation. This is required, e.g., to illustrate compliance 
with a standard considering development of a safety system 
or an informal document illustrating the safety foundation of 
a system, which can be used as a part of safety assessment of 
a system. Design patterns can be used for documentation 
purposes [1]. The applied patterns and roles of the patterns 
can be marked in a document (e.g., in a diagram). For an 
experienced pattern user this quickly indicates the type of 
solution used (described by the pattern). The need for 
reading textual representations decreases as the reader can 
obtain the information on the roles of the system elements 
directly from the diagram. In an informal supplementary 
documentation usage of well-known safety related patterns 
can be justified. The reader is able to identify the patterns 
applied and assess their suitability in context of the safety 
system under consideration. However, in context of the legal 
safety system documentation, the usage of patterns in 
documentation does not remove the need for textual 
representations as the usage of pattern notation in the 
documentation does not cover the whole functionality and all 
the aspects of the applied solution. 
D. Co-existence of control and safety systems 
A safety system often co-exists with a main control 
system as stated in section II. Although safety and control 
systems are designed to be separated, they often need to be 
connected some way (e.g., to share state and operation 
information). This aspect further increases the amount of 
work needed to design an operational entity consisting of 
safety and control systems. 
Integration of safety and main control systems is 
sometimes, especially in context of larger processes, a 
unique design. The operation and responsibilities of the 
safety and control systems need to be defined and fitted to 
operate in harmony. If such a system is repeatedly designed 
from scratch, a great amount of design work needs to be 
redone. In such situations the design process may greatly 
benefit from the reuse of templates [21], model libraries and 
similar ways of reusing existing designs developed in a 
specific development environment. However, templates and 
library solutions as such are not a good fit to document 
solution models and approaches on a generic level. This is 
due to the fact that solutions are bound to the implementation 
environment: the solutions are described in terms of the 
implementation environment/tool. Such an approach 
complicates the understanding about the solution on a higher 
level of abstraction.  
Contrarily, patterns provide a format to document 
solutions on a platform independent level. This enables the 
documentation of solutions, which can be used in different 
implementation environments as long as the context and 
other prerequisites are considered. The benefit of a pattern 
approach is that one is able to take the idea from a pattern 
and adapt the principle of the solution to solve the problem 
in hand, thus increasing the efficiency of the design process. 
1) A case for pattern usage in design of safety and 
control system co-existence 
This section illustrates a case for usage of design patterns 
is design of system in which safety and control system 
operate the system under control. The functional safety 
system patterns introduced in Table I illustrate solutions for 
safety and control system co-existence. The patterns describe 
approaches to arrange the responsibilities of the systems and 
override of the control system. The idea is to divide the 
responsibilities so that the development of the safety system 
is as lightweight as possible, but the safety system still is 
retaining full control over the machinery.  
A potential design decision flow to utilize the patterns is 
illustrated in Fig. 1. The figure illustrates the pattern relations 
of the patterns in Table I. The Separated safety pattern is 
applied first to the system under development. This decision 
results separated safety and control systems and only the 
safety system has to be developed according to safety 
standards, which decreases the development burden 
considerable as the control system (which is typically a 
larger entity than the safety system) can now be developed 
Separated 
safety
Productive 
Safety
Separated 
override
Safety 
limiter
De-energized 
override
Hardwired 
safety
Related pattern
Alternative solution
  
Figure 1.  Design flow using functional safety system patterns [5] 
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without safety standard conformance. 
When the system is divided into safety and control 
system, the Productive safety pattern can be considered. It 
suggests that the control system implements the basic 
interlock mechanisms that (try to) keep the system in a 
normal operational state as far as possible. The interlock 
mechanisms can be as complex as needed as they do not 
need to conform to the safety standards. The actual safety 
functions are implemented on the safety system and they can 
be rather simple because the control system keeps the 
machinery in the normal operational state. The safety system 
can, for instance, only implement an emergency shutdown of 
the machinery when the control system has failed to retain 
the normal operational state. This approach simplifies, and 
thus potentially lowers the cost of, the safety system 
development and implementation. 
As the safety system must be able to drive the system 
into a safe state regardless of the control system state, the 
designer needs to implement such functionality. The three 
override patterns provide three distinct approaches how the 
safety system can override the control system on the actuator 
level. The designer can compare the suggested approaches 
and select the one with most desirable consequences 
regarding the system under control. For instance, if 
separation between the safety and control system is the main 
concern, the Separated or De-energized override pattern is 
the most appropriate. However, if there is a need to lower the 
amount of actuators or use advanced safety functionality, the 
Safety limiter pattern may be a better alternative. 
The above workflow illustration also depicts the potential 
of pattern language utilization. The designer uses a pattern 
language as a framework and selects the most appropriate 
patterns to design the system. The pattern language supports 
the design process by defining relationships between the 
patterns. The relationships illustrate, e.g., patterns that are 
applicable after a certain pattern has been applied, 
conflicting patterns or patterns that solve problems, which 
may arise when a pattern is applied. 
E. Maintainability of common solution models  
An important feature of control systems, especially in an 
industrial domain, is long life-cycles. As safety systems are 
part of control structures of a system, they also have long 
life-cycles in similar applications. The maintenance phase of 
a system may contribute considerably to a large part of 
system design and development costs when the whole life-
cycle costs of the system are considered. Thus the 
maintainability of a safety system is an important aspect to 
be ensured during the initial development process of the 
safety system. 
Maintenance of a system is easier if the system is 
intelligible. Usage of design patterns can improve 
intelligibility through common vocabulary. If design patterns 
are used in system development and documentation [1], the 
maintenance team can more easily understand the system 
concepts and execute maintenance operations to the system. 
Naturally this requires that both the developer and the 
maintenance team know and understand the used patterns. 
This, in practice, requires either company’s internal patterns 
or widely adopted patterns related to the domain. 
VI. CHALLENGES IN DESIGN PATTERN USAGE IN SAFETY 
SYSTEM ENGINEERING 
Patterns have qualities that justify their usage in the 
development of safety systems. However, some challenging 
issues can be identified as well. To provide ample insight 
into patterns the issues of patterns are discussed in this 
section. 
Patterns are not exact. As mentioned, patterns (typically) 
describe solution on a relatively high abstraction level so that 
they can be used and implemented in multiple ways. In 
safety system development exactness and completeness are 
considered virtues that patterns can, but often do not, 
provide.  
Usage of patterns may lead to inconsistent understanding 
between system developers. A pattern can be implemented in 
many ways and each person has a unique mindset about a 
pattern. Thus patterns are not applicable as safety 
documentation as such. However, when a set of patterns has 
been used extensively, the patterns may become a part of a 
communication language that clarifies the ideas shared 
between individuals [1] and thus may act as a supporting 
form of documentation. 
A developer may misunderstand pattern solutions or use 
them in contexts not suitable for the pattern. A similar issue 
is naturally related to all situations when documented 
solutions are applied. One can also misunderstand solutions 
illustrated in a book, journal article or data of a preceding 
project. 
Patterns are not meant to be detailed illustrations of the 
solution (though some patterns indeed illustrate details). 
Instead, they typically provide a generic framework of the 
solution, which the designer can apply in the environment in 
which the problem is considered. This is one of the strengths 
of patterns, but it is also a potential issue. A pattern author 
may have accidentally or intentionally left out some 
information that would be needed to be fully able to consider 
all the side-effects of the pattern.  
If a pattern reader is unfamiliar with the domain the 
patterns consider, an incorrect overall picture could be 
adopted. Though patterns consider various aspects of the 
solution, they cannot take into account all the relevant 
aspects. In the domain of safety system engineering artefacts 
relate to each other in complex manners. A single pattern 
cannot consider all these aspects as it would shift the focus 
of the pattern. Thus the reader should regard patterns with a 
healthy sense of criticism when they are applied. 
Patterns may encourage designers to stick with existing 
solutions. Often the reuse of solutions is a productive way to 
go and well-tried solutions are valuable in the field of safety 
system engineering. However, this should not mean that 
reuse of solutions is the only way to go. New, more efficient, 
simpler, and better approaches cannot be developed if old 
solutions are constantly used. It has to be identified if the 
design benefits from the reuse of solutions and when one 
needs to focus on creating a better, novel approach to the 
problem in hand. 
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VII. FUTURE WORK 
Our future effort is expansion of our safety system 
development related pattern collection [5] and development 
of tool support for a semantic search of patterns. The target 
of the pattern collection expansion is to construct a pattern 
language that could serve safety system developers. Another 
aspect is to study the effects of pattern usage in practical 
development processes. Empirical studies on pattern usage in 
the development processes of safety systems would provide 
insight into widening the usage of patterns. 
The semantic search for patterns eases pattern discovery. 
Semantic relations between pattern data are being developed. 
This enables the search of patterns supported with a semantic 
deduction engine to identify patterns with similar features 
and consequences as given in the original search. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In this article, we have illustrated rationale for using 
design patterns in the development of safety systems. The 
foundation of usage of patterns lies in the idea of providing a 
way to document tacit and existing knowledge into an 
explicit format. When experience is formatted as a design 
pattern, it can become common knowledge that can serve in 
documentation, implementation and communication 
purposes. 
Safety systems are parts of critical systems that are able 
to cause physical damage. The sole purpose of a safety 
system is to prevent the hazardous situations leading to 
physical damage. Well-tried solutions and approaches 
documented in patterns can help in the development of a 
dependable and cost-effective safety system. Development of 
safety systems is heavily regulated by standards and 
legislation, which require methods, techniques and processes 
to be used, but provide few practical solutions. With design 
patterns practical solutions can be documented into an 
intelligible format while providing room for modifiability. 
Cooperation between a control and a safety system can 
prove to be a burdensome task especially if it is made from 
scratch. This may occur in larger control system projects for 
large scale unique plants. In such cases patterns provide a 
valuable engineering resource as they describe solution and 
approaches on an abstract level. This enables a designer to 
apply the approach in a suitable way considering the system. 
Design patterns also have some drawbacks in context of 
safety system development. They are not exact and accepted 
as documentation or proof of compliance. Still patterns can 
help to improve development process and share knowledge. 
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Abstract—Design patterns illustrate qualities and features that 
would suit well in current understanding of safety system 
development, design and documentation. However, though a 
number of design patterns for safety system development have 
been proposed, the focus has been on individual quality 
attributes such as fault tolerance and reliability. The 
systematic use of design patterns in the development process 
has received less attention. In this paper, we discuss and 
illustrate extended usage possibilities for design patterns as 
part of safety system development. We discuss a design pattern 
language that we are developing to cover, e.g., safety system 
architecture, scope minimization and co-operation with basic 
control systems. Use of patterns for documentation purposes, 
tool support for using patterns, and rationale for the pattern 
approach are discussed as well. 
Keywords-safety system; software; design pattern; safety 
standard; tool support 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Design patterns are a means to systematically promote 
the re-use of design and proven solutions to recurring 
problems and challenges in design. Each design pattern 
represents a general, reusable solution to a recurring problem 
in a given context. Triplets of problems, contexts and 
solutions are also the essential pieces of information in 
patterns. In addition, pattern representation conventions can 
include, among others, relations to other patterns. With such 
relations describing, for example, rational orders to use 
patterns, patterns can be combined to collections and to 
pattern languages. Depending on patterns, the natures of their 
solution parts can vary too, for example, from source code 
templates to text and Unified Modeling Language (UML) 
illustrations. 
Software safety functions are software parts of usually 
multi-technical systems, the purpose of which is to ensure 
the safety of controlled processes and plants. Unlike many 
other software systems, safety systems are developed 
according to standards. The standards govern the 
development lifecycle activities, as well as techniques and 
applicable solutions of such systems. However, although 
design patterns have been specified also for safety system 
development, their systematic use has not been researched in 
the domain. This is surprising because the use of patterns 
could facilitate both design and documentation activities, 
which are equally important in safety system development. 
In this paper, we address the aforementioned issues. The 
contributions of the paper are as follows. We rationalize how 
and why design patterns, which have already shown their 
value in software development, in general [1], could be 
especially useful in safety system development. We discuss a 
design pattern language for safety systems, which has been 
developed and published iteratively and is to be finalized 
during DPSafe project in collaboration with Forum for 
Intelligent Machines (FIMA) in the machinery domain. 
Lastly, we discuss and rationalize the role of tool support in 
facilitating the use of patterns and in benefitting from 
patterns. 
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 
reviews work related to design patterns and the use of design 
patterns in safety system development. Section 3 presents a 
view on the development of software safety systems and 
rationalizes why and how design patterns could be 
beneficial. In Section 4, we discuss a design pattern language 
for safety system development that has been developed at the 
Tampere University of Technology. Before conclusions, 
Section 5 discusses the role of tool support when trying to 
benefit from patterns. 
II. RELATED WORK 
The design pattern concept was originally presented by 
Alexander [2][ 3] in the building architecture domain to refer 
to recurring design solutions. In software development, 
design patterns begun to attract interest after the publication 
of the Gang of Four (GoF) patterns [4]. Thereafter, 
collections of design patterns have been gathered and used 
for various purposes in various domains. Results from their 
use have included, among others, improvements in quality of 
code, as well as improved communication through shorthand 
concepts [1]. 
Design patterns have also been developed for special 
purposes and application domains, including critical [5] and 
distributed [6] control systems. In the functional safety 
domain, especially, patterns already cover many solutions 
and techniques that are recommended by standards, such as 
IEC 61508 [7] and ISO 13849 [8]. For example, related to 
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architecture design in [7], there are patterns to implement 
redundancy [9] and recovery from faults [10]. 
Pattern languages, on the other hand, aim to provide 
holistic support for developing software systems by using 
and weaving patterns and sequences of patterns [11]. For 
embedded safety system development, for example, a large 
collection of (both software and hardware) patterns for 
various problems is listed in [5]. However, the multi-
technical collection is not regarded as a pattern language, per 
se. 
Partially because of reasons to be discussed in the next 
section, documentation is of special importance in safety 
system development. A developer of a software safety 
system needs to be able to prove the compliance of the 
application to standards. Otherwise, the application cannot 
be used in the safety system. However, certifiable safety 
applications are not made by coincidences but by designing 
the systems and applications systematically, with 
certifiability in mind. As such, also the software parts need to 
be specified (modeled) prior to their implementation. On the 
other hand, the suitable solutions (patterns) that are used in 
the applications should already be visible in the models. 
Otherwise, the use of the patterns would not be documented 
in the models and valuable information could be lost. 
It is thus clear that the systematic use of design patterns 
in safety application development requires tool support for 
the patterns already in the modeling phase. This is regardless 
of whether or not the models can be used in producing 
(automatically) executable code as, e.g., in Model-Driven 
Development (MDD). Using and applying patterns in UML, 
which is currently the de-facto software modeling language, 
has been addressed in several publications. For example, 
work has been published to specify patterns in a precise 
manner [12], to apply patterns to models [13, 14], to detect 
pattern instances [15, 16] and to visualize pattern instances in 
models and diagrams [17]. However, without extensions the 
support for patterns is still weak in UML [18].  
III. PATTERNS IN SAFETY SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT 
The development of safety functions is governed by 
standards, such as IEC 61508 [7], IEC 62061 [19], and EN 
ISO 13849-1 [8]. These standards guide the development of 
safety systems involving electric, electronic and 
programmable electronic control systems in their operation. 
Regardless of the variety of standards, we outline a generic 
development process for safety systems common to the 
aforementioned standards. The simplified process is 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
The development process begins by the definition of the 
concepts and scope of the system to be developed. This 
includes forming an overall picture of the system and 
defining the boundaries of the system/machine to be 
analyzed or made safe. The next step is to carry out a hazard 
analysis and risk assessment. The role of this phase is centric 
as only known risks can be consciously mitigated. Otherwise 
risk mitigation measures have no justification. Typically, risk 
assessment includes hazard identification, risk estimation 
and evaluation. The former provides an indicator for the risk 
and the latter assess the impact of the risk, that is, is the risk 
tolerable or not. Intolerable risks need to be mitigated or 
made tolerable otherwise. 
As the risks are assessed, the requirements considering 
the system safety can be justifiably made. In this phase, 
suitable risk reduction methods are selected and their 
requirements are documented. In the context of this paper it 
is assumed that the risk reduction method is a protective 
measure depending on a control system to implement the 
required functionality. In addition, the allocation of the 
measures is done. That is, to allocate the measures for 
dedicated functions. 
The next phase is the development (realization in IEC 
61508 terminology) of the safety functions allocated in the 
previous phase. The development process starts with 
compiling a requirement specification for the safety 
functions. The specification should include both functional 
Concept and scope definition
Risk assessment
System safety requirements definition and 
allocation
Development of safety function
Safety function requirement 
specification
Hardware design Software design
Safety function system integration
Validation of safety function 
performance
Overall installation, commissioning and safety 
validation
All safety functions implemented? No
Yes
Modification or new
 hazard gererated?
Yes
 
Figure 1.  Simplified safety system development process according to EN 
ISO 13849-1 [8] and IEC 61508 [7] 
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descriptions, what the functions need to do, and non-
functional descriptions, how or within which restrictions the 
functions need to operate.  
Quite often, the non-functional descriptions include the 
specification of performance or integrity levels for the 
functions. When the requirement specification is completed, 
the hardware and software design can begin. In this state the 
hardware and software parts of the safety function are 
designed, potentially with separation between the design 
teams. Thus, hardware and software integration needs to take 
place along the design process. At this point, a functional 
entity can be constructed including both the hardware and 
software to be used in the final system. Finally, the results of 
the safety function development are verified to match the 
safety function requirements and required 
performance/integrity levels. If unimplemented safety 
functions exist, the development process is reinitialized for 
the next safety function. 
A. Utilization of patterns in safety system development 
In the context of safety system development and design, 
design patterns can be used to capture and provide solution 
models for techniques and applicable solutions that are 
recommended and/or required by applicable standards. In 
this case, a design pattern captures the solution that is used in 
order to fulfill the requirements and recommendations of a 
standard. Such design patterns can be linked to the parts of 
the standards for which the design patterns provide a 
complete or partial fulfillment or help to achieve to fulfill the 
standard requirements. This kind of approach also supports 
building the libraries of named solutions. That is, the patterns 
support the awareness and usage of the solutions. 
One can justifiably argue that standard solutions to 
recurring problems have been applied in safety system 
development and other domains of engineering for years –
without necessarily calling them patterns. However, their 
unconscious use may not have eased the task of documenting 
the systems. Since design patterns provide names for 
solutions, they can be used in communication, too [1]. 
Though initially applicable to discussions and face-to-face 
communication, design patterns can be used as a part of 
written and diagrammatic documentation. This is achieved 
by referring to the solution illustrated by a pattern with the 
name of the pattern that should be both illustrative and 
related to the application context. 
The documentation aspect can be achieved by marking 
the patterns in, e.g., diagrams that are used as a part of the 
system documentation. This can enhance traceability 
between the standard solutions and their practical 
applications in systems. For a pattern-aware person, this may 
increase the understandability and traceability of the design 
decisions, too. To take further advantage of this setup, 
statistics could be gathered to see which patterns are used the 
most and in which kind of situations. It can also be noted that 
the quality attributes understandability and traceability are 
similarly components of systematic integrity acknowledged 
by IEC 61508 [7]. 
Other viewpoints supporting the utilization of design 
patterns in safety system development include for instance 
[20]: 
 Patterns document well-tried solutions and thus 
condense experience on proven solutions, which is 
of special importance in the domain. The approach 
resembles, for instance, the proven in use concept 
defined by IEC 61508. 
 Patterns can alleviate bureaucracy by providing 
practical solutions and approaches to fulfil 
requirements given to safety system development in, 
for example, standards. Bridging the gap between 
the requirements and design and implementation 
eases the burden of designers. 
 Patterns create the vocabulary of solutions to 
domains. Assuming that the patterns are known by 
both the developer and maintainer of a system, 
patterns can help to communicate the structural and 
operational principles of the system. This aspect thus 
improves the communicability and maintainability of 
the system. 
B. Safety system patterns 
In the context of this paper, we are especially interested 
in design patterns for safety system development, called 
safety system patterns here. These patterns are, or at least 
they are meant to be, most useful in the development of 
(functional) safety systems. This does not indicate that the 
patterns could not be used for other purposes as well. 
However, the contexts of the patterns relate them to the 
safety system development. It is up to the readers or appliers 
of the patterns to judge whether the solutions are applicable 
outside the indented contexts of the patterns, too. 
It should be noted that a pattern does not necessarily 
illustrate the cleverest or the most innovative solution or 
approach to the defined problem. Instead, the preferable 
approach is to provide proven solutions and approaches that 
have been utilized successfully in practice, in real projects 
and systems. This is, on one hand, targeted to provide 
assurance on the applicability of the solution, for instance, in 
the eyes of an inspector. On the other hand, the most 
innovative solutions might promote other quality attributes 
than simplicity, which is one of the most important driving 
qualities behind a safety system development. 
So, which parts does a safety system pattern consist of? 
In our work, we have used a slightly modified canonical 
pattern format [21]. That is, each pattern documents the 
context, problem and solution. They are complemented with 
forces, consequences, example, known usages and related 
patterns, see Figure 2. The triplet of context, problem and 
solution provides the main framework for the patterns. These 
aspects should provide sufficient information to apply a 
given pattern. However, the other aspects, for instance, 
support the selection of the most suitable pattern and help to 
identify other potentially applicable patterns. The former 
aspect is achieved through the definition of forces and 
consequences. Forces relate to the context, refine the 
problem, and direct the solution to the one selected to be 
illustrated on the pattern. On the other hand, consequences 
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provide hints to select a solution proposed by a certain 
pattern. Presumably one wants to select a pattern or a 
solution that has the most positive consequences and/or the 
least negative consequences produced by the solution. 
In addition to the mentioned pattern aspects, safety 
system patterns could be complemented with an aspect 
indicating the applicable performance level (PL), safety 
integrity level (SIL), or similar quantity. This is to indicate 
for which purposes or levels (as defined in standards) the 
pattern can be used. [21]. For certain patterns or solutions 
such indicators can be given directly and for others such 
indicators are indirect or cannot be given at all. For instance, 
a pattern implementing cyclic execution behavior could be 
recommended or highly recommended on all safety integrity 
levels (as defined on IEC 61508-3:2010 table A.2 [7]). 
How and where can design patterns then be obtained? 
Foundationally, design patterns document recurring 
solutions. The basic assumption is that at least three known 
usages for a solution need to be obtained to call a solution a 
design pattern [22]. Keeping this in mind at least the 
following pattern mining approaches can be considered. 
As standards, such as the mentioned IEC 61508 and EN 
ISO 13849-1, provide requirements considering safety 
system design and development, they are potential 
candidates as source information. One potential approach is 
to take requirement clauses or required techniques or 
methods and search and provide practical solutions to fulfil 
the requirements. Depending on the standard and case, the 
standard may or may not provide instructions on how to 
actually apply and use required methods, techniques and 
clauses. Thus treating such elements as problems yields a 
way to found similar solutions and format them as patterns. 
For instance, one could consider graceful degradation, which 
is at least recommended on all SIL levels (as defined by IEC 
61508-3:2010 table A.2), and mine patterns to design and 
implement graceful degradation on software. Using this 
approach, the integrity (or performance or similar quantity) 
levels can be directly linked to the patterns. 
Literature and similar sources provide a feasible source 
for pattern mining. Solutions found from different literature 
sources can be considered pattern input. However, 
potentially the most credible sources for pattern mining are 
existing systems and their documentation. In the context of 
safety system patterns, such sources would be safety 
systems, their documentation and developers. To provide 
additional credibility for the mined safety system patterns (at 
least from the standard point of view), the patterns should be 
mined from inspected and approved systems. Such merit 
supports the patterns as the solution has been used as a part 
of an approved system. It should be noted, however, that a 
pattern originating from an inspected system does not 
directly implicate that the new system in which the pattern is 
applied, would be automatically approved. Nevertheless, 
such a pattern provides support and trust to believe that the 
solution is approvable in similar context. 
Thus, ideally safety system patterns are mined from 
existing, inspected, and approved safety systems. As such, 
the solutions should be applicable on similar integrity level 
systems and also on lower levels although this is not always 
the case. Actually, by looking for instance IEC 61508-3 
Annex A, this is not always the case. There are methods and 
techniques highly recommended, e.g., on SIL 3-4 and only 
recommended on SIL 1-2. Apparently the method or 
technique is still applicable, but it may be considered too 
heavy-weight or expensive for the lower integrity levels. To 
complement this approach, the inspection process and results 
could be systematically used to document the approved 
solutions in the form of patterns. During the process, the 
inspector approves and declines some of the solutions, 
approaches, and design decisions, which should be 
considered valuable input for future work. In the end, the 
inspections cost money and other resources to the customer 
so it is rational to try to minimize the process and to learn 
from mistakes and successful designs. Such work would 
support one of the purposes of patterns in the first place, that 
is, the systematic reuse of solutions. 
IV. A PATTERN LANGUAGE FOR SAFETY SYSTEMS? 
First of all, what do we mean by a pattern language? A 
pattern language is in our case a set of patterns that consider 
the same domain and are interconnected through relations. 
According to Eloranta et al., a pattern language is a concept 
“guiding the designer in building a coherent whole using 
patterns as building blocks” [6]. In this context, building 
block mindset, pattern relations and shared domain context 
between the patterns is seen centric to form the grammar to 
use the patterns. In practice, the pattern language defines 
restrictions, rules and suggestions on how to compose the 
designs of the provided building blocks. [6]. A collection of 
patterns, in contrast to a pattern language, does not have to 
have grammar or relations between the patterns. 
The relations promote co-usage of the patterns as they 
guide a designer through the language by providing her with 
links indicating patterns that can be considered next, 
alternative, specialized and incompatible solutions related to 
the pattern that has been recently applied. Although the 
described approach may ease decision making, it may also 
narrow the designer viewpoint. A pattern language cannot 
include all possible solutions and the ones that are included, 
Problem
Solution Context
Forces
ExampleKnown uses
Consequences
illustrate
validate
has
direct
refine
relate
Related
patterns
point alternative,
next to consider,
specialisation, etc.
may
indicate
new
 
Figure 2.  The pattern structure used in our safety system patterns. 
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do not necessarily introduce the best alternative for a 
problem or situation under consideration. 
One way to utilize the pattern language in design work 
was described above. The mentioned pattern relation based 
language walkthrough approach is a rather optimistic view at 
least if a large context is considered. Safety system 
development as well as other system development is a 
process consisting of multiple phases. Covering all of these 
with a single language of patterns is a large scale problem 
itself not to mention how to parse a meaningful language by 
establishing the pattern relations and interconnections. Still, 
patterns can provide pinpointed solutions to encountered 
problems and the related patterns may offer ideas during the 
design process. From our perspective, this is a more feasible 
use case for a safety system pattern language. To support the 
usage of the language, the patterns should be, however, 
grouped so that they resemble the corresponding design 
phases. That is, architectural patterns would benefit 
architecture design phase issues and implementation patterns 
(or idioms) the implementation phase issues. 
The safety system design pattern language developed at 
the Tampere University of Technology has currently some 
50 patterns and/or pattern candidates and some of them have 
been discussed in the workshops of patterns conferences 
[23]-[27]. (Pattern candidates are initial pattern ideas that do 
not yet have three known uses, that is, they are under 
construction. We have found writing pattern candidates an 
excellent way to communicate the ideas and find new known 
usages for the pattern candidates.) 
In its current state, relations have not been specified for 
all the patterns of the language, but there are relations 
between the individual patterns. For example, patterns can 
specialize more general solutions in stricter contexts. Thus 
one could say the language lies somewhere between a pattern 
language and a collection of patterns at the moment. 
However, our purpose is to develop a full pattern language 
for safety system development. 
We started the work in 2010 and the patterns have been 
collected, developed and published under various projects 
such as SULAVA, ReUse, and currently under DPSafe 
project. In the DPSafe project, we are working with several 
companies involved one way or another in safety systems 
design and development in the context of machinery 
applications. The target of the project is to mine and 
document design patterns considering software based safety 
functions and systems as well as gain new known uses for 
the existing patterns and identified pattern candidates. The 
participating companies include machinery producers, 
engineering offices, as well as software houses so there is 
potential to have different relevant views on the subject. 
The patterns are targeted to safety system development. 
Currently, the language includes patterns and pattern 
candidates considering, for instance: 
 development process 
 risk mitigation strategies 
 architecture and principles in terms of 
o software 
o hardware 
o system 
 co-existence with control system 
 scope reduction 
In contrast to, for example, redundancy, diversity and 
other fault tolerance related matters, the sub domains 
mentioned above seemed to have less attention by pattern 
community. Thus our purpose is to extend the pattern 
approach to cover larger part of the safety system 
development outside the fault tolerance aspect. According to 
our work carried out in the DPSafe project, there seems to be 
a clear need for such an approach.  
V. ON TOOL SUPPORT FOR DESIGN PATTERNS 
Whereas some of the benefits of patterns described in 
Section 3 could be achievable in any case, it is clear that tool 
support for patterns could increase their benefits 
significantly. For example, even without tool support, pattern 
names can become a part of the developer vocabulary [1]. 
Without a doubt, recurring solutions have also been used in 
the domain. However, using patterns to improve the 
traceability of standards solutions, for instance, would 
certainly benefit from automated functions already during 
the specification and modeling of the applications. 
Unfortunately, the support for patterns is in current software 
modeling tools restricted, at best. The purpose of this section 
is to discuss opportunities and challenges related to pattern 
tool support in safety system development. When 
appropriate, lessons learned from the previous work of the 
authors [18] will also be provided. 
A. On Pattern Modeling 
As mentioned, tool support for patterns is currently weak. 
For example, the pattern concepts of UML, structured 
collaborations [28], restrict patterns to describe the contents 
of the UML classifiers only. Thus, elements such as 
components and packages that would be useful in describing 
architectural patterns (for instance) cannot be used in 
patterns in UML [18]. The variety of published patterns in 
literature, however, covers problems on different levels of 
design and for various purposes. It cannot be said that all the 
patterns would be related to classifiers (classes) when all 
patterns are not even related to software systems. The origin 
of the (pattern) concept is in building architectures [2, 3] and 
there are also, for example, multi-technical pattern 
collections (such as [5]) with both software and hardware 
aspects. It is thus clear that the UML pattern concepts are 
currently too restricting, by nature. 
With respect to the modeling of multi-technical patterns 
mentioned above, they could be used in SysML models, 
which are not restricted to software. However, the use of 
patterns would not have to be limited to modeling languages 
at all. For example, patterns could be equally useful in, for 
example, Computer Aided Design (CAD) tools and software 
Integrated Development Environments (IDE), in aiding 
practical design and programming work. Similarly to 
software engineering, also other engineering disciplines most 
certainly have recurring problems with known solutions. 
While acknowledging this, in our work [18] the focus in 
developing tool support has been on safety systems and their 
UML and Systems Modeling Language (SysML) based 
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modeling in a Model-Driven Development (MDD) context. 
With new pattern modeling concepts and by integrating them 
into both UML and SysML, the aim has been to support 
hardware aspects in addition to software and UML modeling. 
Safety systems are also systems that are developed and 
approved as a whole. Good practices and documentation are 
needed not only for software parts but for all parts of the 
systems, regardless of their implementation technologies. 
However, while the developed approach [18] currently 
allows pattern definitions and instances to consist of 
practically any modeling elements, the approach suffers from 
the drawback of not being easily portable to standard tools. 
B. On Pattern Instances 
In addition to (more or less) formal approaches, e.g., that 
of UML, modeling tools could support patterns also in an 
informal manner. Informal support has been developed into, 
e.g., MagicDraw that enables instantiating patterns from 
libraries by copying modeling elements. This functionality is 
not restricted to classifiers as is the case with standard UML. 
However, copying patterns (informally) can support mainly 
the aspect of using the solutions and not necessarily using the 
information about the use of the solutions. Copying model 
elements may not enable storing information about the 
elements being part of a pattern instance so that the 
information could be used for, e.g., documentation purposes. 
There is existing research, e.g., [15] and [16], on 
detecting pattern instances in design models by searching for 
model structures that are similar to pattern definitions. 
However, it is questionable whether the use of such work 
would be an appropriate solution in safety system 
development. A developer does not use a design pattern by a 
coincidence. Instead, developers decide to apply patterns 
because they are facing challenges that they aim to solve 
with the solutions of the patterns. As such, it is natural that 
the decisions, which are architectural decisions, should be 
documented. Why should one try to guess whether a pattern 
has been applied when the decision could have been 
explicitly marked in the model when applying the pattern? 
Identifying pattern instances based on markings could 
also be more reliable by nature than trying to detect instances 
with, for example, the mentioned comparison techniques. 
When patterns are used in design, they are applied to 
contexts in which it is feasible to use context specific names 
and to include additional properties. For example, a non-
trivial subject (in an Observer [4] instance) should probably 
have properties (etc.) that the observer would be interested 
in. With context specific names, properties and surroundings 
(in the model), the results of comparisons could be less 
reliable. However, by marking pattern instances explicitly, 
the information should be as reliable as documentation is in 
general. In the end, it would be about the reliability of the 
developer that marks the pattern instances. 
It is thus clear that the information on pattern occurrences 
should be stored (i.e., the pattern occurrences marked) when 
they are created. This is also the case in the approach of the 
authors [18]. Patterns, however, could be in general 
instantiated both manually and in a tool-assisted manner and 
the initiatives (to instantiate patterns) could come from either 
a developer or a tool. 
C. On Instantiating Patterns 
In a simple, conventional case, pattern instances can be 
assumed to be always created manually. In this case, it is 
natural to assume the markings (about the pattern instances) 
to be created manually, too. Otherwise, a tool would need to 
– somehow - know about a pattern being applied although 
the task would be performed by a developer. A tool could 
also include support for marking the pattern instances - 
without assisting in the pattern application task itself. 
However, also in this case the responsibility over the 
(possibly easily forgotten) marking task should be taken by 
the developer who knows about the pattern being applied. 
Assuming that the pattern application process would be 
assisted by the tool, also the markings could be on the 
responsibility of the tool because the tool would know about 
the application. This thinking has also been used in our work 
[18]. When patterns are created with an interactive wizard, a 
developer can justifiably expect the tool to handle the 
markings. However, markings can be edited (and created) 
also manually. For example, functions to manually edit 
markings are needed when deleting or editing a pattern 
instance. 
D. On Initiatives to Instantiate Patterns 
In order to actively suggest a design pattern to be applied, 
the tool should have the ability to identify both the context 
and the problem at hand (in the design task) and to notice 
that they correspond to the context and problem of the 
pattern. If the active party was the developer, the tool would 
not necessarily need to have all the abilities. A set of 
suggested patterns, to be shown as a response to a user 
activity for example, could be narrowed down from all 
possible patterns based on the identification of context or 
problem. Naturally, with less information, not all the 
suggestions could be appropriate. However, it would still be 
up to the developer to make the decision. 
Detecting a context of a pattern to match that at hand 
could be done based on a graph or semantic techniques, for 
example. However, there could still be challenges in 
formalizing contexts of many existing patterns that have 
been defined mainly with text. Identifying a problem, what 
the developer would like the system to be like, could be even 
more difficult to automate, and prone to errors. 
If the active party to initiate an activity to apply a pattern 
would be the developer, also key words and search functions 
could be used to filter suggested patterns. This would not be 
possible if the active party would be the tool, so that the 
initiative would come prior to any user activity, i.e., prior to 
typing the key words. In addition, with the key words would 
come the problem of using different words to describe 
similar aspects. Nevertheless, key words could provide a 
sufficiently practical solution for suggesting patterns. 
When suggesting patterns to use, a tool could also take 
advantage on information included - not in the patterns 
themselves - but in the pattern languages and collections that 
the patterns appear in. For example, when noticing a pattern 
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to follow a recently used pattern in a pattern language and 
the problem of the pattern to match the context at hand, the 
pattern could be (at least) raised in a list of suggested 
patterns. Similarly, relations in pattern languages that 
indicate patterns solving the resulting problems of other 
patterns could be used in an automated manner to facilitate 
the work of developers.  
In our work [18], pattern suggestions currently based on 
comparing the patterns that are used in models to collections 
of patterns that have been formed to correspond to the 
recommendations of standards. In the domain, this is 
meaningful since the standards govern and restrict the 
practical solutions that can (or should) be used by 
developers. However, the patterns are not yet suggested in 
any specific phase and the initiative to use patterns comes 
always from the developer. On the other hand, suggestions 
do not rely on the identification of either context or problem 
at hand. This could, however, be a possible future research 
direction. 
In the domain, there can be also competence 
requirements for developers. As such, it can be assumed that 
appropriate solutions (patterns) are known by developers and 
that tool support for suggesting patterns would not even be a 
necessity. Nonetheless, automated functions can be useful in 
gathering information on the use of the patterns when there is 
reliable information about their presence available. 
E. On Using Pattern Instances 
When pattern instances are reliably detected (marked), 
the information can be collected from models for analysis 
purposes or to present it in a tabular, compact form. 
Especially this can be used to support traceability between 
solutions and their use, as demonstrated in [18]. Traceability 
is also a good example property in the (safety) domain 
because it is a property of systematic integrity and required 
from safety system development. As discussed in Section 3, 
the development process of software safety systems and 
applications consists of phases during which developers 
should apply appropriate techniques and measures that are to 
ensure the quality of the applications. Documentation is, 
though, needed to indicate how and where the techniques 
and measures have been used. 
With pattern marks, it is also possible to automate 
different kinds of consistency checks, in addition to 
supporting traceability. For example, it can be made sure that 
patterns are appropriate for the safety levels required from 
the safety function or application. Naturally, this requires 
information on the applicability of the solutions to different 
levels of safety. 
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has discussed the role of design patterns in 
facilitating the development of software safety systems and 
applications. Design patterns, which are essentially triplets of 
contexts, problems and solutions, are a means to 
systematically re-use design and proven solutions to 
recurring problems and needs. Their systematic use in the 
safety system development, however, has not been 
researched extensively although the re-use of recommended 
solutions is a general virtue in the domain. 
Reasons why design patterns could, in general, benefit 
safety system development are various. Patterns document 
proven solutions, which provide designer support on 
selecting the solution to be used in the safety system under 
design. Known usages and ideally known usages from 
inspected and approved systems build this support. Patterns 
can illustrate practical approaches and solutions to alleviate 
the requirements considering safety system development 
given in standards, etc. This eases the burden of the designer 
by bridging the gap between standards and safety system 
design and implementation. In relation to this, patterns can 
be used as a part of documentation. 
To provide designers with the patterns to be used in 
safety system design and development, we have mined and 
documented a set design patterns and pattern prototypes. The 
patterns consider various aspects of the safety system design 
including the development process, architecture, co-
existence with basic control systems and scope minimization 
aspects. The work considering the pattern collection is in 
progress and current effort is to extend the collection to 
software based safety functions. New known usages for the 
existing patterns and pattern candidates are also being 
collected. 
The development of safety systems is a systematic 
process that is governed by standards. Phases of the process 
build on information produced in the previous phases so that, 
for example, safety function requirements are specified to 
treat previously identified hazards and their associated risks. 
In the implementation phases of the process, developers are 
required to apply solutions, techniques and measures that are 
recommended by the standards and can be assumed to result 
in sufficient quality. However, in safety system development, 
it is not enough to apply the required techniques and 
solutions. Developers need to be able to prove the 
compliance of the applications to standards. This is where 
appropriate documentation - including information on the 
usage of the solutions - is needed. 
Clearly, certifiable software parts of safety systems are 
not built by coincidences but by designing them 
systematically, with the use of appropriate solutions and 
techniques. As such, the applications need to be specified 
prior to their implementation, which usually includes at least 
their partial modeling. Unfortunately, the support for patterns 
is in UML, the de-facto software modeling language, 
restricted at best. 
When developing pattern modeling approaches, however, 
patterns should be specified with dedicated modeling 
concepts and pattern instances marked in the models. In this 
way, reliable information on patterns could be used for 
documentation purposes and to automate consistency checks. 
In the future, tool support could be developed also for 
assisting developers in selecting patterns to use. However, 
this task should perhaps consider not only information 
included in the patterns themselves but also the information 
included in pattern languages and collections of patterns. 
Such collections could then be developed with the 
requirements of safety standards in mind. 
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Patterns for control system safety 
JARI RAUHAMÄKIDQGSEPPO KUIKKA, Tampere University of Technology
The main purpose of a control system is to operate a system under control so that it functions as desired. However, when a control system for 
a plant, process or device is being designed, safety-related aspects also need to be considered. In this article four design patterns for control 
system safety are illustrated. The patterns consider software architecture to implement interlock mechanism, design of the system to be 
safe when de-energized, and to check that operation in software has the desired response in the physical world. The patterns are applicable 
to safety systems and to control systems with safety-related aspects.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: Design patterns; Process control systems; Safety critical systems, Software system structures.
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Control system, safety
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1. INTRODUCTION
Control systems are nowadays used to operate various systems from miniature to large scale. The 
purpose of a control system is to control the machinery so that it operates in a desirable manner. Part of 
desirable operation of a system is that the system under control does not cause an intolerable risk level to 
people, environment or the machine itself. Typically a dedicated safety system is employed to reduce the 
risk related to a hazard into a tolerable level. However, the control system itself should also take a stand for 
safe operation, especially in terms of safety of the machine itself. In this article we present four patterns 
related to control system safety. The patterns are applicable in control systems to implement safety related 
functions which, however, are not actual safety functions. Such safety related functions are sometimes 
referred to as SIL 0 (Safety Integrity Level 0) functions opposed to actual safety functions with SIL 1-4. In 
addition, the patterns can be applied in actual safety functions and systems as well. 
The patterns presented here are a part of a larger collection of patterns. Six of the patterns of the 
collection have been published in VikingPLoP 2012 (Rauhamäki et al. 2012). The patterns of this article 
partly relate to the formerly published patterns. 
The patterns are not directly discovered from real systems or applications. Instead, our approach is 
constructive: the patterns are sketched and documented based on our vision of a potential pattern and 
information gathered from standards related to safety system development, literature, and discussions. The 
approach includes both inductive and deductive parts as illustrated by Kohls and Panke (Kohls and Panke 
2009). The core ideas of the patterns are mostly inducted from discussions, standards or literature, but the 
solution models are mostly result of deductive approach so far. Our goal is, however, to identify real world 
applications for all the patterns. 
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1.1 Elements of a control system 
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Figure 1: Illustration elements of a control system completed with a safety system. 
Figure 1 illustrates basic concepts and elements of a control system operating alongside a dedicated 
safety system. In the figure a simplified structure of a hydraulic motor control application is sketched. The 
figure includes five parts each illustrating a logical part of the system. The considered application can be, 
for instance, a hoist cable system control of a crane (mobile or stationary). Notice that the presented 
system is simplified and many aspects have been left out for the sake of intelligibility. 
The first illustration 1) presents the system under control. The system consists of a hydraulic pump and 
motor and a hoist cable system including transmission, cable, reels etc. In illustration 2), a control system
is added to the system (the system to be controlled is greyed out). The control system consists of the
following elements: controller, control valve and rotary sensor. The controller uses operator input to control 
the motor. Illustration 3) presents the automated system (control system + system to be controlled).  
In the illustration 4) a safety system is given. The safety system consists of a safety controller, safety 
system sensors and a safety valve. Through the safety valve the safety system is able to actuate safety 
functions such as prevent lifting when support legs have no sufficient ground contact or overload is 
detected. Finally illustration 5) provides the whole system combining the automated system and the safety 
system. The safety system is connected to the automated system so that the safety system can 
communicate its state to the control system (and vice versa) (Rauhamäki et al. 2013). 
1.2 Pattern overview 
Figure 2 provides an illustration of the relations between the patterns described in this paper. The bold 
lined boxes represent the patterns considered in detail in this article. The arrows between the patterns 
represent a potential application order of patterns. For example, the OUTPUT INTERLOCKING pattern can be 
applied after the CO-OPERATIVE SAFETY ACTUATION. Table 1 provides short descriptions of the patters 
illustrated and referenced in this paper. 
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Check physical 
response
Small 
subsystem fault 
detection
Indirect 
response check
Co-operative 
safety actuation
Output
interlocking
De-energized 
safe state
Safe state
De-energized 
override
Backup power 
for safety system
Figure 2: Relations of the patterns 
Table 1: Short descriptions (patlets) of the patterns considered and referenced in this article 
Pattern Patlet
Check physical 
response
Operations and commands executed in software may success or fail in physical 
world though software continues execution. Therefore, use sensors to ensure that 
operations executed in software have presumed effect in physical world.
De-energized safe 
state
Power blackout or power supply failure causes malfunction of the safety system 
and introduces possible hazardous state of the system. Therefore, use power to 
keep system in operational state and let the system take safe state autonomously 
using stored potential energy.
Indirect response 
check
Adding dedicated hardware for checking that operations executed in software really 
occurred in physical world is costly and increases complexity and spatial properties 
of the system. Therefore, check operation success by indirect indication.
Output Interlocking
The control system must protect machinery, environment and humans from being 
damaged. Implementing protective interlocking functions in control algorithms 
makes the algorithms complex and hinders reusability of the algorithms. Therefore, 
use an interlock element alongside each control actuator output in the control 
system to separate the interlock logic from control logic.
Co-operative safety 
actuation
(Rauhamäki et al. 
2013)
How should the control system react on a safe state notification from the safety 
system? Let  the  safety  system  also  drive  the  control  system  into  a  safe  
state  whenever  safe state  needs  to  be  obtained  (according  to  the  safety 
system).
De-energized 
override 
(Rauhamäki et al. 
2012)
A safety system   must   be able   to override   the control system whenever 
systems control same process quantities. Therefore, let the safety system use de-
energization of the basic control system’s actuator(s) to obtain safe state.
Limit number of 
retries
Retry fault tolerance may lead to an infinite loop. Therefore, limit the number of 
retries per occurred fault to a reasonable level within time tolerances.
Productive safety
(Rauhamäki et al. 
2012)
A control system utilizes advanced and complex corrective functions to keep the 
controlled process in the operational state. These functions are very hard to 
implement in a safety system.  Therefore,  implement the  corrective  functions  in  
a control  system  and  use  simple(st) approach for the safety system.
Safe state (Eloranta 
et al. 2010)
“If something potentially harmful occurs all nodes should enter a predetermined 
safe state.” (Eloranta et al. 2010)
Small subsystem 
fault detection
It is problematic to transfer substantial information to high-level subsystems 
considering faults. Therefore, apply fault detection on as small subsystem level as 
possible and aggregate fault information for higher-level subsystems.
In the following sections we describe the four patterns for control system safety. 
2. OUTPUT INTERLOCKING
Context 
The PRODUCTIVE SAFETY pattern has been applied. A safety system implements fundamental safety 
functions, but safety-related and protective functions are also implemented into a control system to keep 
the system under control in a productive state.  
Problem 
Implementing protective functions in control algorithms makes the control algorithm complex. 
Forces 
 The control system needs to take into account safety-related aspects as they are used in keeping the
system in operative region
 It should be possible to interlock a control actuator from multiple sources that may have different
priorities in terms of the interlock functionality Æ interlock logic may become complex
 The main concern of a control loop and the control algorithm is to control the process variable of interest
as instructed by the set point provided to the control algorithm considering the process variable
Solution 
Use an interlock element alongside each control actuator output in the control system. The purpose of an 
interlock element is to implement the logic used to retain the system in a specified operation region. In 
contrast, the purpose of the control algorithm is to implement the logic according to which the process 
variable is controlled. That is, apply the principle of separation of concerns (Hürsch and Lopes 1995) to 
distinct the interlock logic from the control logic. The interlock element restricts actuator operation (e.g. 
through a control output element) so that the system remains in its specified operation region. For instance, 
an interlock element may force an actuator into a closed state, regardless of the control algorithm primarily 
operating the actuator. The interlock element gathers information considering the system under control and 
uses it to determine whether or not, and if so, how the control actuator output should be interlocked. 
Interlock element concentrates the logic into a single, well defined place and frees the control algorithm 
elements from interlocking related aspects.  
The principle of control output interlocking is illustrated in Figure 3. The upper row in the control loop 
illustrates a basic control structure with a measurement input element (on the left-hand side), a control 
algorithm element (in the middle), and a control output element (on the right-hand side). The control 
algorithm reads the measurement input, calculates a control value, and operates the control actuator with 
the control value through a control output element. An interlocking element is added to the loop to manage 
control output interlocking. The interlocking element observers the measurement value and according to 
that determines whether or not the control output should be interlocked. Thus, the control algorithm 
element doesn’t have to take a stand on interlocking issues. 
Control loop
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element
Control
algorithm
Control output 
element
Interlock 
element
Optional
measurement 
element for 
interlock
Data flow direction
Figure 3: Basic principle of output interlocking 
The interlock element can be a simple or complex entity. The number of inputs and outputs of an 
interlock element may vary in large scale. Largest interlock elements may have several even dozens of 
inputs. The inputs may consist of any signals used in the system such as measurement, control value, or 
interlocking signals. A control output may have more than one interlock elements attached to it if necessary 
and they can be connected in arbitrary ways to implement the desired functionality. In some cases it is 
beneficial to split the logic of complex elements into smaller entities, for example, to enable usage of 
readymade logic components. 
To be able to function properly, interlock elements must have a way to override the control outputs into 
a suitable state. That is, an interlock element is able to force a control output element into a certain state 
regardless of the control value produced by the control algorithm. In an opposite situation, the interlock 
element typically releases a control output element under the control of the control algorithm. In some 
development environments and restricted modeling/development languages there is a possibility to use 
dedicated types of ports or signals to achieve such functionality.  If such an environment is not used, (e.g. 
full variability programming language such as C is used) the developer needs to take care of this aspect. 
To make things even more complex, the safety control system must have override capability of the control 
system. On the other hand, the interlocking element can be used to transmit safety control system override 
and/or notification information to force the control system into a certain state. 
Consequences 
+ Control algorithms do not need to implement interlocking functionality
+ Increased expandability, maintainability and testability of control loop (elements)
+ Increased reusability of interlock and control logic
+ Opens a potential way to enable co-operative safety actuation
− Increased complexity of control output elements
− Increased workload due to additional element to be considered in control loops.
Example 
Consider a hoisting crane’s hoisting motor controller. The controller drives the motor attached to the cable 
to lift and lower the crane hook. Cranes have a maximum load they can handle due to their mechanical 
structure, platform support properties etc. In this case the crane measures the load through the torque of 
the hoisting motor. If the maximum load is exceeded the motor, cable, crane boom structures etc. may 
suffer damage. Thus it is necessary to prevent hoisting of overload. This is naturally a safety function, but 
high economic losses are also related to a breakdown of the machine. Thus, a protective function is added 
in the control system. 
 The protection is obtained with an interlock element in the hoist motor control loop. The loop is 
illustrated in Figure 4 using the Control Structure Diagram of the UML Automation Profile (Hästbacka et al. 
2011). The stereotypes attached to the elements describe the nature of the element. The AP and IL ports 
attached to the elements illustrate Automation Ports (to transfer generic control system data) and Interlock 
Ports (to transfer interlock function related data) respectively. The connections illustrate data connection 
between the ports attached by the connection. 
The upper row forms the motor control part with measurement, control algorithm and control output 
(AnalogOutput) elements. The lower row forms the interlock part of the loop. The overload interlock 
element includes the interlocking logic for overload protection. The element observes hoist motor torque. 
Normally the interlock is in ReleaseToOpen state in which the control output passes the MotorController 
control value to the hoist motor. If a specified torque limit is exceeded, the interlock forces the control 
output to a close-off state. Now regardless of the MotorController signal the output is closed (i.e. the actual 
motor is stopped). 
It can be seen that the interlocking system is easy to maintain, expand, or modify if needed, because 
the interlocking logic is separated from the control algorithm. 
Related patterns 
The pattern may be used in conjunction with the CO-OPERATIVE SAFETY ACTUATION pattern to provide a way 
for the safety control system to force the control system actuators into a certain state. 
Figure 4:  Interlock element in crane hoist motor control loop
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3. DE-ENERGIZED SAFE STATE
Context 
The system has a well-defined SAFE STATE (Eloranta et al. 2010), i.e. a predefined state that can be always 
obtained which minimizes risks for humans directly or indirectly through environment or devices related to 
the system. 
Problem 
Power supply for the safety and the control system as well as the system under control cannot be 
guaranteed, which might inflict a hazardous state during blackout or power loss in (part of the) safety 
system. 
Forces 
 Safety must be ensured in all reasonably foreseeable situations including power cut-offs
 The system itself and the safety system as well use energy to operate
 Usage of a reliable backup power source is typically expensive and sometimes not an option at all to
ensure safety system operation
 No power source or energy transfer arrangement is infallible
Solution 
Design the safety system (and control system as well if applicable) to take the safe state when power is 
lost. By following this principle, the probability that the system reverts into safe state, if there is no energy 
to keep it in operative state, is increased1. The principle can be applied in both safety-critical as well as
non-safety-critical devices and systems. 
The actual implementation of the de-energized safe state principle depends on the system, safe state 
conditions, devices, etc. The only generic approach is to use potential energy of some kind to apply to the 
safe state. The potential energy used to actuate the safe state generates a force that is overcome by a 
force generated with energy used to operate the system when the control system has power available. The 
potential energy can be stored e.g. in springs, pressure accumulators, batteries, etc. When power is cut-off 
from the control system(s) or actuator(s) the potential energy will position the actuator(s) and thus the 
system in a safe state. 
The following steps provide an outline for designing a system to obtain safe state when de-energized: 
(1) Define the safe state of the (sub)system under consideration (This can be only found for certain types
of systems. For instance, an airplane has no implicit safe state when airborne.)
(2) Validate that the safe state can be obtained by de-energizing the (sub)system. Certain type of safe
state such as: “active cooling by circulating water” are hard to obtain in de-energized state
(3) Define which actuators of the system are needed to enter and retain the safe state.
(4) For each required actuator, define the position (typically open or closed) for the safe state.
(5) Verify that there are no conflicts or hazards in the system when N actuators enter safe state due to
power loss (e.g. cabling breakage).
(6) For each required actuator, choose an actuator type that takes the defined state when de-energized
(e.g. normally open or normally closed) or design a similar functionality.
Consequences 
+ Safe state can be obtained when power is lost from (a part of) the system
+ Reduces or eliminates need for backup power arrangements
− Wastes energy as power is used to keep the actuators in operative positions
− Decreases alternatives of suitable actuators and their positioners
− Possibly increases the cost of safety and control system actuators
− Increases testing effort due to test effects of de-energization of actuators
− Increases maintenance effort due to test of operation of the system during power loss
Example 
A good example of usage of the de-energized safe state is a spring loaded hydraulic valve. Figure 5
illustrates a hydraulic system with de-energized safe state principle applied. Both valves are spring loaded 
to take safe state whenever power is lost. When power is lost the magnetic elements can no longer push 
1 The measures that return a system into a safe state (or actuators required to obtain safe state) may also fail.
the valves open as there is no electric power to generate force to overcome the spring loading. Notice that 
the principle is applied in both safety and control systems, which increases the likelihood of successfully 
taking safe state when power is lost. 
As discussed earlier the measures to return the system into a safe state when unpowered do not 
provide fully guaranteed operation. In the hydraulic system discussed above a potential problem in 
operation of the de-energized safe state are, for example, related to breakdown of the spring loading or 
impurities within the hydraulic fluid that may block valve.  
Spring loaded 
safety valve
Spring loaded 
control valve
Hydraulic 
pump
Hydraulic 
motor
Hydraulic 
fluid container
Figure 5: De-energized safe state applied on hydraulics 
Known use 
Pneumatic parking brakes used in heavy vehicles etc. use the principle of de-energized safe state. The 
brakes are spring loaded and they are operated with pressurized air. Pressurized air released into a brake 
unit (when the parking brake is removed) applies an opposed force to the spring which detaches the brake 
pad from the brake disk. Now, if the air compressor fails, loses power or the piping fails for instance, the 
spring applies the parking brakes. 
The principle of de-energized safe sate is also suggested by the Machinery Directive (European 
Parliament and of the Council 2006). In clause 1.2.6 of the directive states “The interruption, the re-
establishment after an interruption or the fluctuation in whatever manner of the power supply to the 
machinery must not lead to dangerous situations.” (European Parliament and of the Council 2006) By 
applying the de-energized safe state, interruption of power supply transfers the system (or the affected part 
of it) into the SAFE STATE (Eloranta et al. 2010). The IEC 61508-7, in section A.1.5: Idle current principle, 
also suggests usage of the de-energized safe state approach (International Electrotechnical Commission 
2010). 
Related patterns 
The BACKUP POWER FOR SAFETY SYSTEM pattern describes a possible approach to circumvent the principles 
of the DE-ENERGIZED SAFE STATE pattern and to decrease waste of energy and other resources. 
The DE-ENERGIZED OVERRIDE pattern (Rauhamäki et al. 2012) describes how the principle of de-
energization can be used by a safety system to override a control system. 
4. CHECK PHYSICAL RESPONSE
Context 
Control logic software is being developed. The logic controls physical actuator elements the operation of 
which is critical from the safety aspect. 
Problem 
Operations and commands executed in control logic may succeed or fail in physical world unrecognized by 
the logic. 
Forces 
 The control logic needs to be aware whether the operation executed correctly in the physical world
 Additional hardware can be tolerated in the system (e.g. in terms of cost, space and complexity, etc.)
Solution  
Use sensors to ensure that operations executed in control logic have the presumed effect in the physical 
world. When operation is executed in control logic, it is confirmed that the corresponding action in the
physical world also occurred. Provide the system with suitable sensor elements if none of the existing ones 
can directly sense effects of the executed operations.  In control logic it is easy to execute commands and 
presume they were successfully executed. This is often due to omission of return value checks or 
presuming success if no exceptions were caught. 
A generic principle of operation checking is illustrated in Figure 6. First, an operation to affect a physical 
world quantity is executed. Then, control logic checks if the quantity was physically affected. This may take 
some time (e.g. valve opens and allows flow rise in a certain rate, not instantly (from time perspective of a 
computer). If the operation was successful execution can continue. If not, the quantity is checked again. To 
prevent an infinite loop, the number of maximum checks is specified (see LIMIT NUMBER OF RETRIES pattern). 
If no success is achieved, an error is detected and suitable actions can be taken. For example, manual 
actuation of a valve can be requested. 
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control logic
Wait for effect 
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indicating 
quantity
Operation
Successful?
Max retries?
No
No
Operation 
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Operation failed 
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Figure 6: Checking operation success in control logic 
To be able to identify changes in the physical world, sensors are required. A control system has 
(typically) some sensors monitoring the physical world. However, these sensors do not necessarily monitor 
the quantity from which the success or failure of an operation could be identified directly. In such cases, an
additional sensor needs to be added in the system. This increases cost, complexity, and spatial properties 
of the system.  
The primary sensor candidate to be used in determining successful operation is the sensor that triggers 
the safety function if one exists. For instance, the best sensor to indicate that overfill prevention has 
succeed is the level indicator that originally indicated the overfill situation. However, in some cases such 
indicators are too slow or don’t exist so they cannot be directly used as indicators of successful operation.
Consequences 
+ Operation of physical world devices can be ensured in the control logic
+ System is added with a fault detection method
+ Direct measurement of the quantity of interest provides direct information on the operation success
− May require additional (sensor, IO-board, wiring, etc.) hardware
− Increases complexity of the system
− Decreases performance of the control logic as additional checks (with potential waiting) are executed
Example 
Consider a steam operated heating process. A safety system is implemented to disable steam flow to 
prevent over temperature of the heated container. When the safety valve is closed, the safety system 
software ensures that steam flow is actually stopped. The safety system measures steam flow. If it appears 
that the steam flow did not stop, an error is detected and suitable actions can be taken.   
Related patterns 
The SMALL SUBSYSTEM FAULT DETECTION pattern illustrates where to deploy fault detection functionality in 
software considering physical world occurrences. 
The INDIRECT RESPONSE CHECK pattern describes a way to check effect of a control logic operation to the 
physical world indirectly, e.g. in case of non-existing direct sensor element or slow real world operations. In 
some cases the safety-related piece of software cannot stay waiting for direct response when the observed 
quantity changes slowly after command. 
5. INDIRECT RESPONSE CHECK
Context 
Control logic software is being developed. There is no sensor for directly measuring a quantity indicating 
success of an operation executed in control logic. The system includes sensing elements that can indirectly 
indicate success of an operation. 
Problem 
Operations and commands executed in control logic may succeed or fail in physical world unrecognized by 
the logic. 
Forces 
 The control logic needs to be aware that the operation executed correctly in the physical world
 Adding a dedicated sensor in the system to indicate whether or not a operation was successful is costly
and increases system complexity
 Direct measurement of the effect of  the operation is suboptimal due to process dynamics, e.g. slow
response
Solution 
Check operation success by indirect indication. Typical control systems use multiple sensing elements to 
measure the state of the system under control. Some of these sensors may provide indirect indication that 
the operation executed in software has had a sensible effect in the physical world. Indirect indicators can 
be used alongside direct indicators to support decision making. 
The first problem to apply the approach is to identify a suitable indirect indicator. Unfortunately no 
generic approach can be given. One need to consider what should happen when an action is taken and 
which process quantities are affected. To catch the idea of indirect indication, consider the following cases: 
 Closing a valve in a steam supply line may for example stop the steam flow, increase pressure in the
pipeline or increase steam flow in another location (pressure relief line)
 Starting a hydraulic pump may for example increase electric current through the pump, increase
pressure and flow, generate more heat (slowly), increase sound pressure and vibration level in
presence of the pump 
The emerging issue in the approach is unreliability. Especially in complex systems it is difficult to ensure 
correct cause and effect relations of executed operations. That is, it may be hard to demonstrate that an 
indicator really indicates success (or failure) of an operation. In some cases the indirect measurement may 
indicate success of the operation, but the operation may have failed due to other reasons. For instance 
current flowing into an electric fan does not necessarily indicate that the motor is actually rotating or 
providing air flow to the target application. The problem gets worse the more indirect the used indicator is.
A good primary approach is to use the least indirect indicator. 
Consequences 
+ No need for additional sensor hardware for checking purposes
+ Provides a “free” method to enable detection of operation success
+ In some cases may provide a better approach (e.g. in terms of sensing speed) to direct measurement of
the effect
− Less reliable method than direct measurement 
− Though success of an operation is indicated by an indirect indicator, the desired effect may have not 
succeeded
Example 
Cooling fans are turned on by control logic. The purpose of cooling fans is to lower temperature of the 
element under cooling. The cooling effect is, however, relatively slow. Thus the software uses other means 
to detect that the fans actually started. Potential methods include e.g. current consumption of the fans, 
measurement of air flow, or generated noise for instance.  
Related patterns 
The CHECK PHYSICAL RESPONSE pattern describes the main idea of checking that commands executed in 
control logic have the desired impact in physical world using direct measurement of the process variable of 
interest. 
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ABSTRACT 
When a system is being designed, the hazards and corresponding 
risks introduced by the system must be identified. Mitigation of 
risks is required if they are found intolerable. To mitigate risk 
there are multiple valid possibilities, but some are more preferable 
than other. Hazard elimination is the most preferable approach but 
it is not always applicable. In such case substitution, isolation and 
active protective measures in form of electric, electronic and 
programmable electronic systems need to be considered. In this 
paper, we illustrate some hazard management methods and 
provide the suggested order of consideration for the methods in 
format of strategy collection.   
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
D.2.11 [Software Architectures]: Patterns; K.4.1 [Public Policy 
Issues]: Human Safety; J.7 [Computers In Other Systems]: 
Industrial control Process control 
General Terms 
Design  
Keywords 
Safety systems, risk mitigation, and hazard management 
1. Introduction 
When a system, whether a machine or a process, is being 
designed, the hazards introduced by the system need to be 
identified. In addition it is equally important to assess the risks 
associated with the hazards and decide if they are intolerable. In 
this context we shall use the following definitions: 
 Harm: “physical injury or damage to the health of people or 
damage to property or the environment” [6] 
 Hazard: “potential source of harm” [6] 
 Risk: “combination of the probability of occurrence of harm 
and the severity of that harm” [6] 
 Protective measure: “measure intended to achieve risk 
reduction” [2]  
In this paper, a set of strategies considering the methods for 
hazard management is introduced. The purpose of the paper is to 
format a potential approach to begin the process of safety system 
design into a set of strategies. The strategies form a chain of 
actions and design decisions considering how risks and hazards 
related to the system are identified and mitigated on an 
architectural design level. 
We begin with the root action of nearly any safety system 
development process, which is hazard and risk identification. One 
cannot mitigate risk or remove a hazard if one does not know 
what are the hazards related to the system and what are the 
corresponding risks. Therefore hazard and risk assessment has to 
be carried out. When the hazards and related risks are known, the 
controls for intolerable risks are considered. The strategies 
illustrate potential mitigation approaches also known as the 
hierarchy of hazard control and indicate the recommended 
consideration order of the actions as provided in the hierarchy. 
Figure 1 illustrates the strategies introduced in the paper and the 
preferable order of application, that is, one should initially start 
with safety risk identification and to mitigate the risk, first 
consider hazard elimination. Table 1 provides short descriptions 
of the strategies. The strategies illustrated with dashed outline on 
Figure 1 are not included in the paper. However, they may be 
included in a paper to be published in future. 
The strategies have been mined from standards considering the 
development of safety system and literature sources. If a method is 
required by a widely applied standard, for instance IEC 61508 [6], 
it provides, from our perspective, sufficient proof for the method. 
For the latter approach, the methods have been discovered from 
official guidelines and other sources such as literature and 
authority guidelines. The main application domain of the 
guidelines is workplace safety but the same principles can be 
applied in machinery and process system domains as well. The 
strategies belong to a collection of patterns from which parts have 
been previously published [13], [14] and [12]. 
Table 1. Short descriptions of the patterns mentioned in the 
paper 
SAFETY RISK 
IDENTIFICATION 
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hazard and risk management, information on 
these aspects need to be available. Therefore, 
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use structured and/or systematic method(s) to 
identify the hazards and associated risks 
introduced by the system. 
ELIMINATE 
HAZARD 
You want to maximize the likelihood that a 
hazard introduced by a system cannot cause 
harm in any part of the system lifecycle. 
Therefore, eliminate the hazard completely by 
removing the component introducing the 
hazard from the system. 
SUBSTITUTE 
HAZARD 
A hazard is wanted to be eliminated from the 
system. Therefore, substitute the hazardous 
element with a non-hazardous or at least less 
hazardous element. 
PASSIVE 
PROTECTIVE 
MEASURE 
The system introduces a hazardous element of 
intolerable risk, which cannot be eliminated 
from it. Therefore, use a passive protective 
measure of a fixed nature to mitigate the risk. 
ISOLATE HAZARD 
A hazardous element needs to remain in the 
system and with the current exposure profile, 
the related risk is intolerable. Therefore, 
isolate the hazard by physically isolating the 
hazardous element from the environment and 
people. 
ACTIVE 
PROTECTIVE 
MEASURE 
Passive protective measures are unable to 
achieve desirable secondary quality attributes 
in context of the considered protective 
measure. Therefore, use an active protective 
measure that is able to monitor the state of the 
system and/or its environment and affect the 
operation of the system or itself accordingly. 
E/E/PE SAFETY 
SYSTEM 
Active protective measure of relatively 
complex functionality needs to be 
implemented. Therefore, use an electric, 
electronic or programmable electronic 
(E/E/PE) safety system to implement the 
protective measure functionality.  
 
2. Safety risk identification 
2.1 Context 
A system, for instance an industrial process or a machinery 
construction, is being designed and the development project has 
limited resources. The system under development may introduce 
safety risks, but they are not (completely) known beforehand. 
Hazards and their associated risks potentially introduced by the 
system are wanted to be managed and mitigated in a justifiable 
manner. That is, on one hand, consciously manage all the risks 
introduced by the system, and on the other hand, deploy 
meaningful management measures against each risk and hazard. 
Information regarding the system under development exists (the 
type of the system, initial design, target user group, etc.) 
2.2 Problem 
To make conscious decisions considering hazard and risk 
management, information on these aspects need to be available.  
2.3 Forces 
 Realization of, especially, a high severity risk causes financial 
losses, severe injury or loss of life. That is, all the foreseeable 
risks should be mitigated into a tolerable level. 
 Over-mitigation of a risk adds little value, but adds a 
considerable amount of cost as each risk mitigation measure 
increases development, component, manufacturing, and 
maintenance cost of the system. The cost realizes in the 
design, construction and maintenance phases of system 
lifecycle. 
 Under-mitigating a risk leads to realization of the risk in 
higher probability or with more severe consequences 
compared to meaningfully mitigated option. That is, the risk 
may realize more frequently or have more severe 
consequences than is acceptable. There is also the cost of 
negative publicity. All the costs realize when the risk realizes. 
Before this, money can be saved compared to the case in 
which hazards and risks are identified and mitigated into 
tolerable level during development process. 
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Figure 1. Strategy - pattern map 
 Deploying protective measures without identifying and 
analysing the risks, that is, taking a haphazard approach, is 
likely to lead to either under- or over-mitigation of the risks. 
Both are likely to increase the system lifecycle cost. 
2.4 Solution 
Use structured and/or systematic method(s), such as Failure Mode 
and Effect Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), or 
Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP), to identify the hazards 
and associated risks introduced by the system. Only hazards and 
risks which are identified and assessed can be justifiably 
mitigated. If protective measures are added without knowledge of 
the hazard and the related risk, there is no foundation for the 
applied measures. 
 
The key to success is to identify hazards and associated risks as 
early as possible in the system lifecycle. The later the hazard and 
risk is identified, the more costly the mitigation will be. To take 
most out of the hazard and risk assessment, it should be carried 
out several times during the development process. Each iteration 
will have more detailed input information so the potential to 
identify hazards and assess the associated risks meaningfully is 
increased. Also, keep in mind that different hazard and risk 
identification methods characteristically suit in different 
applications. Thus, it is typically a good idea to apply different 
methods for the purposes they fit rather than trying to apply one 
method to all purposes. 
The safety risk identification is divided into two parts: hazard 
analysis and risk analysis. In hazard analysis phase possible 
hazards related to the system are identified. Hazards can be 
identified using various methods such as failure mode and effect 
analysis or hazard and operability study. These methods may also 
reveal information about how the hazard occurs. This information 
is valuable while risk mitigation methods are considered and 
selected. 
The risk analysis is based on the hazard analysis. The risks are 
defined for the identified hazards. A hazard is considered and the 
risk related to the hazard is defined by the probability of hazard 
realization and the consequences of realization of the hazard. 
Qualitative or quantitative value for the hazard probability and 
consequence is defined. The actual risk is decided as a 
combination of the probability and consequence of the considered 
hazard. Again, there are numerous methods to decide the final risk 
reference value, such as the multiplication of the risk factors or 
utilization of a risk table. 
Consequences 
+ Risks are assessed and mitigation needs can be evaluated. 
Thus, the resources can be allocated to aspects that are most 
relevant from safety perspective. 
+ Risks can be mitigated into tolerable level as there is 
knowledge available on them. 
+ The hazards and risks identified can be mitigated during 
development process in which case it is typically cheapest to 
mitigate them. 
+ The hazard identification may have produced valuable 
information on the reasons leading into harm which can be 
used when mitigation methods are selected. 
+ From legal point of view, it is valuable to have documented 
evidence that hazards and risk were considered using 
structured method, in case a legal issue rises afterwards. 
− Hazard and risk analysis requires resources and thus adds 
design and development cost. However, almost in any case 
this investment is many times cheaper compared to 
mitigations designed and applied later in the system lifecycle. 
For instance, consider costs of a few days of additional time 
spent in hazard and risk analysis compared to retrofitting 
protective measures in existing products around the market 
area. 
− Unreal sense of control over hazards and risks may have been 
achieved during analysis process. 
2.5 Example 
Consider the simple electronic low-pass filter circuit illustrated on 
Figure 2. Our task is to identify and analyse potential failures of 
the low-pass. In this simplified example case the failure is carried 
out using fault tree analysis. We shall limit the analysis on typical 
failure modes of the electrical components of the circuit, namely 
the resistor R and the capacitor C. Wires, input voltage source 
Vin, and other aspects are not considered in the analysis. 
 
Figure 2. Schematic figure of a simple electric low-pass filter 
On Figure 3 a fault tree analysis for the low-pass filter failure is 
illustrated. Based on the analysis there are three main causes for 
the low-pass filter failure, which are caused by different 
combinations of failure modes of the capacitor C and resistor R. 
For instance No or very low output is occurs if either capacitor C 
fails short (circuit) or resistor R fails open (circuit). Note that the 
analysis stops on this level. For more detailed analysis one could 
consider why the resistor fails open, for example. 
The fault tree analysis indicated the failure modes of the low-pass 
filter. Now the related risks need to be assessed and this analysis 
is illustrated on Table 2. The likelihood estimates are constructed 
according to component specific failure mode probabilities (Table 
3), assuming, for the sake of simplicity, the same failure rate per 
million hours for both capacitor and resistor components. The 
severity is estimated according to the function of the circuit in its 
context, which is out of the scope of this example. 
2.6 Known use 
The EN ISO 12100 [2] and IEC 61508 2010 [6] require hazard 
and risk analysis as a part of the development process of any 
safety-related system regardless of their implementation (software 
or hardware). 
2.7 Related patterns 
When a hazard introducing an intolerable risk is identified, the 
ELIMINATE HAZARD strategy should be considered initially to 
remove the hazard so that it cannot occur. 
3. Eliminate hazard 
3.1 Context 
Risk analysis for the system under development has been carried 
out and a hazard has been identified. The risk level related to the 
hazard is intolerable without mitigation actions. That is, either the 
consequence or the probability of the realization of the hazard 
needs to be mitigated. 
3.2 Problem 
You want to maximize the likelihood that a hazard introduced by 
a system cannot cause harm in any part of the system lifecycle. 
3.3 Forces 
 No other hazard mitigation method has been considered yet. 
The approach should be the primary approach to mitigate 
hazards. 
 Hazard elimination does not intolerably decrease productivity 
of the system. 
 Other quality attributes can be sacrificed in preference of 
safety. For instance, usability or performance of the system 
may be able to be compromised if necessary. 
 Hazard elimination does not introduce intolerable increase in 
costs of usage of the system in context of constructability, 
main operation execution, maintainability or other aspects 
affecting life cycle costs. 
3.4 Solution 
Eliminate the hazard completely by removing the component 
introducing the hazard from the system. Designing the hazard out 
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Figure 3. Fault tree analysis of low-pass filter circuit 
Table 2. Risk analysis of low-pass filter failure modes 
Failure mode Likelihood Severity Risk 
No or very low 
output 
Very High High Very high 
Unfiltered output 
voltage 
Very Low  Medium Low 
Wrong filter 
corner frequency 
Medium Low Medium 
Table 3. Failure mode distribution of the low-pass filter 
components according to [9, p. 440-444] 
Device type Failure mode Mode probability 
Capacitor, ceramic 
type 
Short 0.49 
Change in value 0.29 
Open 0.22 
Resistor, film type 
Open 0.59 
Parameter change 0.36 
Short 0.05 
this way is the most effective measure to prevent the realization of 
the considered hazard. This is due to fact that if hazard is 
eliminated, it is not able to realize anymore (unless the hazard is 
reintroduced in the system). 
 
Elimination of the hazard should be considered as the primary 
means of risk reduction related to a hazard. The hazard is not only 
eliminated from the system in normal operation, but also during 
special situations such as the maintenance and deconstruction of 
the system. Going even further, the hazard may be eliminated also 
in larger scale, in best case throughout the whole supply chain. 
That is, hazard is not only eliminated on the site considered, but 
for next usage sites of the considered product, device or system.  
Eliminate the hazard by removing the cause or sufficient subset of 
the causes leading to a hazard of the system. The root cause or a 
sufficient subset of the causes can be identified using, for 
instance, a fault tree analysis, but any hazard identification 
method revealing the path to the hazard is applicable. However, 
removing a critical path to the hazard is prone to human error in 
the hazard analysis phase. For instance, even though a large 
amount of resources is put to hazard analysis for a nontrivial 
system the analysis outcome is typically incomplete in terms of 
coverage of the hazards and potential paths leading to the hazards. 
Thus, eliminating a critical path is only a secondary approach. The 
only reliable way to eliminate a hazard is to remove the root cause 
of the hazard. For example, to eliminate a drowning the only 
reliable way is to eliminate any liquid from the system. 
Even though elimination of the hazards is the preferred approach, 
it has to be carefully considered if the elimination of a hazard 
introduces new, possibly even worse, hazards. There is also a 
possibility that the originally eliminated hazard is reintroduced in 
the system in some other part of the design. 
Though an effective measure, hazard elimination cannot always 
be used. This may relate to numerous reasons. One major reason 
is that elimination of a hazard would prevent the operation the 
machine is intended to in the first place. For example, the 
dismissal of a falling hazard in an elevating work platform would 
require that platform is not lifted from ground or completely 
closing the platform which prevents the usage of the system for 
the purpose it was first intended to and still the platform itself 
might fall. Another example is a cutting machine. In such 
machine, there is a risk of the operator being cut by the machine. 
However, the hazard cannot be eliminated as the machine is 
supposed to cut, so the cutting element and functionality has to be 
retained in the system. Elimination of a hazard can also prove 
impractical for other reasons, such as operating cost. For example, 
a toxic chemical could be replaced with a non-toxic one, but this 
implies raise in cost due to decrease in the productivity or quality 
of the product. 
3.5 Consequences 
+ Hazard is completely eliminated diminishing the risk related 
to it. 
+ Hazard cannot occur either in normal or abnormal conditions 
(e.g. unplanned maintenance operations). 
+ There is no maintenance cost for the safety system as there is 
no need for a safety system to mitigate the eliminated hazard, 
which also follows the safe principle of simplicity. This aspect 
is especially relevant in systems to be operated long time 
periods. 
− Eliminating one hazard may introduce another one [11]. It 
must be carefully analysed whether new hazards are 
introduced and determine that the risk levels related to the 
new hazards are lower than the risk of the original hazard. 
− Some of the system’s quality attributes such as usability, 
weight, spatial requirements, or productivity may be degraded. 
− Typically hazard elimination introduces larger design, 
construction, or assembly cost [1]. 
3.6 Example 
Flammable and potentially toxic solvent is used as a carrier in a 
paint product. The flammability and potential toxicity introduce 
fire and health related hazards. The risks related to the hazards are 
identified intolerably high and therefore need to be mitigated. The 
solvent is eliminated by substituting it with water based solution 
(see SUBSTITUTE HAZARD). The elimination of the solvent 
eliminates the hazards related to flammability and intoxication 
hazards introduced by the solvent. This applies throughout the 
product supply chain including the end user. [5]. 
3.7 Known use 
Elimination of hazard is given as the primary means to hazard 
control for example in the following sources [4], [16], [7, p 672], 
[10], [11], [15, p 197-200], [9] and [17]. The CCPS [1 p. 79] 
mentions reorganization and elimination of the hazard in the 
design phase as the ideal way to mitigate hazard potential (in 
context of ignition sources). 
3.8 Related patterns 
The SUBSTITUTE HAZARD strategy describes a potential approach 
for hazard elimination. If hazard cannot be eliminated, then one 
should consider PASSIVE PROTECTIVE MEASURE approach. In this 
approach the original hazard or hazardous element may remain in 
the system, but the risk is mitigated. 
4. Substitute hazard 
4.1 Context 
The system under consideration introduces a hazardous element, 
which introduces a risk that requires mitigation in order to be 
tolerable. The ELIMINATE HAZARD strategy is being considered as a 
management approach. The hazard is introduced by a system 
property, functionality, element, or substance that can be changed 
without intolerable degradation in required performance and/or 
operation of the system. 
4.2 Problem 
A hazard is wanted to be eliminated from the system. 
4.3 Forces  
 Hazardous element cannot be completely removed from the 
system as such due to, for example, cost, performance, 
usability or maintenance reasons. However, the risk must be 
mitigated. 
 There are considerable alternatives for the source of the 
hazard available, which do not hinder other quality attributes 
or operation of the system. 
 The most effective substance or system property from the 
operation efficiency point of view is also often one of the 
most dangerous alternatives. For instance, chemical reactions 
tend to be more effective with higher concentration, pressure 
and temperature as well as working machines’ power tools 
tends to be more effective with higher voltage, speed and 
acceleration properties. 
 Dangerous substances or system properties may be a reason 
for hazards introduced by the system. 
4.4 Solution 
Substitute the hazardous element with a non-hazardous or at least 
less hazardous element. In this case the hazardous element refers 
to a substance such as strong acid or a system property such as 
high voltage or pressure capable to introduce a hazard. For 
example, substitute an extremely flammable substance with a less 
flammable one, such as ethanal with ethanol, or high voltage with 
less high voltage, such as of 100 V with 24 V. 
 
Depending on case, substitution of the hazard may eliminate the 
considered hazard, if the substitute is completely non-hazardous, 
the substitute may be better in terms of multiple hazards, or the 
substitute decreases the severity of consequences. However, other 
hazardous properties related to the original hazard source may still 
remain. For example, substituting strong acid with weaker or less 
concentrated one will decrease the severity of consequences for 
direct skin contact (in case of similar amount and time of 
exposure), but, for instance, the hazards of potential corrosive 
damage and leaking of the substance still exist. Similarly, 
substituting toxic liquid with non-toxic one does not eliminate 
leakage hazard of the liquid. 
The substitution approach can be most typically applied in plant 
context to a mitigate hazard related to toxic substances. The 
typical approach is to select a less toxic substance or a less 
hazardous form of the substance, for example a solid form instead 
of a powdery form of utilized substance if the substance is 
hazardous to the respiratory organs. In context of machinery 
applications substitution can be typically considered in system 
properties such as voltages and pressures used in the system or the 
components of the system. For instance, lowering applied 
hydraulic pressure or using more robust components may mitigate 
risks related to these substituted system properties and 
components. 
4.5 Consequences 
+ The risk related to the considered hazardous element is 
decreased by either reducing the severity and/or the likelihood 
of exposure. 
+ In best case the hazard is eliminated by substitution, but some 
related hazards may still remain.  
− Typically some of the system quality attributes such as 
usability, performance, or productivity etc. may be degraded 
as the substitute may be less effective from the system or 
process point of view.  
− Hazards common to both original and substitute still remain. 
For instance, if liquid is substituted with another liquid it can 
still leak or one can drown in it (if stored in open containers). 
4.6 Example 
Consider a mobile machinery application requiring a battery to 
operate. Initially, a flooded lead-acid battery was chosen for the 
application. However, this battery type produces hydrogen when 
charged. As it was noted that the released hydrogen may induce 
an explosion hazard, the battery type was substituted with a valve-
regulated lead-acid battery that is prone to produce less hydrogen 
than the flooded lead-acid type. 
Another typical application of substitution is related to the state 
(solid, liquid, or gas) and particle size (solid, pellet, granule, 
powder etc.) of the substance. Often reactiveness of a substance is 
dependent on these properties, gas and powder typically being 
more reactive than solid etc. Thus, substituting the substance state 
or particle size with more favourable one is a way to eliminate or 
decrease the risk related to a hazard. This approach is particularly 
applicable in context of process systems. 
4.7 Known use 
Substitution of hazard is given as a means to hazard control for 
example in the following sources [4], [16], [10], [11], and [15]. 
Substitution is also one of the ways to achieve inherently safer 
design [1]. 
4.8 Related patterns 
The SUBSTITUTE HAZARD strategy can be used to implement the 
ELIMINATE HAZARD strategy. 
5. Isolate hazard 
5.1 Context 
The system under consideration introduces a hazard, which is, 
according to risk assessment, intolerable. This is partly due to 
likelihood of occurrence due to exposure to the hazard. The 
ELIMINATE HAZARD approach has been considered, but so far no 
way to remove the hazardous element or elements has been 
identified. Therefore, the PASSIVE PROTECTIVE MEASURE is being 
considered to reduce the risk. The hazardous element is or 
originates, for example, from: 
 inherently hazardous substances, such as toxic materials, 
flammable liquids, or oxidizers 
 high energies or forces introduced by the system, such as 
moving machine parts, high-intensity laser beams, high-
velocity cutting chips, sparkles, or vibrating elements 
 system properties, such as high voltages or pressures, or 
extreme temperatures. 
5.2 Problem 
A hazardous element needs to remain in the system and with the 
current exposure profile the related risk is intolerable. 
5.3 Forces 
 Reducing the exposure to the hazard reduces the risks even 
though the severity of the hazard remains the same. 
 Reduction of severity of the harm is desirable but not the first 
order priority. 
 Passive protective measures tend to require less ongoing 
maintenance effort than their active counterparts [1]. 
5.4 Solution 
Isolate the hazard by physically isolating the hazardous element 
from the environment and people. Isolation needs to ensure that 
the hazardous substance or process part cannot access 
environment and the hazard cannot be accessed from environment 
at least in normal operation conditions. Isolation can be, for 
example, an enclosure on the hazardous process part or fence or 
similar barrier to prevent access to the hazardous zone. Hazard 
isolation does not remove the original hazard from the system, but 
it reduces the risk by decreasing the exposure to the hazard (the 
hazard cannot be accessed) or the severity of the consequences 
(e.g. damage to finger instead of whole arm). 
 
Isolation is an effective risk mitigation method against a hazard 
occurring during normal system operation. However, typically as 
special situation occurs, the isolation approach provides limited or 
no protection. Such situations may occur, for example, during 
maintenance, solving blockage, or inserting or removing a 
machineable or a tool. In such cases a person may need to access 
the hazard source. Nevertheless, hazard isolation is effective as it 
decreases the number of people having access to the hazardous 
element as well as limiting the exposure and potentially the 
severity of the harm caused by the hazard. 
The isolation requires periodic maintenance and inspections. The 
isolating element may, for instance, wear out, break on impacts, 
be removed intentionally or unintentionally, installed incorrectly 
after intentional removal, lose effect in case of environment 
change, etc. Some of the cases can be managed applying an 
ACTIVE PROTECTIVE MEASURE, such as an E/E/PE SAFETY SYSTEM, 
to monitor the state of the isolation and alert operators or trigger a 
safety function if the isolation is lost. The latter case can be 
addressed by designing the isolation so that it does not depend on 
environment of the system. For example, isolation should not 
assume positioning of the system near wall so that the wall acts as 
an isolating element. 
5.5 Consequences 
+ Hazard is isolated in normal operating conditions. That is, the 
hazard cannot be or is very unlikely accessed in normal 
operation conditions, which reduces the exposure to the 
hazard and thus also the risk related to the hazard. 
+ No need to alter the hazardous element itself, which might 
degrade the quality attributes of the system in case of 
elimination or substitution of the hazard. 
− The hazard remains in the system. 
− No or limited protection under special conditions such as 
maintenance, repair of hazardous element, or isolation 
breakage is provided. 
− Some quality attributes may still degrade as the isolation is 
established. For instance, the accessibility to the other 
components within the isolated space is decreased. 
− System lifecycle cost increases as the isolation needs to be 
designed, manufactured, and installed to the system. In 
addition the isolation needs to be inspected and maintained 
throughout the system lifecycle. 
5.6 Example 
A machine power transmission includes a belt drive. The belt 
requires regular maintenance as it needs to be changed when a 
certain number of operations hours are exceeded. To make belt 
change easy the belt is located outside the machine body and thus 
easily accessible by humans and foreign objects1. When the 
machine is operational, the belt drive is hazardous as human body 
part may crush between the belt and the wheels or foreign object 
may jam the power transmission causing havoc in the machine.  
The hazard can be isolated by establishing an isolating enclosure 
over the belt drive. The solution degrades maintainability as the 
enclosure must be securely fixed and is not thus easily removable. 
Actually, the risk could be potentially more effectively mitigated 
by changing the power transmission into something that (is 
supposed to) last the machine life-cycle such as shaft drive and 
locate it completely inside the machine body. 
5.7 Known use 
In electronic products, a double-shield enclosure isolates high 
voltage parts from the environment and thus prevents the electric 
shock hazard in normal conditions. However, during maintenance 
or repair the high voltage parts are exposed. This also applies if 
the isolation is broken from the enclosure. 
In machineries, fans are isolated from users by establishing a grill, 
mesh, solid cover, or barrier around or in front of the fan blades. 
The cover prevents user from accessing the fan (that is, decreases 
the exposure to the hazard) which could result in, e.g., an injury. 
                                                                
 
1 Such belt drives are nowadays rare, but many old fashioned 
systems use such power transmission. 
In case a finger can reach the blades through the isolating 
element, the isolation still acts to decrease the severity of the 
harm. That is, the harms are restricted to damage to finger instead 
of arm or another larger body part. 
In laboratories, in which hazardous bacteria, viruses, etc. are 
studied, isolation is established to protect people. The bacterium 
etc. is handled in an enclosed chamber of which ventilation is also 
isolated from the ventilation of the building and arranged so that 
the air cannot (or should not) flow from the chamber to the room. 
Isolation of a hazard is given as a means to hazard control for 
example in the following sources [4], [16], [7, p 672], [10], [11], 
[15 p. 194], [9] and [17]. 
5.8 Related patterns 
The E/E/PE SAFETY SYSTEM strategy describes how the risks of 
hazards are mitigated with electric, electronic and programmable 
electronic systems. Also, isolation can be combined with E/E/PE 
SAFETY SYSTEM to produce more versatile protective measure such 
as interlocked barrier. 
6. E/E/PE safety system 
6.1 Context 
The system under consideration introduces a hazard, which is, 
according to risk assessment, intolerable. To mitigate the risk, a 
protective measure is being designed as the hazard could not be 
eliminated through design (see ELIMINATE HAZARD). There are 
changes and events occurring in environment and/or the system, 
which affect the desired operation of the protective measure. That 
is, the protective measure needs to take the changes and the events 
into account to successfully reduce the risk. Therefore, the safety 
system needs to be able to sense the changes to operate 
accordingly and ACTIVE PROTECTIVE MEASURE strategy is applied.  
6.2 Problem 
Active protective measure of relatively complex functionality 
needs to be implemented. 
6.3 Forces 
 The safety function implements relatively complex logic or 
functionality. For instance, to implement safety function 
successfully the safety system needs to obtain information 
from multiple sources, do reasoning considering the data and 
control the system in relatively complex and timely precise 
way to ensure successful operation.   
 The implementation of the safety function requires or benefits 
from cooperation of distributed elements. That is, the 
elements may be located in different locations considering the 
system. 
 From maintenance and safety point of view it is beneficial if 
the protective measure can monitor (diagnose) its state and 
even better if it can communicate potential problems to other 
systems or people. 
 An option for wireless data communication is wanted to be 
reserved or required for the current system.  
6.4 Solution 
Use an electric, electronic or programmable electronic (E/E/PE) 
safety system to implement the protective measure functionality. 
An E/E/PE system is inherently an ACTIVE PROTECTIVE MEASURE. 
E/E/PE system observers the system under control for hazardous 
states and applies active actions to achieve the safety of the users, 
environment, and machinery itself. An E/E/PE safety system has 
considerable more possibilities to retain safety as it can affect the 
operation of the system. 
Figure 4 illustrates the typical E/E/PE safety system elements and 
information flow direction between them. The system consists of 
sensor element(s), logic element(s), and actuation element(s). 
There may be multiple instances of each element depending on 
the architecture of the safety system. In some cases, some 
elements may be left out or they can physically exist embedded in 
other elements. For example, the logic element can be embedded 
into a sensor element in some cases or it can exist in cross 
connection between sensor elements and actuation elements. The 
information flow can be arranged applying most appropriate 
approach. Typical alternatives are point-to-point wires and 
communication busses (e.g. CAN, FlexRay, ProfiNet, etc.). 
Wireless communication can be established, if implemented (and 
applicable) according to adhered law, standard, or guideline. 
Optical cables can be used in electromagnetically hostile 
environments. 
The sensor elements measure and observe the system under 
control (typically a process variable) and its environment. The 
sensor element does not necessarily have to be a dedicated sensor 
device. Instead, it can be any information source although the 
integrity of the information need to be sufficient to comply with 
rest of the safety function implementation and required integrity 
(compare to IEC 61508 [6]). The information is transmitted to the 
E/E/PE logic, which may be for example a relay, an electronic 
circuit, or a microcontroller. The logic element produces control 
signal for actuation elements that can physically affect the system 
in order to execute the protective measure. 
Although simplicity is desired property in safety-related systems, 
sometimes more advanced functionality is required. Using E/E/PE 
logic it is relatively easy, especially in context of programmable 
devices, to implement complex functionality to the safety 
function. Information from multiple sensors or information 
sources can be used in decision making applying advanced 
algorithms when necessary. This characteristic feature of E/E/PE 
systems also supports application of diagnostic functionality to 
monitor the operation and state of the safety functionality and 
elements of the system. 
With E/E/PE system many of the shortcomings of passive 
protective measures can be circumvented while implementing 
required safety function to reduce risk into a tolerable level. One 
of the problems with passive protective measures is that they 
cannot react in any changes or affect the operation of the system. 
Using E/E/PE safety system one is able to measure system and its 
environment. Consequently, the safety system can react on 
changes in and the state of the system and its environment. 
However, the development of E/E/PE safety system is 
considerable more burdensome than mechanical protective 
measures or guards. Mechanical protective measures and E/E/PE 
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Figure 4. Typical E/E/PE safety system elements and 
information flow direction. 
safety systems can (and usually have to) be used in combination to 
obtain optimal performance.  
6.5 Consequences 
+ Increased amount of possible safety function becomes 
available, as the protective measure can be aware of changes 
and event in the system and its environment and the system 
under control can be affected by the safety system. 
+ The safety system becomes more flexible due to increase 
expandability and modifiability. 
+ Possible performance (and other secondary quality attribute) 
gains in system as protective measures can be optimized. For 
example, replacing passive finger protection barrier of a fan 
with light curtain and a stop function can improve air flow. 
− The complexity of the safety system increases as all the 
elements, including logic in form of electronics or program 
code, need to be implemented in the safety system. 
− Development process of an E/E/PE safety system is 
considerable more burdensome than its passive counterpart if 
applicable laws and regulations are followed (e.g. the IEC 
61508 requires vast amount of techniques and measures to be 
followed to develop software for an E/E/PE safety system) 
− E/E/PE safety systems are typically more expensive than 
passive ones (or inherently safer design concept including 
eliminating or substituting the hazard) in terms of 
maintenance effort. E/E/PE systems require periodic and 
potentially reactive checking and maintenance especially in 
terms of potential sensor and actuator elements. 
− Spurious trips caused by E/E/PE system may decrease 
productivity of the system. 
6.6 Known use 
Airbags deployed in most new cars are a well-known E/E/PE 
safety system. The E/E/PE system consists of various sensor 
elements that sense collision situations, an airbag control unit / 
electronic control unit (ACU/ECU), which observers the sensors, 
and the airbag unit(s) that actuates the airbag(s). The ACU 
operates the airbag units to inflate the airbags in case of collision. 
[18] [3]. Airbags are E/E/PE safety systems that are used to 
improve the safety of passengers. They complement the passive 
protective measures of a car such as the flexible collision regions 
of the car body and safely shaped interior decrease the risk of 
injury and death in car accidents. 
A steel cutting machine utilizes an E/E/PE safety system to 
prevent cutting operation in case a person (or an object) enters the 
back side of the machine. The machine is depicted on Figure 5. 
The machine has open backside so the blade is directly accessible 
from the backside of the machine. The restricted zone illustrates 
the area in which persons are not allowed to reside during 
machine operation. The front side (work piece handling area) is 
protected by partly fixed and partly opening barrier, which 
interlocks the blade movement if opened. The sides of the 
machine’s backside are fenced. Optic sensors (light curtain) are 
used to notice the objects entering the working area of the 
machine and stopping the cutting blade in such a case. Whenever 
the light curtain is broken the machine is stopped and 
continuation of the operation requires operator to acknowledge 
that the restricted area is cleared. 
An E/E/PE safety system is given as a means to hazard control for 
example in the following sources [4], [16], [10], [11], [9] and 
[17]. The CCPS [1, p. 125] mentions E/E/PE safety systems in 
context of the active safeguarding strategies. 
6.7 Related patterns 
The ISOLATE HAZARD strategy describes how risk can be mitigated 
without an E/E/PE system. In addition E/E/PE protective 
measures can be combined with isolation methods by adding 
E/E/PE safety system to monitor and ensure the isolation. For 
example, a limit switch indicates if isolation is removed from 
hazard and the safety system drives the system into a safe state, 
e.g., stops moving parts under the isolating barrier.  
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There are various ways to protect people, environment and other systems from harm caused by machines and system. In this paper, 
patterns on implementing protective measures applying an active approach are given. The purpose of a protective measure is to 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Hazard elimination is a desirable approach in risk reduction as it completely prevents a hazard from 
causing harm (as the hazard does not exist).In some cases, this applies in many or all phases of system 
lifecycle from manufacturing to disposal. For instance, if asbestos is eliminated from the system in the 
design phase, all the hazards and problems caused by it, are eliminated from the system lifecycle. 
However, in many cases hazards cannot completely be eliminated. In such cases, other protective 
measures are needed to mitigate the remaining risk related to the hazard. 
In case a hazard cannot be eliminated, a potential approach is to apply the ISOLATE HAZARD APPROACH, a 
variant of a PASSIVE PROTECTIVE MEASURE (Rauhamäki & Kuikka 2014). However, in certain cases simple 
isolation is not a viable option. For instance, if a recurring access is required to the hazard zone to operate 
the system, a fixed isolation would complicate the access. In such cases, an ACTIVE PROTECTIVE MEASURE 
(Rauhamäki & Kuikka 2015) can be used to enable opening such as a door, a gate, or a hatch to be placed 
on the isolation and to use a control system to operate the system or the opening to retain safety. In such 
situations, one can consider the combination of the ISOLATE HAZARD and ACTIVE PROTECTIVE MEASURE 
approaches to enable the system under control to respond to the user actions in a safe manner or affect 
user possibilities mastered by a control system to a support safe operation of the system.  
In this paper, we present patterns utilizing the ACTIVE PROTECTIVE MEASUREs to promote safety. That is, 
the patterns describe protective measures that include a functional part. The functional part affects the 
operation of the system to retain the safety of people. 
The target audience of the patterns and the pattern language (see Section 2.1) described on the paper 
contains people involved in safety system development such as system architects, safety engineers, 
hardware and software developers and designers. Primarily, the pattern language aims to serve people 
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with low experience and expertise on safety system development. Secondarily, the language can support 
more experienced people with decision making and provide a guideline for the design process. 
2. BACKGROUND 
2.1 Pattern language for safety system development 
The patterns presented in the paper are considered as a part of larger pattern collection considering safety 
system development. A section of the language is illustrated on Figure 1 and it illustrates how the patterns 
relate to previous work. The patterns presented on this paper have solid bold outline. The root pattern on 
Figure 1 suggests applying a risk based approach on safety. That is, to select the risk mitigation methods 
according to the risk (magnitude and significance). From there onwards, the arrows suggest a potential 
path across the pattern language indication the potential application order of the patterns and strategies. 
Thumbnails for the patterns described and referred to the paper are given in Table 1. 
 
SAFETY RISK 
IDENTIFICATION
ELIMINATE 
HAZARD
SUBSTITUTE 
HAZARD
PASSIVE 
PROTECTIVE 
MEASURE
ACTIVE 
PROTECTIVE 
MEASURE
ISOLATE 
HAZARD
E/E/PE SAFETY 
SYSTEM
Risk identificationi  i tifi ti Hazard and risk mitigationr   ri  iti ti
LOCKED 
HAZARDOUS 
ZONE
INTERRUPTIBLE 
HAZARDOUS 
ZONE
INTERRUPTED 
HAZARDOUS 
ACTION
 
Fig. 1. Section of pattern language for safety system development 
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Table 1: Patlets (aka. short descriptions) for the patterns 
Pattern Patlet 
SAFETY RISK 
IDENTIFICATION 
To make conscious decisions considering hazard and risk management, information 
on these aspects needs to be available. Therefore, use structured and/or systematic 
method(s) in order to identify the hazards and associated risks introduced by the 
system. (Rauhamäki & Kuikka 2014) 
ELIMINATE HAZARD 
You want to maximize the likelihood that a hazard introduced by a system cannot 
cause harm in any part of the system lifecycle. Therefore, eliminate the hazard 
completely by removing the component introducing the hazard from the system. 
(Rauhamäki & Kuikka 2014) 
SUBSTITUTE 
HAZARD 
A hazard needs to be eliminated from the system. Therefore, substitute the hazardous 
element with a non-hazardous or at least less hazardous element. (Rauhamäki & 
Kuikka 2014) 
PASSIVE 
PROTECTIVE 
MEASURE 
A hazard or a hazardous element remains in the system, but the related risk needs to 
be mitigated. Therefore, use a passive protective measure to mitigate the risk by non-
functional design solutions, equipment or system design features that mitigate risk 
related to hazard. (Rauhamäki & Kuikka 2015) 
ACTIVE 
PROTECTIVE 
MEASURE 
A hazard or a hazardous element remains in the system and the related risk needs to 
be mitigated. Therefore, use an active protective measure to mitigate the risk by 
affecting the system operation through a defined functionality so that risk is reduced. 
(Rauhamäki & Kuikka 2015) 
ISOLATE HAZARD 
A hazardous element needs to remain in the system and with the current exposure 
profile, the related risk is intolerable. Therefore, isolate the hazard by physically 
isolating the hazardous element from the environment and people. (Rauhamäki & 
Kuikka 2014) 
E/E/PE SAFETY 
SYSTEM 
An active protective measure of relatively complex functionality needs to be 
implemented. Therefore, use an electric, electronic or programmable electronic 
(E/E/PE) safety system to implement the protective measure functionality. (Rauhamäki 
& Kuikka 2014) 
INTERRUPTED 
HAZARDOUS 
ACTION 
A user operated system element may enter hazardous operating range due to an 
operator initiated actions without the operator noticing this. Therefore, Interrupt the 
hazardous system operation before the hazardous operation range is reached and 
force the operator to acknowledge this. 
INTERRUPTIBLE 
HAZARDOUS ZONE 
The hazardous zone or element needs to be easily accessible but hazardous 
conditions within the zone may exist in defined situations. Therefore, Implement an 
interlocking guard over the hazardous element or zone. 
LOCKED 
HAZARDOUS ZONE 
A hazardous zone or element needs to be easily accessible but hazardous conditions 
within the zone may exist in defined situations. Therefore, Implement a locking guard 
to cover the hazardous element or zone. 
 
2.2 Terminology 
Table 2 provides definitions for some of the terms used on the paper. Especially, the patterns refer to 
various types of guards used as protective measures and these are defined according to (EN ISO 
12100:2010). 
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Table 2: Definition for some of the terms used on the paper. 
Term Definition as given in (EN ISO 12100:2010) 
Guard 
“Physical barrier, designed as part of the machine to provide protection” and 
“Depending on its construction, a guard may be described as, for example, casing, 
shield, cover, screen, door, enclosing guard.” 
Fixed guard 
“Guard affixed in such a manner (for example, by screws, nuts, welding) that it can 
only be opened or removed by the use of tools or by destruction of the affixing means” 
Interlocking guard 
“Guard associated with an interlocking device so that, together with the control system 
of the machine, the following functions are performed: 
⎯  the hazardous machine functions “covered” by the guard cannot operate until 
the guard is closed, 
⎯ if the guard is opened while hazardous machine functions are operating, a stop 
command is given, and 
⎯ when the guard is closed, the hazardous machine functions “covered” by the 
guard can operate (the closure of the guard does not by itself start the 
hazardous machine functions)” 
Interlocking guard 
with guard locking 
/ locking guard 
 
“Guard associated with an interlocking device and a guard locking device so that, 
together with the control system of the machine, the following functions are performed: 
⎯ the hazardous machine functions “covered” by the guard cannot operate until 
the guard is closed and locked, 
⎯ the guard remains closed and locked until the risk due to the hazardous 
machine functions “covered” by the guard has disappeared, and 
⎯ when the guard is closed and locked, the hazardous machine functions 
“covered” by the guard can operate (the closure and locking of the guard do 
not by themselves start the hazardous machine functions)” 
3. INTERRUPTED HAZARDOUS ACTION 
3.1 Intent 
The system interrupts actions leading to hazardous operating range and the user needs to take a 
deliberate action to take the system into a hazardous operating range such as releasing a water tap lock 
for the hot water side. 
3.2 Context 
A human operator operates a system, system part, functionality or parameter directly through a control 
interface. For example, the operator drives a mobile machine or a boom attached to it, operates the 
movement of a hydraulic press, or adjusts the number of revolutions per minute of a turning lathe. The 
operation is actuated through a control interface provided, such as a joystick, switch, button, keyboard, or 
slide. The operated entity introduces a hazard, such as a shear, impact, stability, or noise hazard. The 
hazard is present only in a defined operating range or states where the operator can control the system. 
The harm may occur for a person, the operated machine itself or surrounding machines, structures etc. 
3.3 Problem 
A user operated system element may enter hazardous operating range due to an operator initiated actions 
without the operator noticing this. 
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3.4 Forces 
 The hazardous element cannot be eliminated from the system due to operational reasons. For 
instance, a shearing machine needs to be able to shear regardless the fact that it may also shear 
fingers and hot water needs to be available in household tap regardless the fact that hot water can 
cause a burn. 
 In many cases, a human controller could be able to notice whether or not it is safe to proceed to the 
hazardous operating region. However, human senses are limited so that the safe operating region 
might be hard to detect reliably, such as detecting safe audio volume levels by ear. An operator may 
get bored, distracted, or make mistakes when the time to check the condition to proceed to the 
hazardous region should be made. For instance, when executing repetitive work one loses focus on 
the task and fails to check where the co-worker’s fingers are located. 
 The risk could be potentially mitigated by adjusting the overall operation of the system so that the 
hazardous conditions are avoided. However, this would potentially hinder the system capabilities, 
performance etc. For example, the maximum temperature of circulating hot water could be lowered, 
but this would also introduce a strict limit for the maximum temperature for the water one could take 
from the tap. 
 The operated system could provide the operator with a non-interrupting notification of the hazard or 
hazardous situation. However, this does not require actions or conscious operation from the operator. 
The notification may go unnoticed due to many reasons such as boredom, distraction, or notification 
element malfunction. 
 Using a control system to observe the hazardous element and related properties of the system, the 
hazardous action could be prevented by the means of the control system. However, in many 
situations it might be relatively hard to detect if the operation, that is, driving the considered element 
into hazardous operating range, could cause harm. For instance, detecting if a person is under a 
descending work platform in open environment or what is the maximum angular acceleration rating of 
a disc of an angular grinder is not easily observable by a control system. 
3.5 Solution 
Interrupt the hazardous system operation before the hazardous operating region is reached and force the 
operator to acknowledge this. That is, the operator (or any other instance) should not be able to drive or 
control the system into the hazardous operating region accidentally and unnoticed. In practice, implement 
an extra functionality for the operator to drive the system into a potentially dangerous operation region. The 
functionality interrupts the potentially hazardous actions, movements, events, processes, etc. initiated or 
controlled by the operator, until the operator has, in some way, confirmed that she is conscious about the 
operation and wants to continue the hazardous action. 
Figure 2 illustrates state behaviour of an interrupted hazardous action principle from the interrupting 
function point of view. Initially, the system is typically in the safe operation region. In this region, user can 
freely control and drive the system. When the interrupt functionality observers the system is driven on the 
edge of hazardous operation region, the functionality interrupts the system operation and takes the Waiting 
for user acknowledgement state. Typically, in such case, the proceeding towards the hazardous operation 
region is stopped, regardless the state of the control devices. To proceed to the hazardous operation 
region, the user needs to confirm the operation. Often times this is achieved by re-affecting the controls. 
For example, a joystick or a footswitch needs to be released to the neutral position and end re-engaged to 
continue the hazardous operation. 
Returning from the hazardous operation region can be typically done without an interruption. However, 
the decision is case specific and one needs to consider the hazard and risk assessment to make the final 
conclusion regarding the need for interruption when returning to the safe operation region. 
In the best case, the interrupt forces the operator to check if it is safe to proceed the action. This is 
especially important if the system is operated by multiple people at the same time, but only one person 
actually provides the operating commands or for the system. For instance, some shearing machines are 
operated by two people. Both people lift and handle the material to be sheared but only one is operating 
the machine. If this cannot be achieved, it is still better to catch the operator’s attention and force her make 
the decision consciously. 
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Fig. 2. State machine behaviour of interruptible hazardous action without interrupt on return from the hazardous operating region 
3.6 Consequences 
+ Operator is aware that the system has been driven to a hazardous range as the system requires the 
operator to perform a defined action before letting the hazardous action to continue.  
+ It is harder to drive the system into the hazardous region accidentally, e.g. by an unconscious 
operator or an unintentional effect on system controls. The effectiveness of this depends on the 
implementation of the interrupt and the way it is acknowledged. For instance, if a joystick type control 
needs to be released in the centre position before the action can be continued, it is relatively unlikely 
that a fainted person or a fallen object could drive the system past the interrupt. 
+ The possibility of a co-worker or an outsider to avoid the harms increases. It takes some time to 
perform the required action when an interrupt occurs. Depending on the case this may take some 
tenths of a second to a couple of seconds. Such time, even relatively short, provides the co-operator 
(and others) time to react on the hazardous situation before the harm occurs. 
+ The interrupting functionality serves also as a form of a dead man’s switch. The hazardous action 
cannot be achieved by jamming a control into a certain position and waiting the system to enter the 
hazardous operating region. 
+ The operator may control the system freely within the non-hazardous area, range, and states. 
+ The information regarding the acknowledgement of entering a hazardous zone is available and can 
be logged and used to e.g. monitor system usage and user characteristics. 
− The interrupting function might get annoying if it interrupts workflow continuously (and in some cases 
it will), which might cause the function being bypassed. The potential for bypassing should be 
assessed in terms of risk. If the risk for bypassing is found intolerable through its likeliness or 
consequences, countermeasures need to be applied to prevent or complicate the successful 
implementation of a bypass
1
. 
− If the interrupting function is encountered continuously during the system operation, the effect of 
raising awareness of the operator may degrade and bypassing the interrupt becomes part of the work 
routine. 
− The interruption functionality may add stress to the system. For example, in a case where the 
interrupt introduces a fast stop of moving parts of fluids, the pressure impacts in pneumatic and 
hydraulic systems and mechanical joints add stress on the corresponding parts. 
− Not all the hazards or access to the hazardous zone are easily detectable. This may cause either 
unsuitability of the solution or expensive sensors to detect the situation of interest. 
                                            
1
 The actu a l design  and implementa t ion  of the countermeasures for  bypassing are ou t  of scope of the 
paper . 
Academic Version for Teaching Only
Commercial Development is strictly Prohibited
Interrupted hazardous action Interrupted hazardous actionstate machine [   ]
Halt hazardous actionentry / 
Wait control re-eng ag ementdo / 
Action interrupt Hazardous operating 
region
Safe operating 
region
when (Hazardous operating  reg ion is exited)
when (The edg e of the hazardous operation reg ion is reached)
when (User re-engageds the contols towards the hazardous operating reg ion)
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3.7 Known use 
A bending machine operated by one or two people employs hazardous action interruption functionality 
considering the upper jaw control (see Figure 3). When the jaw is lowered above approximately one inch 
above the lower jaw, the upper jaw is stopped by the control or safety system. In this case, the stop of the 
upper jaw movement is the interruption of the hazardous action. To proceed to the hazardous operating 
region (jaws closed), the operator needs to release the jaw control switch and re-engage it. In this case the 
function (most likely) protects the operators’ fingers, as the fingers need to be located in some cases very 
near the jaws of the machine and there is no guard or protective measure to mitigate the risk. 
 
Fig. 3. Illustration of the upper jaw operating regions of in a bending machine application. (© Jari Rauhamäki) 
An articulated jack passenger hoist stops at a defined height when it is lowered. The purpose of this is 
to provide the people below the platform the possibility to escape. Again, the operator needs to release the 
control switch to neutral and re-engage it to lower the platform into the final low state. 
A boom type passage hoist stops as it approaches the range limits. After the stop the boom may still 
extend further, but typically its movement speed is lowered. 
Samsung Galaxy S5 smartphone (and potentially other similar devices) notifies the user when sound 
volume is raised above a threshold level. The purpose is to protect and warn the user from high volume 
levels. User needs to release the volume increase button and press it again to raise the volume above the 
threshold level. The threshold is predefined and is possibly valid only for the original packed earphones. 
In an operating system environment, a user with normal privileges is asked to elevate the privileges by 
either confirming a prompt or providing a password for elevated privileges account. The former case 
resembles the described solution whereas the latter alternative resembles a more enhanced/enforced 
version of the solution, as special information is required to enable the potentially hazardous operation. In 
the elevated privilege mode (potentially) hazardous operations, such as installing and uninstalling software 
or changing system configuration, can be typically done. For instance, Windows 7 (run as administrator), 
Linux, and Mac OS X (sudo) operating systems resemble the approach to elevating the privileges by 
requiring user action. 
3.8 Related patterns 
The pattern implements an ACTIVE PROTECTIVE MEASURE, that affects the system operation to prevent harm 
from occurring. In this case, the functionality is to stop the system before entering the hazardous operation 
region. 
Upper jaw safe operat ing 
region (consider ing finger 
crushing) 
Upper jaw hazardous operat ing 
region 
Interrupt  locat ion 
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4. INTERRUPTIBLE HAZARDOUS ZONE 
4.1 Intent 
A system is taken into a safe state by means of control whenever user is able to access a hazard (source).  
For example, the microwave radiator is shut down whenever the door of the microwave oven is opened. 
4.2 Context 
There is a hazardous zone introduced a by the system under consideration, which requires frequent 
access by operators. This may be due to, for example, maintenance, operational or other reasons, such as 
lubrication, replacement worn parts, adjustment, changing tool bit or a workpiece or blockage removal 
need to be executed periodically within the hazardous zone. 
The hazardous conditions within the hazardous zone can be removed relatively fast by means of 
controlling the system in relation to the time required to reach or get exposed to the hazard after accessing 
the hazardous area. That is, the control system is able to drive the system in such a state that the 
hazardous conditions are removed relatively fast. For instance, moving parts of a machine are stopped in 
order to prevent crushing, shearing, or impact hazards from occurring. 
4.3 Problem 
A hazardous zone or element need to be easily accessible but hazardous conditions within the zone may 
exist when the zone is accessed. 
4.4 Forces 
 The hazardous zone needs to be relatively easily accessible. Thus, a fixed guard is not an option as it 
instead of promoting, hinders the accessibility. Usage of a fixed guard to isolate location, which needs 
to be frequently accessed, leads more likely to complete the removal or modification of the guard, the 
machine, or the system to enable the access. This again conflicts with the original purpose of the 
guard. 
 The system could control the access to the hazardous zone by locking it out whenever the hazardous 
conditions exist. However, people tend to prefer the situation that they are in charge of operation and 
free to interrupt the system when it suits them best.  
 The more freely a user or an operator can access the hazardous zone (so that hazardous conditions 
are removed beforehand), potentially the more efficiently the user can carry out her tasks. Depending 
on the case, a system adapting to users work routine and phase can save a lot of time. The value of 
this time may overcome the additional investment into a machine build to adapt the user operation. 
4.5 Solution 
Implement an interlocking functionality to protect users from the hazardous element or zone. The 
interlocking functionality drives the system (or part of it) in a safe state, so that the hazardous conditions 
are eliminated within the zone. In practice, the interlocking functionality observes for access to the 
hazardous zone and controls the system in order to remove the hazardous conditions before harm occurs. 
In many cases, the interlocking functionality is implemented through an interlocking guard. The guard is 
connected with a safety function to take the system or hazardous element under the guard into a safe state 
whenever the guard is opened or removed to access the hazardous zone (see Figure 4). This approach 
utilizes the ISOLATE HAZARD approach complemented by an opening guard to prevent access to the hazard 
when the guard is closed. When the guard is closed, it should prevent people, body parts and other non-
wanted object for accessing the hazard zone. Whenever the guard is opened, the hazardous conditions 
are eliminated within the hazardous zone. One needs to ensure and/or take into account in guard design 
that the system needs certain amount of time to be taken into the safe state before one is able to access 
the hazard after opening the guard. 
Further, add a mechanism to detect if the guard is closed or not, that is, if the guard prevents the 
access to the hazard or not. Connect the information on the guard state to control system or safety 
function. Whenever the guard is removed or opened, the safety function ensures that the hazardous 
conditions are removed or minimized. In practice, moving parts are stopped, and/or radiation, noise, etc. 
are removed or lowered to a tolerable level. In addition the system needs to retain this state until the guard 
is closed in place and valid start command is given (to prevent unexpected start-up). 
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In general, as mentioned previously, it is not necessary to isolate the hazardous zone mechanically. 
This, however, requires that there is no need or reason for the mechanical isolation of the hazardous zone 
or system part. In this case monitoring the hazardous zone should suffice. Monitoring can be established 
using non-contacting sensors such as light curtains. If potential for projecting shrapnel, load, sparkles, etc. 
exist, due to the hazard, mechanical isolation is required.  
4.6 Consequences 
+ The hazardous zone can be accessed free through path or access way dedicated to this. Whenever 
the hazardous zone is accessed the system eliminates the hazardous conditions within the 
hazardous zone before they can cause harm. 
+ The system adapts to the operations and workflow of the user/operator. The machine obeys and 
follows the user and diminish the hazardous conditions automatically without requiring user actions 
other than accessing the hazardous zone (using a valid access or path way). 
+ As the system adapts to user actions and protects her from harm, the user can potentially operate 
more optimally and save time and other resources. 
+ No need for a fixed guard that might degrade quality attributes, such as the performance, capacity, or 
usability of the system. 
− The system introducing the hazard needs to be designed to be interruptible and to remove the 
hazardous conditions before they can be reached. This may induce requirements on components, 
mechanics, maximum speeds etc.  
− Typically the approach requires a greater distance between the isolating boundary and the hazard 
compared with the LOCKED HAZARDOUS ZONE approach. The distance needs to make sure the hazard 
cannot be accessed before hazardous conditions are eliminated. Thus, the shorter the distance, the 
shorter the time in which the hazardous conditions need to be eliminated and vice versa. 
− The system needs to tolerate the stress related to removing the hazardous conditions, such as 
stopping moving parts or shutting down radiating components.  
− If the stress on the system during the hazardous condition removal process needs to be decreased, 
the distance from the hazard to the isolating cover or monitoring line needs to be increased. For 
instance, if one second stopping equals one meter distance between the isolating guard and hazard, 
two seconds stopping time would require, for example, two and (a half meter) distance. 
− An active protective measure needs to be developed. Minimally this requires a sensor to observe if 
the hazardous zone is, is to be, or can be accessed, logic to implement needed control activities to 
eliminate the hazardous conditions and actuating element to eliminate the hazardous conditions when 
 
Fig. 4. Illustration of the operation of an interlocking guard operation (with ISOLATE HAZARD approach). Reproduced from (Kivistö-
Rahnasto 2015) 
Hazardous conditions exist 
within the isolated system 
and the guard is closed. 
The guard is opened and 
the control system observes 
this. The system initiates the 
elimination of hazardous 
conditions. 
The hazardous conditions are 
removed before the 
hazardous element can be 
accessed. The protected 
zone is safe to access. 
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needed. These fulfil the observability, model and action conditions as defined by (Leveson 2012) to 
enable the control of the system. Depending on available components and required functionality this 
may be burdensome and expensive. In some cases, a simple access hull operated relay switch might 
suffice, but in other cases software based functionality could be required. 
− More complex logic as potentially multiple sensors needs to be observed. 
− The users may develop a complete dependency on the protective functionality and lose their own 
judgement about the situation.  
4.7 Example 
Consider a rotating power transmission shaft, which needs frequent maintenance. Thus, the shaft should 
be easily accessible. The shaft is not completely located inside the machine body, where it would not 
cause harm, but it would also be hard to access frequently. The shaft is guarded with an opening 
mechanical guard. Whenever the guard is opened, the shaft is stopped before it can be reached. 
4.8 Known use 
The solution model is found in domestic microwave ovens and dish washers. In the former case, the 
microwave radiation is halted whenever the door of the microwave oven is opened to prevent user 
exposure to microwave radiation (see Figure 5). In the latter case the operation of the dish washer is 
stopped to, primarily, protect user from exposure to hot water, and secondly, to prevent building structures 
(floors, wall, ceiling, etc.) and inferiors from exposure to water. 
 
Fig. 5.  A microwave oven can be opened freely by the user even the oven is on. The radiation is removed whenever user opens the 
door. (© Jari Rauhamäki) 
4.9 Related patterns 
An ACTIVE PROTECTIVE MEASURE (Rauhamäki & Kuikka 2014) such as E/E/PE SAFETY SYSTEM (Rauhamäki 
& Kuikka 2014) can be used to implement the mechanism to drive the system into a safe state whenever 
the guard is opened. 
The LOCKED HAZARDOUS ZONE pattern illustrates a solution to the same problem. In this case, the system 
decides when the hazardous zone can be accessed and allows the access only when hazardous 
conditions are not present. 
5. LOCKED HAZARDOUS ZONE 
5.1 Intent 
A hazardous zone is locked for access until the control system determines it is safe to access the area. For 
example, a washing machine door is locked until the end of the program. 
5.2 Context 
Hazardous zone or element has been mechanically isolated (ISOLATE HAZARD (Rauhamäki & Kuikka 2014)) 
from people, environment and other systems to mitigate the related risk due to hazardous conditions within 
the zone. The isolation is achieved using, for example, fences, enclosures, etc. Maintenance, operational 
or other tasks such as changing a tool bit or a workpiece, adjustment, blockage removal, lubrication or 
replacing worn parts need to be executed periodically within the zone. 
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5.3 Problem 
A hazardous zone or element need to be accessible but hazardous conditions within the zone may exist in 
defined situations. 
5.4 Forces 
 The hazardous conditions cannot be removed fast enough by means of controlling the system 
introducing the conditions. That is, the control system is not able to drive the system in such a state 
that the hazardous conditions are removed in a sufficiently short period of time after the guard or the 
isolation is opened. For instance, moving parts of the machine cannot be stopped to prevent 
crushing, shearing, and impact hazards from occurring. This can be due to, for example, high inertia 
combined with low deceleration capacity, which effectively prevent stopping moving a part in a 
sufficiently short period of time. Another example is extreme temperature, which might be hard to 
compensate in a short period of time into a safe level. 
 As the isolated zone needs to be accessible, a fixed guard is not an option as it instead of promoting, 
hinders the accessibility. Usage of a fixed guard to isolate location, which needs to be frequently 
accessed, leads likely to the complete removal or modification of the guard, the machine, or the 
system to allow the access. This again conflicts with the original purpose of the guard. 
 The system operation optimization outweighs the user freedom to operate and access the hazardous 
zone. The primary control of access to the hazardous zone can be given to a machine and it is 
sufficient to let user request the access. 
 The spatial requirements for the system are considerable so that the resulting system should have 
smaller dimensions instead of larger ones. Thus the distance between the hazardous element or 
zone and the isolating barrier should be as small as possible to reduce the area or the volume of the 
hazardous zone. 
5.5 Solution 
Implement a locking guard to cover the hazardous element or zone. A locking guard is a guard that is 
locked by the control system until hazardous conditions are removed from the hazardous zone so that the 
hazard cannot cause harm. The control system releases the guard lock when the hazardous conditions are 
removed and the hazardous zone can be accessed (Fig. 6). 
 The hazardous zone should already be isolated using an enclosure, a barrier, a fence, etc. To enable 
access to the hazardous zone, design an opening part such as a door, gate, or hatch in the isolation. When 
 
 
Fig. 6.  Illustration of the operation of a locking guard operation. Reproduced from (Kivistö-Rahnasto 2015) 
Hazardous conditions exist 
within the system. The guard 
is closed and locked by the 
control system. 
An access to the hazardous 
zone is requested. The control 
system eliminates hazardous 
conditions and ensures that 
safe conditions are reached. 
The control system unlocks the 
guard. The protected zone can 
be accessed. 
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closed, the isolation should prevent people, body parts and other non-wanted objects for accessing the 
hazardous zone. Note, if implemented by a guard, the guard should be primarily left attached to the 
machine when opened (Machinery directive).  
As the access to the hazard zone is prevented when hazardous conditions exist, one does not need to 
consider the time to drive the system into a safe state in terms of the considered hazardous conditions 
(still, user requirements may introduce time constraints). Due to this, there is no need to place the isolating 
cover far away from the hazard zone including the access locations and paths to the hazardous zone 
(unless other restrictions inflict this). 
Equip the opening part with a locking mechanism, which is operated by the control system. That is, not 
the user or operator of the system should be able to release the lock (excluding emergency situations). The 
operation is as follows. User requests access to the hazardous zone. The control system drives the system 
into such state that the hazard(s) cannot cause harm, that is hazardous conditions are removed. The 
control system needs to be able to determine that the hazardous conditions have been removed through a 
measurement. In practice, hazardous condition removal might include, among others stopping moving 
parts, or shutting down radiation or noise sources. In some cases, the control system may not be able to 
directly remove the hazardous conditions by means of controlling the system. For instance, there may be 
no way for the control system to actively cool hot surfaces. In such cases, the control system can only wait 
for the surfaces to cool down to safe temperature. After the hazardous conditions are removed, the control 
system opens the guard lock and it is released to open.  
The control system needs to be aware that the guard is closed, so in addition to locking mechanism, it 
needs a way to detect that the guard is closed before allowing the system to start again. In some cases, 
the locking mechanism may include a suitable sensor to identify the guard state. The start-up should be 
primarily actuated by user to prevent unexpected start-ups. 
5.6 Consequences 
+ The system part, for instance, hazardous movement, radiation, etc. does not have to be designed for 
(relatively) fast stopping. This may promote the usage of less expensive components or enable 
potentially less stress on the system due to the fast removal of the hazardous conditions. 
+ The control system can ensure the removal of hazardous conditions before allowing access to the 
hazardous zone. This adds (potential) additional layer to protect the user from accessing the 
hazardous zone before the removal of hazardous conditions. 
− The control system has to ensure the removal of hazardous conditions before allowing access to the 
hazardous zone. This indicates the following: 
− Increased amount of sensors. The control system needs sensors to ensure that hazardous conditions 
are removed and that the guard is closed before allowing hazardous conditions to reappear (typically 
to restart the system by user).  
− To be able to ensure the hazardous zone is not accessed before it is safe, a locking mechanism 
needs to be added to the isolating guard and it needs to be controllable by the control system. This 
increases cost, complexity and maintenance effort compared with a non-locking approach. 
− More complex logic as potentially multiple sensors needs to be observed. 
5.7 Known use 
Although not machines in terms of the Machinery Directive, the solution model is found in domestic 
washing machines. The washing machine door is locked in the closed position, throughout the washing 
sequence/program. When the washing drum is stopped, energy to its driver is cut off, and water removed 
from the machine, the machine control system releases the door lock (see Figure 7). Only after these 
procedures the machine lets the user open the door. 
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Fig. 7.  Illustration of washing machine access during a program. The washing machine first needs to remove the water from the drum 
and prevent the motor from driving the drum before the feed door can be opened. (© Jari Rauhamäki) 
Another device group in which the pattern is applied in some CD-, DVD-, and Blu-ray -drives using a 
tray for the disc loading. The drive does not open until the disc has stopped rotating inside the drive, that is, 
the disc comes to rest. When user requests eject, the disc is first stopped and only after that the tray 
opens. In this case the functionality primarily protects the disc itself, which could be scratched or otherwise 
damaged if lowered on the tray while spinning. 
5.8 Related patterns 
An ACTIVE PROTECTIVE MEASURE (Rauhamäki & Kuikka 2014) such as E/E/PE SAFETY SYSTEM (Rauhamäki 
& Kuikka 2014) can be used to implement the mechanism to drive the system into a safe state whenever 
the hazardous zone should be accessed. 
The INTERRUPTIBLE HAZARDOUS ZONE pattern illustrates a solution to a similar problem. In this case, the 
user is free to access the hazardous zone and the system needs to conform to this. In practice, the system 
needs to detect if the hazardous zone is accessed and act accordingly to remove the hazardous 
conditions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
When a hazard with intolerable associated risk is identified form a system, the risk needs to be 
mitigated. For this purpose hazard and risk mitigation methods need to be applied. In this paper, two 
abstract hazard and risk mitigation methods, namely active and passive protective measures, are 
introduced. This paper extends the work introduced in (Rauhamäki and Kuikka 2014). 
Active and passive protective measures may have different meaning in different domains. For 
instance, in automotive industry an active safety measure is considered as functionality, etc. that tries 
to prevent harm from occurring. Such system is for example an automatic breaking system. A passive 
safety measure is considered any measure that is reduces the severity of the consequences after or 
during the accident. Such measures include for instance airbags and safety belts.  
In context of this paper, however, we consider safety measures from the point of view of 
machinery and process systems. In these domains, a passive safety measure achieves risk reduction 
by means requiring no information on the system and/or environment state or a need to affect system 
operation by controlling it. Typical examples of such measures are guards (fixed, adjustable, or 
movable) and mechanical limits. In contrast, an active safety measure is considered achieving risk 
reduction by means of being aware of the system and/or environment state (e.g. in terms of one or 
more process variables) and affecting the state or operation of the system/environment/hazard source 
in an appropriate way. 
1.1 Pattern language 
The patterns relate to a larger collection of patterns considering safety system development. They 
position in the beginning of the collection forming the initial steps in safety system development and 
illustrate fundamental choices selecting the methods for risk reduction to achieve acceptable system 
safety. Figure 1 illustrates the patterns introduced in this paper (bold outline) alongside their closely 
related patterns (dashed outline). Table 1 provides short descriptions (patlets) of the patterns.  
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The hazard and risk mitigation methods introduced in this paper are likely known by experienced 
safety engineers and professionals. However, people with less experience in hazard and risk 
mitigation may potentially benefit from the illustration and thus form the most potential audience of the 
pattern described in this paper. 
 
Table 1 Short description of the presented and related patterns 
Pattern Patlet 
Safety risk 
Identification 
To make conscious decisions considering hazard and risk management, 
information on these aspects needs to be available. Therefore, use structured 
and/or systematic method(s) to identify the hazards and associated risks 
introduced by the system. (Rauhamäki&Kuikka 2014) 
Eliminate hazard 
You want to maximize the likelihood that a hazard introduced by a system 
cannot cause harm in any part of the system lifecycle. Therefore, eliminate the 
hazard completely by removing the component introducing the hazard from the 
system. (Rauhamäki&Kuikka 2014) 
Substitute hazard 
A hazard is wanted to be eliminated from the system. Therefore, substitute the 
hazardous element with a non-hazardous or at least less hazardous element. 
(Rauhamäki&Kuikka 2014) 
Passive protective 
measure 
The system introduces a hazardous element of intolerable risk, which cannot 
be eliminated from it. Therefore, implement a passive protective measure to 
mitigate the risk. 
Active protective 
measure 
Passive protective measures have not provided an adequate approach to 
mitigate the risk. Therefore, implement an active protective measure to 
mitigate the risk. 
E/E/PE safety 
system 
Active protective measure of relatively complex functionality needs to be 
implemented. Therefore, use an electric, electronic or programmable electronic 
(E/E/PE) safety system to implement the protective measure functionality. 
(Rauhamäki&Kuikka 2014) 
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Fig 1. The patterns and their closely related patterns modified from (Rauhamäki&Kuikka 2014) 
2 PASSIVE PROTECTIVE MEASURE 
2.1 Context 
The system under consideration introduces a hazard, which is according to risk assessment 
intolerable. The ELIMINATE HAZARD approach has been tried, but no way to eliminate the hazard has 
been identified due to, for instance, technical, system quality attributes degradation, operability, or 
cost restrictions. 
2.2 Problem 
The system introduces a hazardous element of intolerable risk, which cannot be eliminated from it. 
2.3 Forces 
 Introduction of a functional protective measure provides the system with the capability to react on, 
e.g., user and environment actions and events in terms of retaining the safety of the user. This 
opens possibilities to implement more advanced and complex protective measures, which could, 
e.g., improve the system usability, accessibility, performance, etc. However, such approach to 
mitigate the risk requires awareness, logic, and ability to affect the system. This increases the 
system complexity, cost, etc. Not all risks are worth the added complexity, cost, and design 
burden required to implement a functional protective measure. 
 An added component, part or subsystem promotes functionality, adaptability, etc. of the risk 
mitigation method. However, every added component, part, or subsystem also contributes to the 
overall safety system fault characteristics including, among others, Mean Time to Fail (MTTF). 
 Users could be protected against certain hazards applying administrative measures or personal 
protective equipment.  Such non-engineering measures are, more or less, under user, customer, 
or operator consideration and control. Therefore, such measures cannot be directly influenced or 
enforced by the designer or manufacturer of the system. However, an engineering approach to 
mitigate risk should be considered prior to a non-engineering measure such as administrative 
methods or personal protection equipment. The engineering measures are applied by the 
manufacturer/designer of the system, and consequently under their consideration and control. 
2.4 Solution 
Implement a passive protective measure to mitigate the risk. A passive protective measure is a non-
functional design solution, equipment, or system design feature that mitigates the risk related to a 
hazard. A passive protective measure does not remove or eliminate the hazard, but reduces the risk 
related to the hazard. 
The main founding principle of a passive protective measure is the restriction. In practice, the 
likelihood of realization and/or the severity of the consequences of a risk are reduced. For example, 
the likelihood of risk realization can be decreased by restricting user access to the hazardous zone or 
restricting the freedom of operation. The severity of consequences can be restricted by, for example, 
capturing hazardous material in an appropriate container in case the material leaks out from the main 
container.That is, a passive protective measure is based on (reliable) structural and/or physical 
design or structure to reduce the risk by introducing a physical restriction (or property). 
A passive protective measure does not (need to) sense or observe the state of the system, 
environment, or process variable, actively respond to such state changes or introduce functionality to 
the system to reduce risk. (Center for Chemical Process Safety 2012). There is no need for logic to be 
implemented in form of electronics, software, etc. Instead, the restrictions promoting safety and safe 
operation are built in the structure and physics of the designed solution. This promotes the reliability 
of the approach.  
A passive protective measure is typically fixed in terms of self-adjustment. The measure may be 
adjustable or configurable by a human operator in certain cases such as cutting chip stopper in a 
lathe. However, the measure is and remains unaware of itself and its state. 
2.5 Consequences 
+ The risk is mitigated by the restrictive protective measure. In the best case, a passive protective 
measure may eliminate the risk if the measure prevents either the likelihood or the consequences 
of the risk realization. Still, the extent of mitigation depends on the case.  
+ There is no logic involved in a passive protective measure that may malfunction or affect the 
system state. Because of this, there is no sensor, logic, or actuator that could fail. 
+ Potentially a lower operating cost compared with ACTIVE PROTECTIVE MEASURE due to potentially 
lower maintenance cost (Center for Chemical Process Safety 2012). 
+ The protective measure is designed and implemented by the designer and/or manufacturer of the 
system under consideration.  
− The hazard remains in the system. A passive protective measure does not remove the hazard or 
hazardous element from the system. 
− A passive protective measure needs to be scaled to and fixed for the worst case situation 
regardless of the parameters of the system or the environment. For instance, the thickness of 
fireproofing material needs to be scaled for the worst case (the highest) temperature and 
exposure time although the expected values for the temperature and exposure time would be 
lower. This may hinder other quality attributes of the system such as increase structure weight or 
cost. 
− A passive protective measure is not aware of itself, the hazard, or its environment. Thus it is 
unable to carry out self-diagnostic operations or notice if it has been defeated or removed. The 
latter case can be implemented by providing the system the ability to detect the defeat or removal 
of the measure. 
− A passive protective measure requires maintenance and inspections. The protective measure 
may wear, break, or get removed or bypassed etc., which results in the measure not mitigating 
the risk as intended (provides no or reduced mitigation). 
2.6 Example 
A passive protective measure can appear in various forms including, but not restricted to, for 
example: 
 Fireproofing: A steel beam is coated with fireproofing material to increase the structure durability 
under fire situation.  
 Fixed non-interlocking guard: A guard is positioned between an operator and a cutting blade. 
 Fence: A fence restricts access to robot working area. 
 Roll cage: a race car is equipped with a sturdy roll cage to retain the body shape in case of the 
car rolls on its roof. 
 Fixed lines: Free running hose can be accidentally located in a hazardous position e.g. on a 
passage, whereas for fixed lines need to be initially located away of such positions. 
 Leak dike: A tank containing hazardous material is located above a dike capable of containing the 
contents of the tank.   
 Incompatible connectors: To prevent misconnection of multiple lines, each line is equipped with a 
distinct connector that is only fits into the correct supply connector. In more general, this approach 
is also known as poka-yoke, which purpose is to prevent defective conditions. (Shingo and Dillon 
1989). 
The connective aspect in all the aforementioned cases is that the hazard is not removed, but it is 
mitigated by applying a passive protective measure that does not sense the state of the system or its 
environment or respond to the system. 
2.7 Known use 
Connectors used in medical appliances are moving towards incompatibility between appliances 
intended for different purposes. The EN ISO 80369-1 states: “small-bore connectors of each 
application category specified in this International Standard shall be non-interconnectable with any of 
the small-bore connectors of every other application category for risks to be acceptable, unless 
otherwise indicated”. (EN ISO 80169-1:2010 2010). That is, for example, a connector for the neuraxial 
category use shall be non-interconnectable with the enteral gastric category. 
Passive roll-over protection systems have been used widely in tractors and race cars. In practice, 
such systems are mechanically sturdy structures that restrict the vehicle crushing the passengers by 
preserving a space between ground and the vehicle body. 
A hydraulic guillotine shear has a finger guard attached in front of the blade and the moving work 
piece holders (Baykal Machine Tools 2015). The guard has two objectives. Firstly, to reduce the 
likelihood to locate any body part under the guillotine blade when the machine is operated, that is, 
prevent a body part from accessing the blade and sheet holders’ operation zone. Secondly, to reduce 
the severity of the consequences of the harm, if one manages to locate a body part in the operating 
zone of the blade or a sheet holder. One might be able to squeeze a finger under the guard, but it is 
relatively hard to squeeze a hand or an arm under the guard. 
2.8 Related patterns 
The ACTIVE PROTECTIVE MEASURE strategy describes a solution to a similar problem with a different 
approach. An ACTIVE PROTECTIVE MEASURE is functional and thus observes and affects system 
operation to mitigate the risk. The ISOLATE HAZARD is a way to implement a PASSIVE PROTECTIVE 
MEASURE. 
3 ACTIVE PROTECTIVE MEASURE 
3.1 Context 
The system under consideration introduces a hazard, which is according to risk assessment 
intolerable. To mitigate the risk, a protective measure is being designed as the hazard could not be 
eliminated (see ELIMINATE HAZARD). Application of a PASSIVE PROTECTIVE MEASURE has not lead to 
satisfactory solution in terms of risk reduction or quality attribute degradation. That is, risk is not 
mitigated enough, a passive solution would not achieve required functionality, or other quality 
attributes such as usability, maintainability, or performance of the system have degraded intolerably 
with attempts to use one or several PASSIVE PROTECTIVE MEASURES. 
3.2 Problem 
Passive protective measures have not provided an adequate approach to mitigate the risk.  
3.3 Forces 
 A PASSIVE PROTECTIVE MEASURE is typically a simple approach to mitigate a risk. However, its lacks 
the ability to introduce any functionality in terms of retaining safety. This may hinder the usability, 
operability and their related performance of the system under consideration. For example, 
isolating barriers and fences automatically restrict the access to the hazard or hazardous zone 
(which is their purpose), but in some cases such restriction could hinder the system usability. 
Thus, an approach to allow increased freedom in system operation and functionality is sought 
after.  
 In some cases it is sufficient to mitigate the likelihood and consequences of a risk realization in a 
restrictive manner. Making the protective measure unaware of itself, the hazard, and the 
environment promotes the simplicity of the measure. However, in such case the measure needs 
to be scaled for the worst case situation. Still, depending on the case, the state of the system 
does not always require the full restriction. In identified cases, a protective measure may use a 
relaxed restriction or operation compared with the worst case situation. Nevertheless, the 
protective measure must be prepared for the worst case, but it doesn’t need to be fixed, if the 
measure adjusts its operation according to the state of the system. 
 Users could be protected against certain hazards by applying administrative measures or 
personal protective equipment.  Such non-engineering measures are more or less under the user, 
customer, or operator consideration and control and cannot be directly influenced or enforced by 
the designer or manufacturer of the system. However, an engineering approach to mitigate risk 
should be considered prior to a non-engineering measure such as administrative methods or 
personal protection equipment. The engineering measures are applied by the 
manufacturer/designer of the system, and therefore are under their consideration and control. 
3.4 Solution 
Implement an active protective measure to mitigate the risk. Instead of eliminating the hazard or using 
passive protective measures, implement a protective functionality that recognizes the hazardous 
situation and alters the system functionality to retain the safety of people. In case a hazardous 
situation occurs or is developing, an active protective alters or controls the system operation so that 
the hazardous situation is halted or its realization is prevented (or its consequences are reduced). 
An example of the former case is a residual current device. The purpose of such device is to break 
an electric circuit if the input and output currents measured by the device deviate from each other 
more than a specified limit. Such situation occurs, for instance, when part of current flows through a 
person to ground. Another example of such case is a stop function that halts a moving machine if a 
person (or an object) passes through a light-curtain.  
An active protective measure is (and needs to be) able to observe or monitor the state of the 
system under control and affect the operation of the system through control to mitigate the exposure 
to or the consequences of realization of a hazard. The measure is, however, limited by the abilities it 
is given. An active protective measure can only:  
1) Observe and quantify phenomena for which information is provided to the measure either 
through sensors or data input from other systems. 
2) Reason within the logic implemented in it. 
3) Affect the system by the means provided to the measure either through the direct control of 
the actuators or otherwise affecting the system state, for example, by setting the control set 
point of the system or affecting the system structure. 
That being said, an active protective measure is not omnipotent, but its abilities can be extended 
beyond the capabilities of a PASSIVE PROTECTIVE MEASURE. An active protective measure may be, e.g., 
able to run and communicate self-diagnostic data, adjust its operation according to environment, such 
as allow higher speed or larger area of operation. In addition, an active protective measure may be 
able to detect if it is potentially defeated somehow. 
3.5 Consequences 
+ The risk is mitigated by the protective measure. In the best case, an active protective measure 
may eliminate the risk if the measure prevents either likelihood or the consequences of risk 
realization. Still, the extent of mitigation depends on the case. 
+ The protective measure can observe the state of the system and its environment and act 
accordingly. This provides the measure the ability to adjust its operation according to the state of 
the system and its environment. Thus, the measure does not have to be continuously scaled for 
the worst case situation. For instance, an elevating work platform can have larger load when the 
cage is sufficiently near the body, and the overweight protection can take this into account if it 
operates as an active measure. 
+ The protective measure does not have to restrict system operation continuously and all situations. 
Instead, it can allow different operation in different operation points. For instance, a rate of flow in 
a pipeline can be allowed freely under certain conditions and restricted under other conditions. 
+ The protective measure is designed and implemented by the designer and/or manufacturer of the 
system under consideration. This provides the designer with the capability and control over the 
protective measure and it is not so much under the influence of the user or user organization. 
+ If an active protective measure is aware of itself, the system or the environment to some extent, it 
may have the ability to identify failures or attempts to defeat the measure.  
− The hazard remains in the system. An active protective measure does not remove the original 
hazard or hazardous element from the system.  
− An active protective measure has a potentially higher operating cost compared with PASSIVE 
PROTECTIVE MEASURE due to a potentially higher maintenance cost (Center for Chemical Process 
Safety 2012). For instance, the logic, sensors, and actuators need to be potentially tested and 
changed periodically to be retained operational. 
− There is some sort of measurement, logic (or functionality), and actuation associated with the 
protective measure. Designing and implementing such logic is (typically) more complex than 
designing and implementing a passive protective measure. Each of these elements needs to be 
functional in order to achieve the protective functionality. 
3.6 Example 
An active protective measure can appear in various forms including, but not restricted to, for example: 
 Seat belt: A mechanism observes the speed/acceleration of the belt going through the 
mechanism. In case the belt speed/acceleration exceeds the specified limit, the belt feed 
mechanism locks down and prevents further movement of the belt. 
 Robot working area protection: A working area of a robot is isolated (ISOLATE HAZARD) with a 
fence. The fence door activates a safety function that stops or slows down the robot when the 
door is opened (which would allow a person to enter the hazardous zone). 
 Process variable control: The temperature of a process vessel is monitored using a temperature 
sensor. If the temperature crosses a specified limit, an active protective measure cuts off the heat 
source of the vessel, applies cooling, or other counter measure to prevent further temperature 
increase. 
3.7 Known use 
Electricity driven hydraulic guillotine shear has a fixed finger guard attached in front of blade and plate 
holders (Baykal Machine Tools 2015). Part of the guard can be opened by the machine operator. 
Whenever the guard is lifted, the machine motion, including the blade, sheet holders and rear 
supports are halted. The machine also employs a light curtain monitored area behind the machine to 
detect a person or object entering the hazardous area and to trigger similar halt function as described 
previously. 
In machinery and process system perspective, seat belts implement an active protective measure. 
A seatbelt mechanism observes the acceleration of the belt and locks down in case acceleration 
beyond a specified limit occurs. This prevents the belt from loosening in case of an impact (which 
causes the high acceleration of the belt). 
Rupture disks and fuses are extremely simple active protective measures. They observe a process 
variable, pressure and current respectively and alter system operation opening line and breaking a 
circuit respectively. Rupture disks cannot typically recover once ruptured and needs to be replaced. If 
similar functionality and recovery ability is required, pressure relief valves could be considered. 
However, the applications of the two options are typically distinct. 
3.8 Related patterns 
An E/E/PE SAFETY SYSTEM is a form of ACTIVE PROTECTIVE MEASURE. In an E/E/PE SAFETY SYSTEM the 
logic implementing the protective functionality is implemented using an electric, electronic, 
programmable electronic approach. This provides potential for relatively complex logic, especially 
when programmable electronics are considered. 
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Although the automatic operations of machines, processes, and systems have increased, human operators are still typically required
to operate or monitor the system or operate in proximity of the considered process or system. As people operate the systems and in
their proximity, they have a role in the overall safety system operation. Automated safety systems, which primarily ensure a safe
operation of the system under control, have properties that humans are not capable of, but they are not perfect either. In this paper,
two patterns for sharing the responsibilities between automated safety systems and human operators are presented. The strengths of
automated safety systems and human operators are combined so that the weaknesses of the other can be overcome.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Processes, machines and other systems rarely operate completely autonomously though control of these
kinds of systems is typically automated. Instead, human operators are typically required to operate,
monitor, and maintain the systems. As people operate the systems and work in their proximity, they have a
role in keeping the system in safe operating region. In this paper, a safety system refers to an automated
system of which purpose is to decrease risk related to a hazard. An example of such safety system is a
system for stopping a cutting machine if human body part is potentially detected in the blade work area.
Typically, in modern systems, these kinds of safety systems are implemented using an E/E/PE
(Electric/Electronic/Programmable Electronic) approach.
At least two roles for humans in context of safety system operation can be identified. Primarily, humans
are the objects that are protected from the hazards introduced by the system. In this role, humans are
somewhat erratic and one should expect that humans will put themselves in danger at some point
deliberately or subconsciously. Thus, there needs to be a safety system to mitigate the risk. Secondly,
humans operate and monitor the system. Because of this, they are a part of the system functionality and
control. Thus, the operators have a role in the protection of others as the operators are in control of the
system.
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As humans and automated system both can influence safety, how should one share the responsibilities
between them? Humans and automated systems have their strengths and weaknesses considering their
operation as a part of a safety system (Figure 1). Generalizing this line of thought to some extent, the
strengths of one are the weaknesses of the other. For instance, humans are able to sense the environment
and the system broadly whereas E/E/PE systems typically have more limited capabilities in this aspect.
However, in some cases, especially inside a machine, device or system, humans cannot operate. Thus,
observing such locations need to be left for machines. On the other hand, E/E/PE systems are tireless and
have deterministic reactions, whereas human properties do not similarly prosper on this aspect. In addition
they can be placed to observe locations humans cannot tolerate. This setup gives both actors a different
role in context of safety system operation.
In this paper two patterns considering the role of human in context of safety system operation are
presented. The patterns are targeted for designers with no or restricted experience in safety system
design. The patterns discussed and referred to in this paper are shortly introduced on Table 1.
Table 1: Short descriptions of the patterns mentioned in this paper
Pattern Patlet
AUTOMATED SAFETY
SYSTEM
Humans are slow and unreliable decision makers and cannot deterministically react
on random events. Therefore, Avoid humans as a part of the safety system
functionality.
MANUAL SAFETY
ABILITY
E/E/PE safety systems have limited possibilities to observe and interact with their
environment and system. Therefore, provide the human operators with the ability to
manually drive the system into a safe state.
2. AUTOMATED SAFETY SYSTEM
Context
A system under development introduces a hazard related to the operation of the machine. The system is
operated or monitored by human who is able to obtain required amount of information to justifiably activate
a safety function. To mitigate the hazard there is a need for constant awareness and deterministic actions
to achieve the objective of hazard mitigation. However, humans are unreliable decision makers and
observers and cannot deterministically react on random events to execute a desired response.
Problem
The safety function needs to be implemented with a system that is capable of deterministic reaction. That
is, the actuation of the safety function must happen deterministically in a specific time window.
Forces
· Humans have relatively long reaction time compared with electronic systems. Human reaction time is
about 140-160 milliseconds for auditory stimulus and 180-200 milliseconds for visual stimulus (Kosinski
2013) whereas automated system can react in microsecond time scale (consider for example
Figure 1: Human and machine elements in safety function context
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microcontroller). In many cases human reaction time to actuate a safety function would be sufficient,
but there are exceptions. For instance, shutting down a radiation source in case of radiation shield
removal may require faster reaction time than human is capable of.
· Humans get bored executing repetitive (e.g. process value monitoring) task, are fallible and distractible,
which may lead to ignoring or missing a critical event. As a consequence human reaction is not
deterministic. For instance, human may be distracted by chatting with another person, they could
sneeze on a critical moment or in a quick decision making situation they may misinterpret the state of
the system and make wrong decision. Thus, typically human can react in one second, but in some
cases the time may be several seconds, which in some cases is already insufficient reaction time.
Typically, this is a more severe problem than the difference between absolute reaction time of human
and automated system.
· Humans may not be able to resolve a meaningful safety function outcome under a stress of strict time
limits. That is, in addition the reaction itself is not deterministic. For instance, if there are two seconds
to react on an event and select correct reaction, human needs to interpret the input, resolve the
situation and act correctly under a strict time limit. This may increase likelihood of selecting wrong
action or missing the time limit.
· For humans it is hard to quantify an absolute value for magnitude that is, for example, used to
determine whether a safety function should be activated or not. It is easier for humans to determine if a
pressure or temperature is higher or lower than a reference, but very hard to determine what the
absolute pressure or temperature value is.
· For humans it is hard to sense magnitudes or the state of events inside the system due to the
observed location is unreachable (the system is enclosed as it is typically) or the magnitude to be
determined is dangerous (high pressure, voltage or temperature, toxic substances or no air to breath,
for example).
Solution
Implement the safety function applying an automated system approach and avoid humans as a primary
part of this functionality. Human involvement should not be required (or at least required human
involvement should be minimized) for a successful outcome of the objective of a safety system. Human
factors are involved in most process industry incidents (Broadripp, 2012).
Let an automated safety system implement all the necessary elements of safety function
implementation. This can be achieved, for instance, by electric, electronic or programmable electronic
(E/E/PE) system. Other possibilities are, for example, hydraulic, pneumatic, and mechanical systems.
However, often the latter are, or can be, controlled with an E/E/PE system. In context of automated safety
systems, observing the system state, the processing according to safety function (logic), and actuation
should be machine controlled to reduce the required human involvement. The target is to provide the
automated safety system all the information (from sensing elements), ability to interpret this information (by
safety functions), and means to control the system (through the actuators) to meet the safety function
goals.
Though human operators should not primarily be part of safety system functionality as a basis, human
operators should be provided with information about hazardous conditions and means to react accordingly.
Automated safety system
Machine logic
Human logic
Sensor device
Human senses
Actuator device
Human action
System under
control
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There are situations, such as safety system failures or bypasses, where a human operator may be able to
prevent or mitigate the consequences of a hazard realization (see) if they are just aware of the situation
and able to affect the system accordingly. However, primarily the safety system should be as independent
of human operators as possible and integrating humans as a functional part of a safety system should be
considered as a supplementary approach.
Consequences
+ Automated safety system takes care of deterministic (including sufficiently fast) response in order to
implement the safety function(s).
+ Actions of human operators required in operation of the safety system are minimized. That is,
operators are liberated to observe the general view instead of focusing on specific safety function
tasks.
+ Hardware and software are used to do what they do best, that is, routinely and deterministically monitor
the system and actuate safety function if required.
− A dedicated safety system needs to be designed, build and maintained though an operator is
nevertheless required to operate or monitor the system. This increases the cost of the system in terms
of development, instrumentation, construction, use, and maintenance.
− It is difficult, expensive and still potentially inadequate for cover all possible events and event chains
leading to harm in hazard and risk identification. Even though this could be achieved, covering all
possible hazards with an automated system could prove impracticable.
Example
Consider a process vessel (a container, tank or similar equipment designed to hold a substance - gas,
liquid, or solid material) that has potential to overheat, which would cause a serious hazard. To prevent the
overheating hazard an alarm system could be implemented so that the operator is alarmed if the
temperature rises over a specified limit in which case the operator would actuate the safety function (e.g.
disconnect heat source from the vessel or open cooling water valves from control room). In such case, a
human is involved in operation of a safety system. The operator to be alarmed could be e.g. distracted to
notice the alarm information in which case the system could overheat to a dangerous level. To circumvent
the human aspect, an independent E/E/PE safety system can be constructed to monitor the temperature of
the vessel and to actuate the safety function if the measure surpasses the specified temperature limit.
Known use
A steel cutting machine is equipped with an E/E/PE safety system that stops the cutting operation
whenever a person enters the backside of the machine. The stopping functionality is completely
autonomous from a human operator.
Another application of this principle is taken into use in automotive industry. Automatic braking systems
are used to prevent or mitigate the consequences of collisions have been implemented in recent models.
The system initially provides a warning to the driver, but in case the driver does not respond to the warning,
the system automatically decelerates the vehicle to prevent or mitigate collision consequences. (Grover et.
al. 2008).
Related patterns
The MINIMIZE HUMAN INTERVENTION pattern (Hanmer, 2007) illustrates a similar approach in fault tolerance
context suggesting implementing the error processing and recovery without human involvement to speed
up the process. The MANUAL SAFETY ABILITY pattern illustrates a way to supplement an automated safety
system with human abilities. E/E/PE SAFETY SYSTEM (Rauhamäki and Kuikka, 2014) pattern describes a
potential approach to implement an automated safety system using electric, electronic, or programmable
electronic approach.
3. MANUAL SAFETY ABILITY
Context
As a result of hazard and risk identification process, a system is identified to be able to cause damage or
harm to humans, environment, the system itself or other systems. The system is operated and/or
monitored by humans so that they can act to retain the system in a safe operating region. An E/E/PE
(Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic) system is deployed to implement a safety function to
mitigate the identified risks.
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Problem
For an E/E/PE system it is hard to react correctly or in any way in situations which it was not designed for.
E/E/PE safety systems have limited possibilities to do reasoning as well as observe and interact with their
environment and the system under control due to limited sensors, logic and actuators provided for the
safety system. Thus, the safety system may have limited capabilities to mitigate hazards related to
unidentified and unexpected hazards or in case of system or component failure of the E/E/PE safety
system.
Forces
· Hazard and risk analysis for the system under control may have omitted some of the potential hazards
and associated risks. For a large process, machine, or a system it is relatively hard to identify all
possible events and chain of events that may lead to a hazard. An automated safety system (typically)
cannot react correctly on unforeseen hazards.
· In case of a failure of an automated safety system there is a need to retain the system in a safe
operating region or transform the system into a safe state in another way.
· Safety systems have limited capabilities to sense the state of the system under control and its
environment as the safety system utilizes a limited amount of sensors. Providing an E/E/PE safety
system with broad capability to sense its environment and the hazardous system parts would be
expensive and increase complexity in terms of safety system devices and design.
· Safety systems have limited capabilities to do logical reasoning as they can only do reasoning
programmed or otherwise implemented into it. Providing an E/E/PE safety system with ability to do
human like reasoning is problematic in general and if applied in safety system context it would be hard,
expensive, and complex.
· Safety systems have limited capabilities to affect the system as they utilize a limited amount of
actuators. Providing an E/E/PE safety system with broad capability to affect the system would be,
expensive and increase complexity of the (safety) system.
· The human operators of the system potentially have a much better general view on the environment
and thus they can observe environment in ways that safety systems typically cannot. For instance, it is
relatively easy for human to detect a blowpipe flame (if one is visible), but for E/E/PE system this might
require special hardware.
· A human operator reasoning is not similarly restricted as the predefined reasoning of the logics of
E/E/PE safety systems is.
· Humans tend to feel more comfortable if they know they have some mechanism to have control over
an automated system.
Solution
Provide the human operators with the ability to manually drive the system into a safe state (see SAFE STATE
(Eloranta et. al 2014) or a safe operating region. This can be achieved for example by providing an
emergency stop button which stops any movement of the corresponding machine or system. Any kind of
automated safety measure may fail as a cause of bypassing, removal of the function, hardware or software
errors, and unexpected conditions and so on. Human operators are capable of observing machine
operation, its environment and others around the machine, do reasoning (beyond E/E/PE system logics) to
identify hazardous situations and act to prevent a hazard from realizing (though relatively slowly compared
with E/E/PE system). Thus, human operators have ability to operate beyond the safety system and, if
needed, take the system into a safe state.
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In practice, automated safety systems are hard to build to take account all possible hazards, mainly
because it is difficult to identify all the possible hazards beforehand. Instead, the safety systems target the
hazards that can be identified (and which risk needs to be mitigated). Design of practically any system
includes some assumptions such as: a wall will hold any foreseeable pressure level, piping will not leak, or
devices withstand the forces given in their specification and operate as expected. However, various
reasons may lead to situations in which such assumptions do not apply and a hazardous situation is
created. For an E/E/PE safety system it is very difficult to observe such an event for which it was not
designed for because it has no suitable sensor element, it cannot reason what to do in the situation if no
logic is provided for the task, or affect the system accordingly if there are no suitable actuators for the
purpose. A human operator still may be eligible to perceive the situation, do logical reasoning and react
accordingly.
Manual safety actuation can be implemented in various ways. The actual implementation is not as
important as to give the human the ability to bring the system into a safe state. One typical approach is
described in the known use section. Regardless of the implementation, the manual safety actuation should
not be the primary safety measure, but only to be used as last resort. That is, a human operator can drive
the system into a safe state if the primary safety system fails to do this.
Consequences
+ There is a possibility to apply the safe state or drive the system in a safe operating region by human
operators when an (E/E/PE) safety system fails to react or has no possibility react on a hazardous
situation. Thus, also hazard emerging from unexpected or unidentified events or chains of events in
context of E/E/PE safety system can be handled (at least to some extent).
+ Human strengths are efficiently used to improve safety, i.e., to prevent or reduce the consequences of
unpredictable hazards which an automated safety system is incapable to detect, reason, or handle.
That is, human operators can supplement the E/E/PE safety system operation forming a redundant
hazard mitigation resource especially considering abnormal situations.
− Additional hardware and possibly logic is required to implement the safety system. To take the system
into safe state human needs a suitable interface such as an emergency stop button or a manually
operable valve. These interfaces need to be located at least at the potential place of a hazard, but also
at other places where they are seen appropriate.
Human driven safety actions
Automated safety system
Machine logicSensor device Actuator device
System under
control
Human senses Human logic Human action
Supplement Supplement Manual control
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− Humans provide no deterministic behaviour from the safety point of view. That is, though a human
operator is able to actuate the safety function, it could happen in wrong time, wrong way or
unnecessarily. In the latter case, the system availability is hindered as the system is taken towards a
safe operation region when it is not actually necessary. For instance, an operator shuts down a
machine inadvertently.
Example
Consider a mobile machinery application that operates using a hydraulic system. Due to wear of the piping
or external reasons a breakage may appear in the piping in which case the hydraulic oil would start out of
the hydraulic system. This kind of hazard could be mitigated with an E/E/PE safety system, but in the
hazard and risk identification phase the risk related to this event was considered negligible and no E/E/PE
system was deployed to mitigate the hazard. Thus, there is no automated safety system to react on such
situation. Nevertheless, a human operator may identify the hazard and shut down the hydraulics to prevent
further leakage of oil.
Known use
A known use of manual safety actuation is the emergency stop button, which takes the system into the safe
state. Emergency stop buttons are used to take the system into a safe state when a hazardous situation is
detected by a human. Emergency stop buttons are mandatory in machinery applications according to the
Machine Directive (Machinery Directive, 2010).
Mobile elevating working platforms are equipped with manual safety actuation to drive the platform
down on the ground level in emergency situations. Such situations are, for instance, incapable (e.g.
fainted) platform operator or a movement halt of the platform due to the overload or insufficient ground
contact of a support leg of the platform. The manual actuation elements reside on ground level (on the
platform of the machine) so that they can be operated from by others.
Related patterns
The MAXIMIZE HUMAN PARTICIPATION pattern (Hanmer, 2007) illustrates a similar approach in fault tolerance
context suggesting providing system experts possibility to participate in the system operation. The DE-
ENERGIZED OVERRIDE pattern (Rauhamäki & Kuikka, 2013) describes how a safety system can override the
control system to obtain a safe state. The approach can be applied for the implementation of manual safety
ability. The SAFE STATE (Eloranta et. al 2014) pattern describes the concept of a safe state in which the
machine or system introduces minimal risk for itself, its environment and people around it. The pattern
does not take a stand on how the safe state is obtained and retained. The DE-ENERGIZED SAFE STATE
(Rauhamäki & Kuikka, 2013) pattern suggests designing a system to take a SAFE STATE when it is de-
energized. That is, if the system (or part of it) is not energized, it returns into a defined safe state.
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